Problems of Communism

MAY–JUNE 1978

CHINA

The Politics of Modernization
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Political Participation
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Caribbean Leftism
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Book Reviews
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

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Problems of Communism

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The Politics of Modernization in the PRC

By Kenneth Lieberthal

The modernizing coalition that seized power in the wake of Mao Tse-tung's death has set an extraordinary agenda for the People's Republic of China (PRC). Touting the goal of achieving the all-around modernization of China's industry, agriculture, military, and science and technology by the end of this century, the leadership has initiated a series of measures that are breathtaking in their scope and potential consequences.

Hua Kuo-feng's "Government Work Report" to the Fifth National People's Congress (NPC) that convened in Peking on February 26-March 5, 1978, touched on the major dimensions of the modernization effort.[1] These include dramatic new departures in economic, educational, and administrative policy. The program is, in brief, one that transcends the strictly industrial dimensions of the task of modernization and addresses the social and political implications of this monumental undertaking.

Effected in its entirety, the new Chinese program will produce a China that not only is more industrialized but also is more centralized, disciplined, stratified, and militarily powerful. What are the details of this gargantuan effort? Even more important, can the coalition that has launched this ambitious modernization program hold together to see it through?

The Program

Economic recovery and expansion of production are central to the program of the post-Mao leadership. Achieving these objectives is a formidable task, for problems abound. Labor productivity is very low, partly as a result of a policy of low wages and few material incentives. Some key sectors such as coal, transportation, and electric power have suffered greatly from past neglect.[2] More and more capital investment is evidently required to obtain each additional increment in agricultural output.[3] At the same time, the generals are pressing for modernization of the armed forces, workers demand higher wages, and consumers ask for more goods and better housing.[4]

Against this background, Hua Kuo-feng set an extraordinarily ambitious series of goals for the coming seven years. Agricultural output is to increase in value by 4-5 percent for each of these years[5]—

[1]All major documents from the First Session of the Fifth National People's Congress are reprinted in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: People's Republic of China* (Washington, DC—hereafter cited as *FBIS-CHI*), Mar. 16, 1978, Supplement. Hua Kuo-feng's "Report On The Work of Government" is found on pp. 3-39.

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[2]The most complete and forthcoming report from China on the country's economic difficulties is Yü Ch'iu-li's report to the Fourth Session of the Standing Committee of the Fourth National People's Congress, New China News Agency (NCNA), Oct. 24, 1977, in *FBIS-CHI*, Oct. 25, 1977 pp. E/6-12.

[3]See Robert Dernberger's contribution to R. Dernberger and A. Whiting, *China's Future*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1977, esp. pp. 134-40.

[4]On the military's desire for modernization of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) see, e.g., *Kuang-ming Jih-pao* (Peking), Jan. 20, 1977, in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 31, 1977, pp. E/1-5; Radio Peking, Jan. 20, 1977, in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 21, 1977, E/1-4; *Chieh-fang-chün Pao* (Peking), Mar. 25, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 28, 1978, pp. E/6-7. On the pressures from workers and consumers, see Yü Ch' iu-li, loc. cit.

[5]*FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 16, 1978, Supplement, p. 14.

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The petrochemical complex of Liao-yang in Manchuria, built with French assistance.

—SYGMA.

almost twice the average rate of increase since 1953.[6] Steel production will more than double, rising to 60 million tons a year.[7] The state will construct 120 major large-scale enterprises and will develop 14 "fairly strong and fairly rationally located" industrial bases by 1985.[8]

The Chinese leaders are counting on a mix of policies to work this economic magic. They plan to realize major savings through better administration—improving the planning apparatus, reducing peculation and waste, tightening cost-accounting and financing procedures, vigorously instituting a system of one-man responsibility, replacing "revolutionary committees" with more efficient management structures except at key administrative levels of government, and stressing discipline and hard work for government employees, factory management, and ordinary workers alike.[9] They will channel investment as much as possible into the priority spheres of power, fuel, raw and semifinished materials, and transport and communications. Material incentives will again entice industrial workers to greater efforts: about half of China's industrial work force received a modest pay raise last fall, and various forms of bo-

[6]Figures on the PRC's agricultural output are provided by Dernberger, loc. cit; and in the articles by Alva Lewis Erisman and Dwight Perkins in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *China: A Reassessment of the Economy*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1975, pp. 324-65. Recently revised US government estimates of China's agricultural output present a somewhat more complex picture. These show that the gross annual value of Chinese agricultural output increased an average of 5.6 percent in 1966-70, 4.2 percent in 1971-75, and 0.0 percent in 1976-77. Information from an unclassified briefing by the US Central Intelligence Agency at the US Department of Commerce, Washington, DC, on May 23, 1978. While generally higher than the 25-year average cited in the text, these figures show a declining trend in the increase in the value of agricultural output that will require enormous inputs to reverse.

[7]*FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 16, 1978, Supplement, p. 14. China's 1976 production of crude steel was 23 million metric tons. See US Central Intelligence Agency, *China: Economic Indicators*, Washington, DC, 1977, p. 1. At the same time, current steel production *capacity* (as opposed to actual production) may exceed 30 million tons a year. This figure is suggested by Hua Kuo-feng's assertion in his NPC report that production of steel had fallen below capacity an average of more than nine million tons a year in 1974-76. See *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 16, 1978, Supplement, p. 6. I am indebted to Dr. Nai-juenn Chen for calling Hua's comment to my attention.

[8]*FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 16, 1978, Supplement, p. 19.

[9]Ibid., pp. 21-22.

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nuses, piecework remuneration, and other schemes to peg income directly to output have now been sanctioned.[10] Peasants are being promised better terms of trade for their goods at the same time that they are exhorted to increase their contributions to what the Chinese call "basic capital construction"—that is, off-season efforts to reclaim wasteland, construct irrigation projects, level fields, terrace hillsides, and so forth. Increased state investment in agriculture will hasten mechanization and fund large-scale water control projects.[11] Finally, foreign trade will provide a source of advanced technology, of complete plants, of food imports (when necessary), and perhaps also of industrial management techniques.[12] Overall, this is a tough-minded, solid program.

In China's educational system, Hua and his colleagues have reintroduced examinations for admission, promotion, and graduation in higher education;[13] promised teachers more money, increased prestige, and greater authority in the classroom;[14] reestablished both basic and applied scientific research as high-priority tasks that brook little political interference;[15] and relaxed somewhat the political straitjacket that has confined academic discussion in most spheres over the past decade.[16] High-quality schools for gifted youths are again being sanctioned and are commanding special attention,[17] and academic titles have been reinstated for teachers.[18]

These measures amount to a fundamental change in the educational system, drastically curtailing or eliminating the most important "reforms" that were introduced during the Cultural Revolution. One can gain some measure of their meaning from the fact that the examinations for admission to universities held this past winter attracted nationwide press attention and some 5.7 million applicants.[19] Competition for the limited number of places proved so severe that even many of those who scored well on the examinations could not matriculate at a university.[20]

The authorities are, moreover, making an open bid for the loyalty and affection of the veteran teachers and researchers who suffered terrible hardships and persecution during the 1966-76 decade. For example, an eight-point plan for carrying out the party's policies in education adopted by the Szechwan Bureau of Higher Education demands that teachers of merit receive promotions and academic titles; obtain good housing; have some of their children exempted from the program of sending youths to the countryside, so that these children can live nearby and help them; be allowed to return to work from retirement if they wish; have their spouses assigned to work in their locale so their families need not be separated; receive special consideration in job transfers; have past allegations against them reviewed and, where appropriate, corrected; and have at least five sixths of their time kept free for their professional work, in part through their institutes' hiring enough laborers to relieve them of menial tasks. The import of the stricture on the review of past allegations is made clear by the accompanying revelation that, of the 44 teachers at the Chungking Medical College who had been under a cloud, 43 found relief upon reexamination of their cases. *Jen-min Jih-pao* has held up this Szechwan program as a national model for all locales to follow.[21]

A purged and toughened Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is heading the work in all of these spheres. The new leadership is trying hard to reinvest the party with the authority and competence that it enjoyed prior to Mao Tse-tung's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR), during which it suffered

[10] Ibid., pp. 18 and 22-23; Yü Ch'iu-li, loc. cit.

[11] *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 16, 1978, Supplement, pp. 22, 17-18.

[12] Hua paid little attention to foreign trade in his NPC Report. For what he said, see ibid., p. 20. The major programmatic document available on foreign trade is an article by Li Ch'iang in *Hung-ch'i* (Peking), No. 10, 1978, pp. 31-38, translated in *FBIS-CHI*, Oct. 26, 1977, pp. E/1-8. Li Hsien-nien told a visiting Japanese trade delegation that China is interested in importing Japan's experiences in factory management as well as in carrying on more conventional trade. See Kyodo News Service in English, Oct. 24, 1977, in *FBIS-CHI*, Oct. 26, 1977, p. A/10.

[13] See, e.g., *Jen-min Jih-pao* (Peking—hereafter *JMJP*), Oct. 26, 1977, in *FBIS-CHI*, Oct. 28, 1977, pp. E/1-2; *Kuang-ming Jih-pao*, *Oct. 21*, 1977, in *FBIS-CHI*, Oct. 28, 1977, pp. E/2-4.

[14] Based on information conveyed to me during a trip to the PRC in August 1977.

[15] See, e.g., the literature on the March 1978 National Science Conference in Peking—especially the speeches by Teng Hsiao-p'ing and Fang I in, respectively, *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 21, 1978, pp. E/4-15, and Mar. 20, 1978, pp. E/10-12 (summary).

[16] *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 16, 1978, Supplement, pp. 27-29.

[17] The list of 88 universities designated as "key" institutions of higher learning is in *JMJP*, Mar. 2, 1978, translated in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 13, 1978, pp. E/10-12.

[18] The newly reinstated titles are those of professor, associate professor, lecturer, and assistant. See NCNA, Mar. 18, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 21, 1978, pp. E/20-21.

[19] On the results of these examinations, see *Kuang-ming Jih-pao*, Mar. 7, 1978, translated in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 14, 1978, pp. E/13-15.

[20] A late admission of an additional group of students has drawn exclusively from this pool of applicants who scored well on the exams but failed to gain admission. This "second round," however, by no means exhausts the pool of students who passed the entrance exams but did not gain acceptance at a school of higher learning. See NCNA, Mar. 19, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 23, 1978, p. E/5.

[21] For the Szechwan program and the *JMJP*'s editorial endorsement of it, see *JMJP*, Mar. 12, 1978, translated in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 17, 1978, pp. E/5-8.

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

Students of the Western District of Peking take the national college entrance examination administered at the No. 150 Middle School of Peking on December 10, 1977.

—*China Pictorial* (Peking), No. 3, 1978, p. 40.

more damage than any other organ in China.[22]

Factional conflict of the 1970's had infected the internal workings of the party apparatus itself, as each group placed its followers in the bureaucratic bailiwicks of its opponents. These "plants" stole documents and leaked information so as to embarrass their enemies. Factional struggles pervaded the policy-making process, and substantive issues became inextricably tied to personal political interests and careers. Since the majority "moderate" group controlled most of the internal party communications apparatus, their "radical" opponents literally set up an illegal document distribution and reproduction system all their own and used this to circumvent normal bureaucratic channels and procedures.[23]

In addition, the public security agencies penetrated the party apparatus, intimidating and arresting party functionaries. A battle raged in both Peking and the provinces for control of this public security bureaucracy.

The post-Mao leadership has barred the public security bureaucracy from concerning itself with party affairs.[24] Moreover, those tens of thousands who suffered unjustly from these earlier transgressions are now being reinstated.[25] Party schools have been reestablished and are to play a major role in cadre training. The object is to recreate a strong, disciplined, and competent party cadre to lead the revolution.[26]

The above program provides dramatic evidence of the speed and vigor with which the moderate coalition currently in power has moved to tackle the critical problems confronting China after 10 years of succession struggles. Hammering out this program has required difficult compromises, a willingness to face tough issues, and the adroit handling of such troublesome subjects as Mao Tse-tung's radical ideological legacy, the rehabilitation of Teng Hsiao-p'ing, the purging of followers of the Gang of Four from the party without sparking their determined resistance, and the reevaluation of the T'ienanmen incident of April 1976.[27]

There are many reasons to argue that, despite differences among them, the members of the current moderate coalition will continue to work together in relative harmony to implement fully the program that they articulated over the past year and summed up at the Fifth National People's Congress. All share an

[22]Hua Kuo-feng stressed this point in his political report to the 11th Party Congress in August 1977. See NCNA, Aug. 22, 1977, in *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 1, 1977, Supplement No. 9, pp. 32-36.

[23]This is analyzed in some detail in Kenneth Lieberthal, *Central Documents and Politburo Politics in China*, Michigan Papers in Chinese Studies No. 33, Ann Arbor, MI, Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1978.

[24]The major article touching off a spate of exposés in the provinces on battles in the public security realm was *JMJP*, Nov. 28, 1977, translated in *FBIS-CHI*, Nov. 29, 1977, pp. E/1-11. See especially pp. E/4-5 for information on the public security network's penetration of the party apparatus and a prohibition against this practice in the future.

[25]More than 10,000 people have been rehabilitated over the past year in Shanghai Municipality alone. See NCNA Domestic in Chinese, Mar. 12, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 16, 1978, pp. E/2-5.

[26]See, e.g., the materials on the restoration of party schools and the inauguration of the Party School under the Central Committee in *FBIS-CHI*, Oct. 11, 1977, pp. E/1-17.

[27]This "incident" refers to the large demonstration (100,000 or so people) in T'ienanmen Square in Peking in support of Chou En-lai which led directly to Teng Hsiao-p'ing's dismissal from all his posts on Apr. 7, 1976. For relevant documentation, see *Peking Review* (hereafter *PR*), No. 15, Apr. 9, 1976, pp. 3-7. According to a well-informed source, Hua Kuo-feng formally acknowledged a "reversal of verdict" on Teng Hsiao-p'ing's culpability for the T'ienanmen incident in his report to the March 1977 Central Work Conference. See *Ming-pao* (Hong Kong), May 27, 1977, p. 1. The most recent official position on the T'ienanmen incident was expressed by Teng Ying-chao (Chou En-lai's widow) in an interview with Yugoslav journalists. See Belgrade Tanjug, Apr. 4, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 4, 1978, p. A/15.

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ardent desire to make China a strong, modern socialist country marching in the front ranks of the world by the end of this century. All perceive the Soviet Union as a dangerous military threat and believe that the PRC's security requires, among other measures, rapid development of China's industry.[28] All witnessed the rapid deterioration of the body politic in China when the leadership split during the late 1960's and early 1970's, and none could contemplate with equanimity a recurrence of the civil strife, anarchy, industrial stagnation, and demoralization of those years. Thus, elements of cohesion—if not complete unity—among the current leadership are strong, and prognoses concerning leadership stability in the future must give due weight to these forces. Nevertheless, indications of significant disagreement within the leadership, discussed below, have been so numerous and persistent as to warrant assessment of the factors that could produce a breakup of the current ruling coalition and lead to alterations in the modernization program.

Threats to the Program

The past history of the PRC suggests that neither interpersonal factional conflicts in the Politburo, devoid of a mass base, nor social tensions that beat against a unified political apparatus are sufficient in themselves to bring dramatic change in the program outlined by Hua Kuo-feng at the NPC. Both together, however, could well accomplish what neither alone could do.

There is little question that the measures under way to realize the four modernizations will engender the mass base needed for a potential attack on this program, for they strike directly at some of the core values of the Chinese revolution. An educational system based on merit, for instance, inherently favors urban over rural youths and those from cultured family backgrounds over those of less educated lineage. The rapidly shifting social base of university students under the new system has already caused reported flare-ups at Peking University between the students enrolled on the basis of examinations and other students admitted according to the more political criteria in favor until recently. The new students are castigating their predecessors as "country bumpkins."[29] Bonuses and other material incentives risk the creation of a labor aristocracy, much as occurred in the Soviet Union under Yosef Stalin.[30] Attaching priority to rapid industrialization almost certainly will increase the gap between urban and rural living standards, while vesting increased authority in the party and government administrative apparatuses tends to broaden the cleavage between leaders and led.

In brief, while Hua Kuo-feng told the NPC "only by speeding up socialist modernization. . . can we. . . gradually eliminate the distinctions between town and country, between industry and agriculture and between mental and manual labor,"[31] his statement is accurate (if at all) only over the long run. During the next decade or so, the measures he advocated to carry out the four modernizations will increase the size of what the Chinese term the "three major differences"[32] and strike at the egalitarianism that has been so central to the Chinese revolution.

A foreign presence, both physical and intellectual, will also increase in China as the four modernizations program is implemented. Importation of complete plants from abroad will bring foreign technicians along with foreign techniques.[33] Intellectually, scientific and technological knowledge developed abroad will be introduced to China on a greater scale. To earn the requisite foreign exchange, China's exports of raw materials (especially oil and coal) and of light manufactures must increase, giving the PRC a trade pattern that comes perilously close to that which characterized the Middle Kingdom in the early years of this century.

Few issues are more sensitive, however, than is China's relationship with the outside world. Any program that is based implicitly on the premises that (to use the phrases employed by the radicals before their political demise) "the moon looks better over

[28]The views of the current leaders on the Soviet question are summed up in the discussion of the perspective of the "moderates" in Kenneth Lieberthal, "The Foreign Policy Debate in Peking As Seen Through Allegorical Articles, 1973-1976," *China Quarterly* (London), September 1977, pp. 528-54. This article is based on analysis of the political debate in China carried on in articles ostensibly concerning historical subjects (such as the struggle between Confucianists and Legalists) that appeared in the media during 1973-76. For further analysis grounded in the politics of these years and updated in light of nonallegorical data from the Chinese media, see Kenneth Lieberthal, *Sino-Soviet Relations in the 1970's*, forthcoming.

[29]Hong Kong AFP, Mar. 22, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 22, 1978, p. E/10.

[30]This dimension of the Stalinist system is analyzed in Alex Inkeles, "Social Stratification and Mobility in the Soviet Union, 1940-1950," *American Sociological Review* (Washington, DC), Vol. 15, No. 4, 1950, pp. 465-79.

[31]*FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 16, 1978, Supplement, p. 9.

[32]Between town and countryside, industry and agriculture, and mental and manual labor.

[33]The best available data on the experiences of foreign technicians in China in the 1970's are contained in the three-part series in *The China Business Review* (Washington, DC), September-October and November-December 1976, and January-February 1977.

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Hua Kuo-feng, Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party and Premier of the People's Republic of China.

—SYGMA.

foreign lands" and "China can only creep along in the wake of other countries"[34] will stir up deep sentiments within the populace, especially among the youth.

In addition, key specific measures now in train violate the personal interests of important segments of the population. For instance, many young teachers who for years devoted their energies to mastering the political tasks assigned them are not well qualified to teach the new educational curricula and may find their career prospects severely diminished.[35] Youths who responded to the radicals' repeated exhortations to rebel against authority, some 17 million of whom joined the Chinese Communist Party over the past decade,[36] are now being disciplined for their past transgressions. Students who obediently went to the countryside after graduation from middle school during the early 1970's now find themselves severely disadvantaged in competing for coveted places in the revitalized higher educational system.[37] Every major policy reversal affects the interests of significant portions of the population, and the magnitude of the policy shift in the PRC following the death of Mao Tse-tung and the overthrow of the radicals assures that the degree of dissatisfaction engendered will be large, whether or not it is openly expressed.

Perhaps most fundamental, however, the current "moderate" leadership is actually proposing to drive China through a wrenching revolution—a process of forced-draft industrialization that will transform not only the face but the very substance of the society. Industrialization perhaps more than any "cultural revolution" will, as Mao Tse-tung desired, "touch men's souls," as it produces radically new perceptions about the relationships of men to their work, to their colleagues, and even to nature itself. Few processes are as penetrating or as fundamentally upsetting as is the transformation from an agrarian to an industrial economy, and the sense of malaise that it engenders among many whose former way of life is uprooted can be a politically powerful force.[38]

Will the modernizing coalition hold together in the face of these tensions and mold China into the modern, powerful state that its members envision? Age alone insures that the coalition currently in power will have undergone some important changes several years from now. The second-, third- and fourth-ranking members of the Politburo—Yeh Chien-ying, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, and Li Hsien-nien—are 80, 73, and 79

[34]As explained below, Hua revived both these phrases in his Mar. 24, 1978, address to a National Science Conference in Peking. See NCNA, Mar. 25, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 27, 1978, p. E/6.

[35]The same is true for personnel in the party apparatus, for the CCP has made clear that party cadres put in charge of scientific research institutions solely on the strength of their political qualifications must now be replaced by party cadres who also have scientific training and expertise. See Teng's address to the National Science Conference, as reported by NCNA, Mar. 21, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 21, 1978, pp. E/14-15.

[36]Nearly 50 percent of the 35 million members of the Chinese Communist Party were recruited during 1966-76, and the media treatment of them makes clear that virtually all were young. See *JMJP*, Nov. 28, 1977, translated in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 9, 1977, p. E/8.

[37]The best available analysis of this program is Thomas Bernstein, *Up To The Mountains and Down To The Villages*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1977. According to the latest published report on the extent of the program, "well over" 16 million youths have been sent to the countryside, of whom 10 million still remain there. See NCNA, Jan. 24, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 24, 1978, p. E/18. Information about the new examination system has revealed considerable sensitivity on the regime's part with regard to the obvious dissatisfaction that this policy change may cause among these "sent down" youths. See, e.g., NCNA, Oct. 20, 1977, and *JMJP* editorial, Oct. 20, 1977, both in *FBIS-CHI*, Oct. 21, 1977, pp. E/1-7.

[38]A vast literature supports the generalizations in this paragraph. See, for example, Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, Boston, Ma, Beacon Press, 1967.

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An older factory district in Shanghai.

—Vincent Mentzel.

years old respectively, and seven of the remaining 20 members of the Politburo are also over 70.[39] It is not advancing age, however, that augurs for potential political instability, but rather important political differences that divide the older generation on the Politburo from members in their 50's and 60's.

Not all political cleavages of the Politburo run along one simple line, with all the elder members on one side of disputed issues and their younger colleagues on the other. In the foreign policy realm, for example, although all current leaders fear Soviet aggression, there is disagreement as to how best to prevent a Soviet attack while China builds up her economic and military might. Hua and Yeh seem to favor a hard-line policy that nevertheless allows for occasional compromises to undercut Moscow's hawks. Teng, by contrast, argues for a consistently belligerent stance. In his view, the Soviets will regard signs of compromise as indications of China's weakness, and Moscow only attacks the weak.[40] The very high targets in the 10-year plan for both industry and agriculture suggest, moreover, that allocation issues remain a source of crisscrossing tension and disagreement and that the solution to date has been

[39]Based on US Central Intelligence Agency, *The Chinese Communist Party Central Committee—Members Elected at the 11th Party Congress*, CR 77-14473, Washington, DC, September 1977. The seven are Chang T'ing-fa, Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien, Hsü Shih-yu, Liu Po-ch'eng, Nieh Jung-chen, Wei Kuo-ch'ing, and Ulanfu.

[40]Teng's perspective on this issue was articulated by Radio Peking (although there was no explicit attribution to Teng) on Mar. 21, 1978: "Note must be made of some people who advocate compromise and concessions in the face of Soviet

(*continued on page 8*)

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essentially to promise each major group of claimants the resources it desires.[41]

But past histories tend to divide the current leadership along rough generational lines. Three key younger members of the Politburo—Wu Te, Ch'en Hsi-lien, and Li Te-sheng[42]—tried to straddle both sides of the fence during the 1970-76 battle between the veteran cadres and the Gang of Four, and they are now politically vulnerable because of this checkered political history.[43] Wang Tung-hsing, the fifth-ranking member of the Politburo, received a major promotion on the eve of the Cultural Revolution and played an important role in the purges of top party leaders that followed.[44] Each of these men must now think in terms of joining a coalition that will protect him from attack, and these members of the younger generation on the Politburo seem to be coalescing around Hua Kuo-feng against the older Teng Hsiao-p'ing.[45] A brief review of the relationship between Hua and Teng is thus called for.

Differences Between Hua and Teng

In 1975, when Teng Hsiao-p'ing took charge of the work of the Central Committee,[46] there were clear signs that relations between Hua and Teng were excellent—indeed, that Teng had begun to groom Hua as his likely successor. The two men cooperated closely on policy toward science and technology and also worked together on some dimensions of foreign policy, especially regarding the release of captured Soviet helicopter pilots in December 1975.[47]

However, Teng's downfall in April 1976 put Hua, as the new First Vice-Chairman of the CCP, in the

expansion and threats in the belief that peace may thus be preserved. However, this is a naive expectation, because such a policy of appeasement will only hasten the beginning of war. The reason is very simple: Aggressors always hurt the weak, are afraid of the strong and will never rest on their laurels." See *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 23, 1978, p. A/2. Teng has argued for military cooperation between Western Europe and China and has opposed any conciliation of the Soviet Union on the basis that concessions will only whet the Soviet appetite for conquest and hasten the outbreak of war. See *Die Welt* (Hamburg), Sept. 26, 1977, in *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 26, 1977, pp. A/10-11; and several articles in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 23, 1978, pp. A/22-24. Chi Teng-k'uei, Li Hsien-nien, and T'an Chen-lin have expressed sentiments in line with those of Teng on this issue. For Chi's views, see *Ta Kung Pao* (Hong Kong), May 17, 1977, translated in *FBIS-CHI*, May 18, 1977, p. N/1. Li's and T'an's views are conveyed in Hong Kong AFP, Nov. 2, 1976, in *FBIS-CHI*, Nov. 3, 1976, pp. A/5-6; *Le Monde* (Paris), Nov. 3, 1976, in *FBIS-CHI*, Nov. 4, 1976, p. A/1; and Hong Kong AFP, Nov. 6, 1976 in *FBIS-CHI*, Nov. 8, 1976, p. A/3. Fuller evidence for this analysis is presented in Lieberthal, *Sino-Soviet Relations in the 1970's*, Chap. 2.

[41]The 10-year plan, for instance, promises an increased percentage of state investment in agriculture at the same time that it sets very ambitious goals for the growth of the steel industry and other major components of the industrial sector. See *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 16, 1978, Supplement, pp. 16-18. This difficulty in limiting demands on the center highlights the important role that Mao Tse-tung played before 1976 as a result of his possession of sufficient authority to set priorities for the system.

[42]Heads, respectively, of the Peking Municipal Party apparatus, the Peking Military Region, and the Shenyang Military Region (which is responsible for the entire strategically vital area of Manchuria). "Younger" here means under 70 years of age.

[43]Wu and Ch'en have been criticized in wall posters since the overthrow of the Gang of Four. See, for instance, Hong Kong AFP, Jan. 8, 1977, and Jan. 9, 1977, in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 10, 1977, pp. E/4-5; Hong Kong AFP, Apr. 4, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 4, 1978, p. E/1; Hong Kong AFP, Apr. 5, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 5, 1978, pp. E/1-2; *Time* (New York, NY), Apr. 24, 1978. While Li Te-sheng has not been criticized directly in available documents, his bailiwick of Northeast China has come under heavy fire. See, e.g., Harbin Provincial Service in Mandarin, quoting an editorial in *Heilungkiang Jih-pao* (no date given), *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 7, 1978, pp. L/1-3; *JMJP*, Apr. 6, 1978, translated in *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 11, 1978, pp. E/1-10; and Changchun Provincial Service in Mandarin, quoting *Kirin Jih-pao*, Apr. 6, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 11, 1978, pp. L/4-7.

[44]Wang Tung-hsing replaced Yang Shang-k'un as head of the General Office of the Central Committee when Yang was purged in May 1966. As head of this office, Wang controlled access to the vitally important archives of the CCP Central Committee. Wang also headed Mao Tse-tung's personal political security apparatus and the 8341 Division of the People's Liberation Army (the unit charged with security for all Politburo members). These positions must have thrust Wang onto center stage in the investigations, arrests, and purges of the Politburo-level opponents of Mao during the Cultural Revolution—including, of course, Teng Hsiao-p'ing.

[45]Hua has reciprocated, in particular going out of his way to associate himself in public with Wu Te, Wang Tung-hsing, and Li Te-sheng. For example, Wu Te was in political trouble throughout the fall of 1976 (see, e.g., Rome ANSA, Oct. 20, 1977, in *FBIS-CHI*, Oct. 21, 1977, pp. E/16-17), and during this period Hua on several occasions sought to cover Wu with his own mantle. On September 22, he inspected the Hunghsing chicken farm and experimental pig farm in Peking's suburbs with Wu and gave important instructions there. See NCNA, Oct. 6, 1977, in *FBIS-CHI*, Oct. 7, 1977, pp. E/1-2. Wu then personally convened a rally of 550,000 people in Peking to convey Hua's commands. See NCNA, Oct. 6, 1977, in *FBIS-CHI*, Oct. 11, 1977, pp. E/26-28. Hua also had Wu accompany him to the Miyun Reservoir on Nov. 27 in a partisan political gesture analyzed below. This excursion, moreover, took place in the middle of the Peking Municipal People's Congress that met for the first time since the overthrow of the radical Gang of Four to confirm the leadership of the Peking governmental apparatus. Wu retained his top position at this meeting. Hua received all the delegates to the Congress and agreed to represent Peking Municipality in the upcoming Fifth National People's Congress. See NCNA, Dec. 14, 1977, in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 15, 1977, pp. K/7-14. Through these actions, Hua closely associated himself with Wu. Hua's publicized ties with both Wang Tung-hsing and Li Te-sheng are best illustrated by his trip to China's three northeastern provinces during the National Conference to Learn From Taching in April 1977. Wang and Li accompanied Hua on this unusual journey to Li's bailiwick. See Heilungkiang Provincial Radio, May 16, 1977, in *FBIS-CHI*, May 17, 1977, pp. L/1-3.

[46]Radio Shanghai, Nov. 25, 1977, in *FBIS-CHI*, Nov. 29, 1977, p. G/8.

[47]On Hua-Teng cooperation on a range of issues in 1975, see Lieberthal, *Sino-Soviet Relations in the 1970's*, Chap. 20. With regard to science and technology in particular, see Lieberthal, *Central Documents* . . ., pp. 35-44.

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CCP leaders Li Hsien-nien (left), Hua Kuo-feng (center), and Wang Tung-hsing (right) work at Miyun Reservoir on November 27, 1977.

—***China Pictorial*** **(Peking), No. 2, 1978, pp. 2-3.**

embarrassing position of having to run the campaign to criticize "Teng Hsiao-p'ing and his right deviationist attempt to reverse correct verdicts." Even though Hua worked hard to limit the scope and effectiveness of this campaign despite attempts by the radicals to broaden it (it was in this context that Mao Tse-tung told Hua in April 1976 that "with you in charge, I am at ease"), the sequence of events likely soured the Hua-Teng relationship to some degree. Moreover, Hua, in view of the obvious authority crisis in China in the aftermath of Mao Tse-tung's death and the arrest of Mao's wife and her followers, evidently argued that the new leadership should move slowly and carefully in rehabilitating Teng, a man whom Mao had personally excoriated in the last year of his life. Such caution Teng may have interpreted as an unseemly grab for power by a person whom only a year before Teng had taken under his wing and groomed for future leadership.

In March 1977, Hua struck a compromise with Teng that allowed for the latter's rehabilitation. Teng declared in writing (his two pertinent letters to Hua were circulated throughout the party in May 1977) that he recognized Hua as the rightful successor to the Chairmanship of the CCP; that he acknowledged that he, Teng, had committed personal errors that

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warranted his criticism during 1976; and that he now desired only to serve under Hua and contribute his services to the revolution. It was on this basis that Hua recommended Teng's rehabilitation to a Central Work Conference in March 1977, and that Teng was formally returned to all his previous posts by the Third Plenum of the 10th Central Committee in July 1977.[48]

By September 1977, however, Teng showed clear signs of chafing under the compromise arrangement. Foreigners who met with him reported that he acted like a man in complete command.[49] His cherished program of the four modernizations, with an emphasis on the modernization of science and technology, dominated the media,[50] and many of his former colleagues reappeared and assumed leading posts in the party and government.[51] As Teng took charge, Hua seemed to fade into the background, retaining only titular leadership. Many analysts fully expected Teng to be appointed premier when the scheduled meeting of the Fifth National People's Congress convened in the late fall. But the meeting was postponed,[52] amidst increasing signs that Teng was seeking not only the premiership but also a direct criticism of Mao Tse-tung and possibly the overthrow of Hua Kuo-feng.

Things seemed to come to a boil in November-December 1977. On November 2 and 5, *Jen-min Jih-pao* carried articles that denounced both Mao and Hua in only the most thinly-veiled way.[53] On the 27th, Hua and many of his supporters made a trip to the Miyun reservoir on the outskirts of Peking to do a stint of "manual labor," emulating a similar excursion led by Mao to this spot in 1958. The significance of this brief trip was underlined by the fact that the Chinese media did not mention it until four days after it took place, suggesting that it posed a very thorny issue for the leadership.[54] Teng, in response, hosted a banquet for Rewi Alley—a foreigner long resident in China—on December 2, and the following day *Jen-min Jih-pao* printed Alley's poem commemorating the Third Plenum of the 10th Party Congress that had convened in July 1977. The poem praised the Plenum's resolutions concerning the rehabilitation of Teng and the purge of the Gang of Four. It pointedly omitted the Plenum's third major resolution—the one confirming Hua Kuo-feng as the Party Chairman.[55]

The elusive Fifth National People's Congress finally convened on February 26-March 5, 1978, and its outcome indicates that Hua has successfully, if temporarily, blunted Teng's offensive. Not only did Teng fail to obtain the premiership, but he played almost no role in the proceedings of the Congress itself. His sole address to the gathering consisted of a brief salutation at the end, in which he called the Congress a congress of unity and of victory.[56] Teng had a somewhat more prominent part in the less prestigious Fifth Meeting of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), a "united front" body, which convened at roughly the same time as the NPC. Indeed, the fact that Teng's close collaborator Wei Kuo-ch'ing gave the major address to the CPPCC[57] and that the CPPCC elected Teng chairman of its National Committee[58] strongly suggests that while Hua managed to ensure his dominance of the NPC, Teng and his colleagues received control of the powerless CPPCC forum as somewhat meager face-saving(?) compensation.

Personnel appointments made during recent months suggest a relatively evenhanded compromise between competing political groupings at the center in Peking. While available data are unfortunately insufficient to provide a very complete "mapping" of the allegiances of various high-level appointees, one can evaluate those of a few people with some confidence, and the pattern that emerges indicates an effort to balance off Teng and Hua partisans in each of the major functional hierarchies. Wang Tung-hsing, a party vice-chairman who almost certainly plays an important role in both organization and public secu-

[48]Teng's two letters were circulated as *Chung-fa* (i.e., Central Committee document) No. 15, 1977, on May 3, 1977. See *Ming-pao*, May 27, 1977. This was subsequently confirmed in the communique of the Third Plenum of the 10th Central Committee adopted on July 21, 1977. See *PR*, No. 31, July 29, 1977, p. 5.

[49]See, for example, Han Su-yin's interview with Teng in September 1977, *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), Nov. 21, 1977, in *FBIS-CHI*, Nov. 25, 1977, pp. E/14-18.

[50]The Central Committee circular on convening a national science conference, for instance, was issued on Sept. 18, 1977. See the text in *PR*, No. 40, Sept. 30, 1977, pp. 6-11.

[51]Such as Hu Yao-pang and Hu Ch'iao-mu.

[52]T'an Chen-lin stated in an interview with Japanese visitors that the Fifth National People's Congress would convene in the latter part of 1977. See Hong Kong AFP, Apr. 31, 1977, in *FBIS-CHI*, May 2, 1977, p. E/29. The Fifth NPC did not in fact convene until Feb. 26, 1978.

[53]The Nov. 3 article is translated in *FBIS-CHI*, Nov. 7, 1977, pp. E/9-13; the Nov. 5 article is carried in *FBIS-CHI*, Nov. 14, 1977, p. E/14.

[54]NCNA, Dec. 1, 1977, in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 2, 1977, pp. E/1-3.

[55]Information on Teng's banquet for Alley is in NCNA, Dec. 2, 1977, in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 5, 1977, pp. A/9-11. The latter's poem is in *JMJP*, Dec. 3, 1977, translated in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 5, 1977, p. A/12. The three resolutions of the Third Plenum are discussed in the communique of the Plenum. See *PR*, No. 31, July 29, 1977, pp. 3-8.

[56]NCNA, Mar. 5, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 6, 1978, p. D/10.

[57]Text in NCNA, Mar. 9, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 10, 1978, pp. D/1-4.

[58]NCNA, Mar. 8, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 8, 1978, p. D/49.

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rity work,[59] is offset in these areas by Teng's associates: Hu Yao-pang as director of the Party Organization Department and Chao Ts'ang-pi as Minister of Public Security.[60] While Hua Kuo-feng's protége Chang P'ing-hua has moved from Hunan to Peking to take over the Party Propaganda Department, Teng supporter Chu Mu-chih serves directly under Chang as deputy director.[61] Hua Kuo-feng personally serves as President of the revived Higher Party School, with Wang Tung-hsing as his First Vice-President. However, Hu Yao-pang holds the position of Second Vice-President.[62] The sensitive post of Minister of Defense, which *de facto* seems to have been vacant for more than a year,[63] was assigned to Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien at the Fifth NPC. Hsü is an elderly man who does not seem to be a strong partisan of either Hua or Teng.[64] PLA Chief of Staff Teng Hsiao-p'ing almost certainly wanted to place his close colleague Hsü Shih-yu in this position; hence Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien's appointment provides yet another indication that Teng received less than he had hoped at the recent NPC meeting.

Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien, member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and, since March 1978, Minister of Defense of the People's Republic of China.

—Wide World.

The Key Dispute

As the above indicates, Teng and Hua have been at loggerheads, and a number of factors in the current situation—the advanced age of many Politburo members, difficulties in resolving allocational disputes, the strains introduced by past political feuds, disagreements over the best tactical approach to the Soviet issue—guarantee that politics in Peking will remain lively over the next few years. To be sure, the current leadership has repeatedly demonstrated that it can reach compromises on these difficult problems and forge ahead on its dramatic program to modernize China by the end of this century. But there is one central issue on which the division between Teng and Hua appears to be fundamental. *While both want modernization, Teng is willing to strive for this goal at far greater cost to the core values of the Chinese revolution than is Hua.* It is this basic issue

[59]This conjecture is based on Wang's experience in party organization work as a function of his years as head of the CCP's General Office and on his extensive background in public security affairs as the head of Mao Tse-tung's personal political security apparatus. Although Teng and Hua are the two current Politburo members best qualified to take charge of each of these areas respectively, both are preoccupied with other responsibilities; thus, the task has probably fallen to Wang Tung-hsing. On the system of assigning leadership over functional areas to individual members of the Politburo, see Lieberthal, *Central Documents . . .*, pp. 26-50, 76-80.

[60]Hu became director of the Organization Department at some time between early October and mid-November 1977. See AFP, Hong Kong, Dec. 15, 1977, in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 15, 1977, p. E/1. Chao became Minister of Public Security at least as early as November 1977. See *Hsin Wan Pao* (Hong Kong), Nov. 29, 1977, translated in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 8, 1977, p. N/1.

[61]Chang was first identified as director of the Party Propaganda Department on Nov. 10, 1977. See Radio Hangchow, Nov. 13, 1977, in *FBIS-CHI*, Nov. 15, 1977, p. G/1. Chu Mu-chih was appointed deputy director no later than mid-December 1977. See AFP, Hong Kong, Dec. 19, 1977, in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 19, 1977, p. E/14.

[62]These appointments were announced on Oct. 9, 1977. See *PR*, No. 43, Oct. 21, 1977, p. 4.

[63]Yeh Chien-ying, the Minister of Defense at the time of Mao Tse-tung's death in September 1976, was not identified as such at any time after late September 1976, although he continued to make frequent public appearances wearing his hats of Party Vice-Chairman, Vice-Premier of the State Council, and Vice-Chairman of the Military Commission of the CCP.

[64]He is 76 years old, according to the date of birth provided in Donald Klein and Anne B. Clark, *Biographical Dictionary of Chinese Communism, 1921-1965*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1971. This same biography provides data that suggest Hsü's most long-standing personal ties may be with Li Hsien-nien.

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and its repercussions that may break up the current coalition in Peking and upset the modernization program spelled out in the first part of this article.

The different perspectives of the two men emerged with dramatic clarity in their speeches to the National Science Conference that convened in Peking less than two weeks after the conclusion of the Fifth NPC in March. Teng addressed the Science Conference at its opening session on March 18, and Hua presented his views to this meeting six days later.[65]

Both Teng and Hua stressed the need to develop China's science and technology as a key dimension of the process of achieving the four modernizations, but here agreement ended. Teng outlined a program designed to foster a professional scientific cadre of the highest possible calibre in order to bring about the scientific revolution he deems essential to China's future, and he did not shrink from spelling out the political requisites of this position. He bluntly stated that scientists serve the revolution best by sharpening their professional skills and bringing them to bear to strengthen and transform China. While regulations promulgated on September 18, 1977, stated that scientists must be allowed at least five sixths of their time for professional work,[66] Teng went even further. He declared that any scientists willing to spend all of their time on professional work should be encouraged to do so. "We cannot," he asserted, "demand that scientists and technicians, or at any rate the overwhelming majority of them, study a lot of political and theoretical books, participate in numerous social activities, and attend many meetings not related to their work."[67] To Hua, by contrast,

Far from being weakened, political and ideological work should be strengthened. . . . Politics is the commander, the soul in everything, and it won't do not to grasp political and ideological work.[68]

Disagreement, however, went far beyond the amount of time that scientists should spend on political study. Teng made a startling change in a basic tenet of Mao Tse-tung Thought by asserting that so long as people who work with their minds instead of their hands serve the revolution, there is no real difference between them and manual laborers. In Teng's terminology,

Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Vice-Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party and Vice-Premier of the People's Republic of China, pictured during his March 18, 1978, report to the National Science Conference in Peking.

—Wide World.

. . . the overwhelming majority of [scientists] are part of the proletariat. The difference between them and the manual workers lies only in a different role in the social division of labor. Those who labor, whether by hand or brain, are all working people in a socialist society.[69]

Teng then used this theoretical innovation as the political underpinning for the many measures he advocated that would foster an elitist scientific cadre which would receive special training, enjoy material perquisites and high prestige, and have the opportunity for extensive interaction with the international community in return for driving China forward into the front ranks of the world by the year 2000.

[65]For the text of Teng's speech, see NCNA, Mar. 21, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 21, 1978, pp. E/4-15. For the text of Hua's, see NCNA, Mar. 25, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 27, 1978, pp. E/1-8.

[66]In the Central Committee Circular on Convening a National Conference on Science and Technology. See *PR*, No. 40, Sept. 30, 1977, pp. 6-11.

[67]*FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 21, 1978, p. E/10.

[68]Ibid., Mar. 15, 1978, p. E/5.

[69]Ibid., Mar. 21, 1978, p. E/7.

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Hua would have none of this. Contending that "it won't do to have only a small number or a section of the people; hundreds of millions of people, the entire Chinese nation, must reach a higher level,"[70] he argued for scientific advance through mass struggles to integrate the scientists with the people and to raise the level of culture for all of China. He affirmed that China's modernization must differ fundamentally from those of the Soviet Union and the capitalist countries, for "only this kind of modernization can bring genuine happiness to our people."[71] Hua's approach was, in brief, far more nativist and populist than was Teng's. Hua recognized the need to learn what China could from the industrialized countries, but, unlike Teng, the Party Chairman somewhat defensively recounted the entire litany of Chinese fears of inferiority vis-à-vis the West ("the moon looks better over foreign lands," "China can only creep along in the wake of other countries") and concluded with the stout assertion:

Facts past and present show that we Chinese have a head and two hands just like others and are no stupider than they. The key lies in the correct line. . . . We can learn anything, provided we rely on the enthusiasm of the masses. No difficulty can stop us, provided we rely on the united strength of the masses.[72]

These sentiments in no way echoed Teng's address to the same national conference six days earlier.

Thus, both Teng and Hua ardently desire rapid modernization, but they differ significantly over the path China must follow to achieve this goal. Teng is willing to open China wide to foreign influences and do great violence to the egalitarian goals of the revolution in order to hurtle the PRC into the modern world during the coming decades. Hua wants modernization but demands that it be achieved in ways that are consonant with egalitarian values and without compromising China's political and cultural integrity.

This division between Teng and Hua continues an almost century-long debate in China between some who argue that only all-around Westernization can save the country from outside aggression and others who assert that China can successfully employ Western technology to strengthen herself while maintaining a political and cultural system that is distinctive from—and superior to—that of the West.[73] In identifying himself with the second position, Hua Kuo-feng is, in a sense, Mao Tse-tung's truest successor, for the former Party Chairman himself exemplified the modern incarnation of this view. Indeed, Hua began his report to the Fifth NPC with a 1963 quotation from Mao that asserted that China could prevent future humiliation in the international community only by restructuring her social system and modernizing her economy and technology.[74] Everyone in Hua's audience knew, however, that three years after making this assertion Mao broke up the most powerful modernizing coalition China had enjoyed to date in order to purify the social system at

A peasant of the Tachai National Model Production Brigade for Agriculture works on hillside terracing.

—Vincent Mentzel via Nancy Palmer.

[70] Ibid., Mar. 25, 1978, p. E/3.
[71] Ibid., p. E/2.
[72] Ibid., p. E/8.
[73] The latter group initially adopted the famous slogan, "Chinese learning for the base, Western learning for practical use." Stuart Schram captures the threads of this debate within the Chinese Communist Party from the party's inception in his "Introduction," in Stuart Schram, Ed., *Authority, Participation and Cultural Change in China*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1973, pp. 1-108. Michel Oksenberg and Steven Goldstein present a distinctly different, albeit related, analysis of this issue in their "The Chinese Political Spectrum," *Problems of Communism*, (Washington, DC), March-April 1974, pp. 1-13.

A third thread of argument in the last 100 years in China has been that security lies in expurgating the evil influence of the West and turning inward for purification. The radicals under Chiang Ch'ing are the most recent representatives of this strain of Chinese political thinking, and the Red Guard pronouncements during the Cultural Revolution suggest that a considerable popular base for this view still exists in China. However, no representatives of this view are likely to hold high-level positions in Chinese politics in the foreseeable future.

[74] *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 16, 1977, p. D/8.

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the cost of great setbacks to the program of economic and technological modernization.

Teng Hsiao-p'ing was the second most prominent victim of Mao's fierce attack on the modernization program in 1966; consequently, he can only look with foreboding on the statements that Hua made to the National Science Conference (which undoubtedly reflect sentiments Hua has voiced in the higher councils of the party in private). How widely is Hua's perspective shared within the Politburo, and how has Teng shaped his strategy to deal with his potential challenge to his view of the fundamental requirements of the Chinese revolution during the remainder of the century?

In a strict sense, the data are not available to specify those on the Politburo who incline toward Hua's conception of the modernization program rather than Teng's. It is pertinent to note in this connection, though, that the Chinese revolution is now passing to the hands of a less cosmopolitan generation of leaders than has been at the helm over the past few decades. In contrast to the situation in the 1950's, for instance, none of the 13 members of the current Politburo who are under 70 years of age has ever studied abroad,[75] and evidently only three have visited, even for a brief period, what might be called an industrialized country.[76] While these younger leaders may advocate modernization, they cannot possibly have a full awareness of the social dimensions of an industrialized society. Hua admitted this fact in his Fifth NPC report when he noted that "in many respects, modern production of necessity remains an unknown kingdom to us."[77] He was not being overly modest.

Teng thus faces a considerable problem because those who likely share his perspective tend to be men in their 70's or older. Moreover, he must confront the virtual certainty that his program of forced-draft industrialization and modernization will engender strong opposition among the many segments of the population mentioned earlier that are particularly sensitive to the issues of egalitarianism and China's relations with the international community. Hence, Hua's dissenting group may be able to establish a mass base.

[75]These are Ch'en Hsi-lien, Ch'en Yung-kuei, Chi Teng-k'uei, Fang I, Hua Kuo-feng, Keng Piao, Li Te-sheng, Ni Chih-fu, P'eng Ch'ung, Su Chen-hua, Wang Tung-hsing, Wu Te, and Yü Ch'iu-li.

Tang Au-chin (left), Professor of Chemistry at Kirin University, discusses molecular chemistry with two of his colleagues.

—*China Pictorial* (Peking), No. 2, 1978, p. 31.

Teng's Strategy

Given the advancing age of his leading supporters and the sensitivity of some of his key programs, Teng has relatively little leverage he can exercise to hold the party to his priorities over the coming decades, but hints of the strategy Teng seems to have sculpted to cope with this unfavorable situation have appeared in the Chinese media in recent months. Basically, Teng is trying to box in his successors by having the current coalition formally commit itself to long-term programs for modernization and by denying to Hua and his supporters the radical legacy of Mao Tse-tung's last decade as a basis for undermining Teng's program.

The first prong of this strategy has become clear with the adoption of a 10-year economic program by the Fifth NPC,[78] an eight-year program in science and technology by the National Science Confer-

[76]This statement applies only to full members of the Politburo and covers travel only up to the beginning of 1978. The three individuals who have been to countries of an industrialized character are Ch'en Hsi-lien (the USSR in 1957), Ch'en Yung-kuei (Mexico in 1976), and Keng Piao (as ambassador in Europe in the 1950's). Others may have made unpublicized trips to the Soviet Union during the 1950's that do not show up in my data. These are drawn from the biographies in Klein and Clark, op. cit., for the years to 1966 and from the US Central Intelligence Agency series, *Appearances and Activities of Leading Personalities of the People's Republic of China* (Washington, DC), since then.

[77]*FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 16, 1978, Supplement, p. 23.

[78]Since this economic plan purportedly began in 1976, it ends in 1985. Hua Kuo-feng conveyed most of the available details of it in his NPC report, cited in fn. 1 above.

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ence,[79] and China's acceptance of long-term trade agreements with both Japan and the European Economic Community during the spring of 1978.[80] None of these actions provides much assurance that China will hold to a course of rapid modernization, but all at least formally commit the current leadership to this program and potentially keep these ambitious goals on the leadership agenda for many years to come. If China remains faithful to the modernization program until 1985-88, Teng probably accurately figures that its components will by then be sufficiently firmly in place that they are unlikely to be upset.

The second and most important prong of Teng's strategy is to exorcize the ghost of Mao Tse-tung's Cultural Revolution radicalism from the Chinese political system. Virtually every dimension of Teng's four modernizations program goes against the key tenets of Mao Tse-tung Thought as propagated and applied in the final decade of the Chairman's life, and the continued legitimacy of this ideological legacy certainly eases the way for those who at a subsequent date might turn away from the costs of the four-point modernization program. Thus, to Teng the risk of initiating a limited, explicit de-Maoization, trying to preserve those aspects of the Chairman's legacy that are compatible with current priorities and methods while doing away with Mao's pronouncements of the Cultural Revolution years and afterwards, is well worth taking,[81] and evidence of an effort to accomplish such an end has surfaced repeatedly in the Chinese media.

During the mid-1970's, major political campaigns in China launched by the radicals closely identified Mao Tse-tung with one of China's most forceful former emperors, Ch'in Shih Huang-ti. Since Mao's death, therefore, reevaluation of Ch'in Shih Huang-ti's role in Chinese history has provided a convenient, easily recognized, and relatively "safe" tool for criticism of Chairman Mao. The November 5, 1977, *Jen-min Jih-pao,* for example, carried an article that concluded: "As compared with the Communist Party, Ch'in Shih Huang was but a drop in the ocean, unworthy to be mentioned in the same breath."[82] The January 1978 issue of *Li-shih yen-chiu* went considerably further, arguing in detail (albeit allegorically[83]) that Mao Tse-tung's major contribution to the Chinese revolution was to unify China and that to deify his "thought" as the key to Chinese development after unification is to take an idealist approach to history that is "fallacious in the extreme."[84] This article details what seems to be the position that Teng is advocating on the treatment of Mao, and thus is worth quoting in extenso:

It is true that Ch'in Shih Huang [i.e., Mao] was an outstanding historical figure. Compared to the other. . . figures. . . in his time, he was farsighted and resourceful, being able to turn to good account the conditions created by history in accomplishing his great cause of bringing China under one roof. He was extremely staunch and firm throughout the course of establishing the autocratic system of centralization. But we must not, because of this, make him a god without making an. . . analysis of him. . . .

* * * * *

. . . The fact that [the Gang of Four] dressed Ch'in Shih Huang up as an all-powerful, history-making "hero" betrayed their willful idealist attempt to roll back the wheels of history.

Elsewhere, this article provides a scathing critique of the Cultural Revolution.

Other sorts of attacks on Mao have also cropped up in the Chinese media. For instance, in an article in *Jen-min Jih-pao* in March 1978 to commemorate Chou En-lai's birthday, Lo Jui-ch'ing counted among Chou's fine qualities the fact that he never allowed his birthplace to be turned into a shrine for others to visit.[85] The contrast with Mao could not have escaped the attention of those who read the article.

The problem is that both Hua Kuo-feng and Wang Tung-hsing owe their high positions directly to Mao's personal patronage during the years from 1966 onward, and any desecration of Mao's standing during these years would have to damage their personal

[79]Excerpts ofFang I's speach to the conference remain the most detailed available statement of the contents of the plan. See *PR*, No. 14, Apr. 7, 1978, pp. 6-14, 17.

[80]The agreement with the EEC is for five years. See NCNA, Apr. 4, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 4, 1978, pp. A/9-10. That with Japan is for eight years. See NCNA, Feb. 16, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 16, 1978, p. A/5.

[81]Teng might also, for purely personal reasons, relish the opportunity to criticize Mao's actions and judgment during the decade that Mao twice turned against Teng and purged him. The argument here, however, is that there are very powerful substantive reasons as well for Teng to place high priority on initiating an explicit criticism of Mao at this time.

[82]*FBIS-CHI*, Nov. 14, 1977, p. E/14.

[83]On the problems of "reading" allegorical articles to decipher their true meaning, see Lieberthal, "The Foreign Policy Debate in Peking . . .," loc. cit., pp. 548-54.

[84]Yu Ching, "They Were Mending the Refuge of Idealism—Refutation of the Reactionary Views of the 'Gang of Four' on the Appraisal of Ch'in Shih Huang," *Li-shih yen-chiu* (Peking), No. 1, January 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 24, 1978, pp. E/1-9.

[85]See *PR*, No. 11, Mar. 17, 1978, p. 35.

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Yeh Chien-ying, Vice-Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party and Vice-Premier of the People's Republic of China.

—Vincent Mentzel.

political stature.[86] No wonder, then, that Hua has been the most voluble proponent of Mao Tse-tung Thought among the current Chinese leaders since the death of the former Chairman. It is striking, indeed, to note that of the 26 full and alternate members of the Chinese Politburo, 13 fared relatively well during Mao's Cultural Revolution,[87] while 12 suffered either severe criticism or outright purge (Liu Po-ch'eng has been inactive due to illness since before the Cultural Revolution).[88] The former would most likely object to any direct refutation of the man and the movement that brought them into national prominence. The fact that all save three of those who suffered during the Cultural Revolution[89] are over 70, while none who benefited from the GPCR has yet reached that age, simply adds demographic point to the pressures that Teng and his older colleagues probably feel to force the issue of Chairman Mao's legacy.

Prospects

Thus, important substantive differences over acceptable means to achieve the four modernizations divide Teng Hsiao-p'ing from Hua Kuo-feng. These are compelling Teng to adopt a strategy that calls for an explicit criticism of Mao Tse-tung's last decade in power as a means of denying this radical legacy to Hua and others who might bolt from Teng's program. Moreover, the key substantive dispute about the path to modernization seems to overlap considerably with other cleavages in the Politburo—cleavages between different generations and between those who suffered from the Cultural Revolution and those who profited from it. The younger generation not only experienced the Cultural Revolution differently but have also had far less exposure to industrialized societies abroad than have their elders.

It is not possible to predict with certainty how these pressures will work themselves out in the Chinese succession over the next few years. As noted above, the key measures of Teng's modernization program do violence to the egalitarian and nativist sentiments of significant sectors of the population, creating a potential popular base for Hua and his supporters to utilize should they feel it imperative (for personal or policy reasons) to modify this program. At the same time, all recognize the costs of an open split and the need for stable authority in Peking after a decade of purges and recriminations.[90] Consequently, the

[86]Indeed, Hua's vulnerability with regard to criticism of Mao Tse-tung is highlighted by Lo Jui-ch'ing's implicit criticism of Mao's permitting his birthplace to become a shrine. There is some evidence that Hua was personally involved in erecting this shrine while he worked in Hunan. See Michel Oksenberg and Yeung Sai-cheung, "Hua Kuo-feng's Pre-Cultural Revolution Hunan Years, 1949-66: The Making of A Political Generalist," *China Quarterly*, No. 69, March 1977, p. 53.

[87]For some individuals who experienced peaks and troughs during the Cultural Revolution, this categorization represents a summary judgment that may not find universal agreement among analysts. The 13 include those who experienced a rapid rise during 1970-71 in the immediate wake of the Cultural Revolution and those who simply lost no ground during the Cultural Revolution. These 13 are Ch'en Hsi-lien, Ch'en Mu-hua, Ch'en Yung-kuei, Chi Teng-K'uei, Fang I, Hua Kuo-feng, Keng Piao, Li Te-sheng, Ni Chih-fu, P'eng Ch'ung, Saifudin, Wang Tung-hsing, and Wu Te.

[88]These are Chang T'ing-fa, Chao Tzu-yang, Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien, Hsü Shih-yu, Li Hsien-nien, Nieh Jung-chen, Su Chen-hua, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Ulanfu, Wei Kuo-ch'ing, Yeh Chien-ying, and Yü Ch'iu-li.

[89]Chao Tzu-yang, Su Chen-hua, and Yü Ch'iu-li.

[90]Teng made these considerations explicit in the two letters he wrote to Hua that were circulated by the Central Committee after the March 1977 Central Work Conference. See *Ming-pao*, May 27, 1977.

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future may well witness political jockeying within the context of continued adherence to the dramatic modernization program that the leadership has articulated during the last year.

Should friction break apart the current coalition for the reasons analyzed above, a split seems most likely to occur during one of two periods.[91] The first is the remainder of 1978, during which the key underlying political issue will be whether or not to undertake an explicit denunciation of Mao Tse-tung's later years, with all its implications for Hua Kuo-feng, Wang Tung-hsing, and others.[92] If Teng has not succeeded in persuading a majority of the Politburo to take this dramatic initiative by the end of the year—and there is indirect evidence that even such "natural" Teng allies as the aged Yeh Chien-ying oppose such a step[93]—the matter is likely to remain settled for quite a while thereafter. The second critical time frame is 1981-82, by which period the Chinese need to have achieved the average annual increases in agricultural output that they are seeking. If they have not yet done so, Peking will either have to make painful cuts in the industrialization program or to significantly increase its exploitation of China's agricultural sector.[94] This dilemma will occur, moreover, at a time when the social repercussions of Teng's four-point modernization program are fully evident, and it will thus reflect all the strains that have been discussed above. The political solution of the issue at that juncture will most likely shape the Chinese revolution for the last two decades of this century.

[91] A "split" may not necessarily entail the removal of an individual from all his offices. Rather, it may simply lead to emasculation of his power. This seems to have been the outcome of the recent conflict involving the former Sinkiang leader Saifudin.

[92] This, of course, does not mean that other issues—resource allocation questions; attacks on Li Te-sheng, Wu Te, and Ch'en Hsi-lien; etc.—will not continue to rile the political waters during 1978. It merely recognizes that the question of how to treat Mao's ghost is the most central issue for the political leadership and is one that crystallizes the range of tensions within the leadership discussed above.

[93] Yeh gave the report on the revision of the PRC Constitution at the Fifth NPC in March. As discussed above, Teng was largely shut out of the NPC; therefore, Yeh's prominent role in the meeting might indicate the old marshal's endorsement of Hua Kuo-feng's leadership. For the text of Yeh's report, see *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 16, 1978, Supplement, pp. 40-53.

[94] A key indicator will be whether the PRC can cease importing grain by 1981. If not, the bill for grain imports will render it impossible to import the technological equipment and related resources that are critical to the planned industrialization effort.

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Political Participation in China

By Victor C. Falkenheim

Mass participation is arguably the most prominent feature of Chinese politics. Not only is the political elite of the People's Republic of China (PRC) committed to an ideological perspective—the "mass line"—which assigns central importance to citizen participation, but by all accepted quantitative indicators, Chinese citizens in fact participate in politics at very high rates.

Nevertheless, because participation in the PRC is often involuntary and takes place in the context of a single-party mobilization system, outside observers in the 1950's and early 1960's tended either to deny the applicability of the term *participation* to the observable forms of civic activity in China, or to equate participation narrowly with some of its specific functions—e.g., policy implementation and political socialization. Alternatively, they sidestepped judgment by adopting the neutral premise that Chinese participation differs fundamentally from Western participation, and they defined their task as one of identifying and understanding the nature and sources of the "Chinese style" of participation.[1] Neither approach, whatever its respective validity, adequately confronted the question of how much real participation exists.

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution forced more direct consideration of this question by convincing many former skeptics that at least part of the Chinese leadership had a far more profound commitment to spontaneous grass-roots political participation than had previously been suspected. Many reforms of the Cultural Revolution appeared to involve efforts at institutionalizing and broadening channels for participation in order to secure more effective mass control over political decision-makers. The developing scholarly consensus in response to these innovations was that Chinese leaders in the 1970's were seeking to reconcile two conflicting values: the disciplinary imperatives of development and the participatory ideals of the Cultural Revolution. Richard Pfeffer articulated this view most succinctly in 1972 by suggesting that the leadership of the PRC was trying to carry out institutional and educational reforms that would ensure elite responsiveness to views of the citizenry within the necessary framework of a "vanguard" political order.[2]

While this view became increasingly influential in the early- and mid-1970's, it never lacked critics, many of whom continued to see the "mass line" as masking a fundamentally Stalinist political reality. More recently, events following Mao's death, the sweeping purge of the Gang of Four, and Chinese Communist Party Chairman Hua Kuo-feng's stress on "great order" have led to a growing critical backlash against more positive perspectives on participation. This has been in part a response to what is perceived as a shift toward greater authoritarianism within China, and in part a response to the uncritical

[1]James R. Townsend, *Political Participation in Communist China*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1965, pp. 3-4.

[2]Richard M. Pfeffer, "Serving the People and Continuing the Revolution," *China Quarterly* (London), October-December 1972.

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Small group discussions such as that shown constitute one form of citizen participation in China.

—Vincent Mentzel.

nature of much China-watching from abroad in the 1970's.[3]

Given the current debate on the question of mass participation, it is clear that an attempt to reassess the quality of political life in China is necessary. This is by no means an easy task, though, for there have been few empirical studies of the citizen's role in the PRC's political processes. The crucial requirement, as James Townsend pointed out a decade ago, remains an understanding of the citizen's response to the participatory structures of the Chinese state.[4] An accurate appraisal of this response is crucial not only to a proper understanding of Chinese politics since the Cultural Revolution, but also to assessing the validity of the "mass line" theory for China, since the theory is predicated on citizens' actively performing the critical watchdog role (*chien tu*) it assigns to them.

The present paper seeks to cast light on citizen response by exploring, by means of émigré interviews, recent patterns of local and work-site civic participation in China. Primary emphasis is on real, nonritual participation, i.e., on participation defined as "activity by private citizens to influence government decision-making."[5] The adoption of this "mainstream" conceptualization represents an attempt to

[3]The clearest sign of this backlash is the warm reception accorded the views expressed in Edward Luttwak, "Seeing China Plain," *Commentary* (New York, NY), December 1976, and Simone Leys, *Chinese Shadows*, New York, NY, Viking, 1977.

[4]Townsend, op. cit., pp. 191-210.

[5]Samuel P. Huntington and Joan M. Nelson, *No Easy Choice: Political Participation in Developing Countries*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1976, p. 3.

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Table 1. Demographic Profile of Respondents

A. Age

Age group	No. of respondents
15–19	1
20–24	1
25–29	16
30–34	9
35–39	4
40–44	3
45–49	1
50 and over	2
TOTAL	37

B. Education

Educational level completed	No. of respondents
Lower primary	3
Upper primary	3
Lower middle	11
Upper middle	10
University and/or post-secondary technical	9
Other	1
TOTAL	37

C. Class background

Class background	No. of respondents
Urban:	
Workers	5
Government workers (*Chih yuan*)	8
Professionals (*Tzu yu chih yeh*)	6
Artisans and petty tradesmen	3
Capitalists	1
KMT officials (*Wei Kuan-yuan*)	1
Counterrevolutionaries	1
Rural:	
Poor peasants	2
Middle peasants	1
Landlords	1
Revolutionary martyrs	1
Other:	
Returned Overseas Chinese	7
TOTAL	37

NOTE: The age of respondents was computed on the basis of Western conventions. Educational levels were measured in terms of years of formal full-time study. Class origin was derived from government-assigned formal class labels based on conventional CCP criteria for such classifications (see Richard Kraus, "Class Conflict and the Vocabulary of Social Analysis in China," *China Quarterly* [London], March 1977).

The average elapsed time between each respondent's departure from China and the date he was interviewed was 11 months.

complement previous studies which approached participation primarily in terms of the values and concerns of the political elite, dwelling as a consequence on the systemic functions of participation. The aim is not to deny the multi-functionality of participation in China, but to focus on one of the neglected dimensions of participation—the pursuit of personal or shared interests and values by ordinary citizens.

The guiding questions for the present study were simple. By what means and with what frequency did citizens participate in politics? What control did they have over their own political lives? What level of attentiveness did they exhibit toward the media and toward politics generally? How did they perceive and how frequently did they utilize various "democratic instruments" of participation? To what extent and in what circumstances did people (1) speak out openly in meetings, (2) criticize cadres, (3) write letters to the press or political leaders, (4) voice personal grievances openly, (5) lobby leaders individually, (6) write "big character posters," and (7) utilize the "opinion boxes" (*i-chien hsiang*) generally available to them? Alternatively, to what extent did citizens resort to illegal, extralegal, and quasi-legal channels in pressing their demands. To what extent was their political activity ritualistic or coerced, and to what extent spontaneous and autonomous? In short, in what ways did citizens respond to the political pressures and opportunities with which they were confronted, and in what ways did their own interests, personal backgrounds and values, and perceptions of politics affect their responses?

The research process involved identifying and then interviewing a number of informants for from 6 to 12 hours each, on the basis of a questionnaire consisting largely of open-ended questions. Initially, the objective was to secure informants of varying educational, occupational, and social backgrounds on the basis of quota sampling, but the group of respondents actually assembled was small (N=37) and skewed (see Table 1). The bulk of the informants were young (age 25-35) and of "middling" class origin. Most had come from South China (Fukien or Kwangtung provinces), half having emigrated legally. Most also were male and relatively well educated, with only five having failed to complete primary school. The work experience of the respondents was varied, involving 25 rural production teams, 9 state farms, 3 factories, 2 academic research-teaching units, 2 government offices, and various kinds of "miscellaneous" work. No claim is made that the respondent group represented a microcosm of Chinese political life. Nevertheless, as the findings will show, these former residents of the PRC exhibited

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a surprising degree of agreement on many issues. In presenting and interpreting the data generated by this research, an attempt will be made to compensate for the skewed quality of the respondent pool by summarizing and generalizing the views expressed only on issues where a consensus existed which cut across all classes and occupations.

Levels of Political Involvement

In China, the overwhelming majority of citizens participate in politics. Whether voluntarily or not, they enroll in small study groups which discuss state policy, they attend larger public political meetings in which political issues are aired, and they become involved to a lesser or greater extent in the host of activities related to China's mass political movements. The politically inactive and apathetic citizen of the Western democracies has no counterpart in China. However, it is clear that Chinese citizens vary in the quality and sincerity of their participation. Citizens can even set their own preferred levels of political activity, as long as they remain above the prescribed minimum. Michel Oksenberg suggested in his study of pre-Cultural Revolution career patterns that each individual's response "to the incessant demands of the political system" represented a crucial life choice. The issue was not "whether" one participated, but rather "to what extent" one participated.[6] It was in part a matter of individual choice whether to pursue an activist pattern of political involvement, with its risks and demands, leading to membership in the Communist Youth League and ultimately to membership in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Yet more was at stake than personal preference, since periodic school and workplace assessments made "political behavior" (*cheng-chih piao-hsien*), "activism," and "political awareness" criteria of evaluation.

[6]Michel Oksenberg, "The Institutionalization of the Chinese Communist Revolution: The Ladder of Success on the Eve of the Cultural Revolution," *China Quarterly*, October-December 1968, p. 63

A workers' meeting at a state farm in Hainan Province in December 1976. Among the participants are members of the Li minority nationality.

—Gamma/Liaison.

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The degree of variation in levels of citizen involvement can be gauged in part in terms of Mao's own estimate that the Chinese citizenry divided into three major groups: the progressives, which he in 1958 judged to be 30 percent of the population; the conservatives, which he estimated at 30 percent of the population; and the lukewarm middle, which he put at 40 percent of the population.[7] If Mao's estimate is used as a basis of comparison, then the respondent group interviewed was broadly representative, in political terms, of the population of the People's Republic. Out of the 37 respondents, 26 declared themselves generally uninterested in politics (*pu-kuan cheng-chih*), while equating "politics" (*cheng-chih*) with "high" national affairs (*kuo chia ta shih*). Only two informants differentiated between the party's politics, in which they were uninterested, and their own brand of dissenting politics, in which they were intensely interested. Respondents for the most part regarded political involvement as time-consuming, competitive with attention to their professional interests, false, empty, and most often potentially dangerous. Significantly, though, the general lack of concern with politics expressed did not translate into apathy or passivity. Instead, it went hand in hand with relatively high levels of attention to media coverage and of ritual support. Only five respondents did not read the newspapers or listen to broadcast news regularly. Eight others said they read the papers regularly but asserted that they ignored political content in favor of the sports, cultural, or professionally oriented news sections. In contrast, 24 respondents reported reading the political news carefully—despite a lack of interest—because, in the representative view, "if you don't grasp politics" (*pu chua cheng-chih*), "politics will grasp you" (*cheng-chih chiu chua ni*).

Similar prudence appeared to underlie most respondents' basic choices concerning levels of political involvement. When asked to place themselves on a conventional activist-nonactivist continuum (*chi-chi-hsing*), 22 of the 37 respondents described themselves as "in the middle" (*i-pan*). And when asked to describe their "political behavior" (*cheng-chih piao hsien*) relative to that of others in their respective work groups, the same number also used the term "middling." It would not do, most said, to be "backward" (*lo hou*), and it was too difficult and demanding to strive for "activist status"; what was most desirable was to be considered neither "progressive" nor backward. On the other hand, 11 interviewees rated their own political behavior as "good" (*cheng-chih piao-hsien hao*), claiming to have had activist status (a formal office or role) in their work units. Six of these respondents were members of the CCP or of the Communist Youth League (CYL), while the other five had aspired to such status.

When invited to comment on Mao's characterization of the Chinese political spectrum, all 37 interviewees dissented from his estimates. Most estimated the "lukewarm middle" in China at between 80 and 90 percent of the population. If measured in terms of its own assessment of the realities of political involvement, therefore, the group interviewed here would appear skewed in a "progressive" direction.

Forms of Participation

Political participation in the PRC assumed many forms—formal and informal, legal and quasi-legal, written and oral. While respondents found it easy to place themselves on a conventional party-defined continuum of political involvement levels, they found it more difficult to be precise about the frequency with which they used most modes of participation. Their recollections were quite precise for some instruments, however.

1. *Formal participation: written forms.* Not a single respondent ever wrote a letter of complaint (*chien chu hsin*) to a newspaper or to an individual upper-level official, and not a single respondent ever made use of the opinion boxes in his unit. In fact, the group regarded the latter device as no more than a hollow form. In a revealing illustration of this, a former leader of a work team recounted that during one village investigation where peasants failed to respond to the work team's invitation to fill the box with their views, the leaders of the team stuffed the opinion box to simulate peasant input as a means of intimidating village leaders.

Not all modes of formal participation were ignored so unanimously. Three respondents had filed formal written appeals through established channels against leadership actions and judgments affecting themselves personally. The appeals sought to reverse unfavorable reports or judgments which, if not altered, would have resulted in severe career setbacks. The sorts of issues treated in this way were not insignifi-

[7] This threefold division of the population into backward, medium, and progressive elements is discussed generally in Mao's "Some Questions Concerning Methods of Leadership" (1943). The specific figures for 1958-59 can be found in Mao's speech at the Lushan Plenum of the 8th CCP Central Committee. See *The Case Against Peng Te-huai,* Kowloon, Union Research Institute, 1968.

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Workers at the Shanghai No. 2 Camera Factory, joined by university students, write big-character posters of quotations of then Chairman Mao Tse-tung in 1967 during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

—China Photo Service via Eastfoto.

cant. One respondent who was suspected of "espionage links" (*t'e wu hsien-yi*), for example, wrote an appeal directly to Peking and got the pertinent unfavorable documentation removed from her file.

Respondents' attitudes toward "big-character" posters, a constitutionally sanctioned democratic form, were significant. Most posters were group authored and pseudonymously signed, partly to diffuse responsibility. Further, while most informants had written "big-character" posters in the early period of the Cultural Revolution, only 10 of 37 had made use of the political form since the Cultural Revolution. Nonritual use of "big-character" posters was not frequent. Only two informants reported using posters to advance their own opinions or interests, in both instances to retaliate against former enemies. In one such case, posters were used to articulate resentments traceable back to the "four cleans" movement of the 1960's.[8] The other informants claimed that their posters were written according to the imperatives of political mass campaigns such as the "anti-Lin" and "anti-Confucius" campaigns, and modeled after newspaper editorials of the day.

Was this pattern of participation atypical? According to the respondents, their own experience was close to the norm. They could cite almost no instances in their own villages which were at variance with the pattern described above or in contradiction to their own behavior. Most rural respondents reported *no* use of "big-character" posters in their villages after the Cultural Revolution. Those who did observe their use said the posters were written by educated village youth according to quotas established by the production brigade, with work points assigned for quota fulfillment. Posters were more in evidence in factories, government offices, and state farms. But those who used them described their drafting as a

[8]The "four cleans" movement was a rural rectification campaign conducted in the early 1960's. See Richard Baum and Frederick C. Tiewes, *Ssu-Ch'ing: The Socialist Education Movement of 1962-1966*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1968.

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collective, not an individual, endeavor, with groups seeking to tailor poster content to leadership requirements so as to get through "unscathed" (*kuo kuan*). Although many respondents knew indirectly of authentic instances of dissenting posters, including Li I-che's famous screed, they viewed such acts, with head-shaking admiration, as worthy but suicidal.[9]

2. *Formal participation: the meeting arena.* While formally sanctioned written instruments of democratic expression were infrequently utilized, according to our respondents, formal participation was far more frequent in the context of public meetings. There was also more discernible variation in citizen attendance levels and attention levels in such public forums. The analysis of such variations, however, is complicated by the fact that attendance policies varied by work unit and issue area. Some work units adopted compulsory attendance policies for public meetings, so that real variation occurred mainly in levels of "attentiveness." Under these circumstances, what was significant, in the words of one informant, was not "who came to meetings, but who remained awake." Other units encouraged attendance by awarding compensatory work points, particularly for daylight meetings, thus introducing pecuniary incentives for participation. In general, routine meetings not related to mass campaigns elicited variable attendance rates which depended on the immediate importance of the economic and other policy issues to be discussed. Important economic and planning meetings were well attended; routine meetings were less well attended. Political movements and campaigns, on the other hand, tended to generate pressures for universal attendance.

[9]Li I-che was the pen name of three former Red Guards who put up a wall poster in Canton in 1974 in which they criticized the Chinese leadership. For a discussion of the case and relevant translated documents, see *Chinese Law and Government* (White Plains, NY), Fall 1977.

Residents of all ages of Peking's Peihsinchiao District attend political night school, in 1975.

—EUPRA.

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Who spoke at the meetings? When issues were important and not politically sensitive, almost everyone did. Out of 37 respondents, 30 reported speaking out quite independently and "nonritually" at least twice a year. Factory workers generally commented on economic supplements and decisions on bonuses; while villagers focused on questions of work points, work grades, rations, outside work, and the like. Participation narrowed significantly when technical production issues were raised. On these subjects, older peasants or workers were deferred to, and their right to speak (*fa yen ch'uan*) and be listened to was recognized. On political issues of a sensitive or quasi-sensitive nature, the main participants tended to be the local activists. Finally, when mass meetings were held in the course of intense political campaigns, high general attendance was counterbalanced by low mass participation. During such meetings, one informant remarked, "they speak, and you listen."

Work unit elections offered significant scope both for participation and for interest articulation. Although the nomination process was controlled to a degree by the next higher administrative level, interference from above was limited by the desire to recruit natural local leaders with "standing" in their respective communities or units. Unit leadership elections in rural areas—for example, for production team heads and production committee members—elicited virtually total participation and considerable contention, including extensive lobbying efforts. Votes often split along lineage lines, and many rusticated youth "sent down" from urban areas reported "campaigning" for candidates who exhibited the most tolerance toward them. Of 21 rural respondents reporting on production team elections, 18 characterized them as "relatively democratic," especially since the Cultural Revolution.

3. *Informal participation: lobbying.* Clearly, some officially provided, formal modes of participation were widely used in the PRC. Nevertheless, the most frequent form of citizen participation involved, according to the respondents, what one study of political participation in the US has termed "particularized contacting," that is, personal contacting of authorities to voice views or demands.[10] This kind of participation tended to be face to face and to occur intermittently according to need. Ordinarily, such lobbying focused on personal grievances or demands related to such matters as work assignments, job ratings, travel permits, and interpersonal conflicts. Farmers who wanted to perform contract work during the slack agricultural off-season, or young people who felt their resettlement subsidies were being misappropriated by the work team might take these matters up directly with local leaders. This type of interaction was viewed as legitimate within the framework of mass-line politics and occurred so frequently that it proved impossible to measure satisfactorily. Where local lobbying proved to no avail, individuals could appeal beyond their immediate units, though only 6 out of the 37 respondents interviewed reported efforts to circumvent a local decision by appealing upward, over the heads of their immediate superiors.

4. *Quasi-legal participation.* Beyond the exercise of legal or customary rights to articulate grievances, most citizens were able to work quietly for certain goals through personal networks of connections, appeals to family ties, or benefit exchange relationships. For example, in many villages lineage connections were considered crucial to getting elected to village office, and also conferred access to benefits such as jobs in the brigade or commune factory, official permission to go "outside to work" (*tzuo san kung*), and recommendations to recruiters of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Urban "rusticated youth" had their own personal resources in the form of city connections, periodic access to urban goods, or introductions they could provide to rural team leaders and others bound for the city. Many former Red Guards had significant networks of region-wide personal contacts formed during the heyday of mass organizations. These were often effective in securing for them better treatment in their villages.

In addition, mild forms of bribery and, with greater risk, threats of violence were occasionally used to achieve personal goals. When all else failed, the right to remonstrate—i.e., to curse (*ma*)—was also generally viewed as legitimate. One respondent who had worked for two years in a Hunan village reported that when villagers had grievances it was customary for wives to stand in the doorways of their homes hurling imprecations, often for several days in a row.

Several conclusions emerge from these data. One is that the degree of variation among respondents in terms of levels of participation is less than one might have expected. To be sure, differences do appear in levels of formal political "activism," but when one measures the frequency of use of particular modes of participation, the amount of variation declines sharply. There is a surprisingly infrequent use by all respondents of the formal democratic modes of par-

[10]Sidney Verba and Norman Nie, *Participation in America*, New York, NY, Harper and Row, 1972, pp. 46-48.

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ticipation such as letters or "big-character" posters. But there is an equally surprising universal use of the less formal, more direct modes of participation. An effort will be made in the remainder of this essay to explain this pattern of activity.

General Constraints on Behavior

The reluctance of almost all respondents to use formal channels for interest advocacy can be explained partly in terms of perceived constraints limiting the use of these forms. The basic constraint voiced by all was fear of the potential sanctions which could accompany their actions. To speak out at a meeting, to write a letter of complaint, to write a "big-character" poster was to run the risk of speaking or writing "incorrectly" (*fan tsuo wu*). Such mistakes could carry penalties of varying severity, ranging from being asked to recant, to being required to undergo study, to being subjected to "struggle," or worse.[11] Similarly, to criticize a cadre, even if asked to do so, was to risk retaliation in the long run. Cadres controlled promotions, bonuses, economic benefits, leaves of absence, work points, job assignments, welfare benefits, educational opportunities, military service obligations, and other critical matters. Most respondents, therefore, were of the view that it was "better to be safe than to be sorry" (*tuo i shih pu ju shao i shih*). Cadre retaliation was not legitimate within the idealized conception of the "mass line," but it appears to have been common and to have bulked large in the calculations of respondents. All respondents could cite numerous instances of reprisals being taken by angry cadres. In fairness, though, it must be added that these were not seen as overwhelming deterrents to citizen participation. Almost all respondents conceded that reprisals were not that severe, since cadre retaliation was illegitimate and could not be direct or open. Moreover, on appeal one could often be vindicated in challenging the policy of the local leadership. Still, the respondents suggested that there was little point in courting the displeasure of those who controlled the important benefits available within the work unit.

A second constraint on participation mentioned was the narrow scope of effective input possible. All respondents appeared to have a clear sense of the policy limits within which legitimate participation could take place. Individuals had the right to air personal grievances and to address themselves to a limited range of remediable problems within the framework of existing policy. Thus, rusticated sent-down youth felt secure in invoking state policy to press for better housing and better treatment overall, and often used both meetings and work unit elections to work for these aims. Similarly, factory workers could appeal within state law for a fair share of economic supplements, housing, and other benefits, and peasants could address themselves particularly vigorously to the problems of securing equitable distribution of work points, private plots, and so on. But it was clearly understood that where state interests or state policy were infringed upon, the dialogue, on an open basis at least, was to cease. In rural areas, for example, production and requisition quotas were not to be subject to serious open discussion by "the masses." When asked to define and illustrate the term "bottom to top" (*tzu hsia el shang*) planning, not a single rural respondent was able to do so, despite the fact that the notion was a central tenet of the "mass line." Interviews with village leadership cadres revealed that in fact, "bottom" meant base-level leaders who participated at brigade and commune meetings, not "the masses." Industrial wages and excess grain allocations were additional issues that simply could not be raised openly or directly, though one could gripe about them quietly.

[11]For a discussion of the various forms of self-criticism and remolding, see Martin K. Whyte, *Small Groups and Political Rituals in China*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1974.

Lu Chung-yi (third from right), Vice-Director of the Shanghai Chiuhsin Shipyard, discusses production problems with workers and cadres during the Cultural Revolution.

—China Photo Service via Eastfoto.

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Five sent-down high-school and university-aged youth at work in 1971 on the Liu Ling Commune in Yenan Province, where they were members of the commune's Willow Grove Brigade.

—Audrey Topping/Photo Researchers.

During the Cultural Revolution, the term "going against the tide" (*fan ch'ao liu*) symbolized the responsibility of citizens to challenge *basic policy* where it was perceived to be ideologically incorrect. Therefore, all respondents were asked to give examples of citizens "going against the tide." Few could do so, and those who were able to cite instances where policy was challenged under this ideological dictum concluded by detailing the detention and remolding of the individuals involved. One informant recounted the experience of an informal Marxist political study group set up in one brigade (neighboring the respondent's own) to discuss the policy changes of the post-Cultural Revolution period. The group was forcibly disbanded, the members required to undergo study, and the leader of the group sentenced to labor reform. In a less ideological case, a member of an investigative work team challenged the work team's judgment against a particular rural leader in a village with which he was personally familiar. When overruled, the investigator, at great personal risk, took extreme measures to bring the case to the attention of higher authorities. In the short term, despite the harassment to which he was subjected, the investigator's judgment was vindicated. Not long after, however, his immediate superiors took quiet but effective reprisals against him. In conclusion, one respondent commented, "it's not really a question of 'going against the tide,' but a question of whose tide one opposes [*fan shei te (ch'ao) liu*] "—a statement which implies that dissenting views are rarely voiced unless they have appropriate upper-level backing.

Sources of Variation

The constraints on participation which have just been outlined had general applicability. Yet the respondents demonstrated clear differences in how they perceived and responded to them. Some individuals were more assertive than others. In part, this was a function of personality. One strongly self-assertive informant, who reported that he had been in hot water constantly, said, "I'm built that way." Beyond this, however, the choice of speaking out or remaining silent appeared to reflect each respondent's perception of (1) the risk involved; (2) the degree of incentive involved or the issue at stake; and (3) the likelihood of success of the initiative. Peasants whose economic interests were even fractionally damaged campaigned vigorously (*nao yi chien*), but seldom above the level of their own work team. They were generally mistrustful of the "upper level" and felt that all cadres were likely to be in league against them whatever they did. Conversely, sent-down youth, though often disgruntled, frequently failed to press their demands. Whereas peasants would fight over a few cents, sent-down youth often felt that the stakes were too small and the deck too stacked against them to warrant any effort. Besides, they often received some material assistance from home, and had a perceived exit option (home or Hong Kong) which reduced their combativeness. At the opposite pole, idealists at times attached such value to the principles at stake that they were prepared to disregard potential sanctions. In the six instances related by the respondents where representation was made above the immediate level of the work unit, powerful ideological and personal incentives were at work.

How any given individual weighed the risks and sanctions involved in personally making representations varied, according to the respondents' perceptions, with age, ethnic origin, class, political status, education, occupation, and work setting. While the compilation of interview data did not allow the systematic linking of such background factors to levels of participation (see Table 2), the comments of various respondents clearly demonstrated their relevance.

The perceived impact of political status appeared to be twofold, with both aspects legitimate in terms of

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TABLE 2. CLASS AND POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT

Class origin	(N)	Political behavior: Good	Political behavior: Median	Political behavior: Poor	Activism: Activist	Activism: Nonactivist	Nonritual participation: High	Nonritual participation: Median	Nonritual participation: Low
"Good" origins	**(8)**	2	6	—	2	6	1	1	6
Workers	(5)	1	4	—	1	4	—	1	4
Poor peasants	(2)	—	2	—	—	2	1	—	1
Revolutionary martyrs	(1)	1	—	—	1[a]	—	—	—	1
"Middling" origins	**(18)**	6	12	—	6	12	1	5	12
Professionals	(6)	3	3	—	3[a]	3	—	3	3
Middle peasants	(1)	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	1
Government workers	(8)	1	7	—	1[a]	7	—	1	7
Artisans and petty tradesmen	(3)	2	1	—	2[a]	1	1	1	1
"Poor" origins[b]	**(4)**	1	2	1	1	3	1	—	3
Overseas Chinese	**(7)**	2	3	2	2	5	2	2	3
Total sample	**(37)**								

NOTE: Class origin categories were grouped according to broad normative criteria ("Good," "Middling," and "Poor") defined both in ideological terms and in terms of the political perception of respondents. Returned Overseas Chinese have a secondary class label based on parental occupation and might have been classified on that basis. However, all tended to be perceived by authorities as to some degree "tainted" by their foreign connections (*hai wai kuan hsi*). As a result, they have been treated as a separate category.

Political behavior categories are standard and were based on self-assessment.

Evaluations of activism levels were based on self-reported roles and offices. For a good discussion of the notions of "activism" and "progressiveness," see Richard Solomon, "On Activism and Activists: Maoist Conceptions of Motivation and Political Role Linking State to Society," *China Quarterly* (London), June-August 1969.

Nonritual participation levels were derived from a composite based on self-reported, autonomous use of meeting arenas, movements, big-character posters, and instruments of appeal.

[a]Indicates Communist Youth League or Communist Party membership.
[b]Landlords, capitalists, counterrevolutionaries.

mass-line ideals. First, leaders tended to be far more receptive to the views of persons of good class origin and to accord them greater weight. They also gave such persons greater access to channels for making their views known. For example, most investigative work teams did not poll entire villages, but instead sought out "reliable" informants from among the ranks of activists and poor and lower-middle peasants. Second, poor peasants and workers were less vulnerable if they made "mistakes." Their mistakes were treated as examples of "contradiction within the people," meriting lighter sanctions. The same incorrect act by a person of more questionable class origin or political status could be interpreted as "class revenge" (*chieh chi pao fu*) and classified as reflecting "antagonistic contradiction," thus leading to the application of harsh sanctions. Most of the older respondents were very sensitive to this distinction. They preferred silence to potential transgression.

Education appeared to affect participation in a more ambiguous way. On the one hand, education conferred skills and resources (information, connections, knowledge of laws, mastery of symbols) which made for more effective participation. Many of the better-educated respondents felt that their mastery of Mao's works and their wider political knowledge were assets in politics. On the other hand, education rendered one more vulnerable to criticism. The more education one had, the more culpable one would be presumed to be in the event of errors, since ignorance would be ruled out as a mitigating factor.

Age differences also accounted for some of the variation in participation patterns. Lack of experience and youthful idealism made many younger respondents less sensitive to the constraints and risks which inhibited older citizens. Several respondents commented that they had participated "nonritually" only once in their lives, during adolescence, and had "learned better." Yet it appears that the young were more active for other reasons as well. First, they were

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ambitious, and their horizons had not yet been constricted by age and disappointment. Second, family responsibilities did not yet fully absorb their time, so that they had more energy and greater leisure time to devote to politics as an attractive form of recreation in the village.

Interestingly, ethnic differences were a distinct source of variation even in this limited sample. The most clearly autonomous participants were the Overseas Chinese (N=7). Idealistic and less well socialized by the political system, they constantly ran afoul of unwritten norms. Half of the small number of strong nonritualistic participators were Overseas Chinese. "Why are all you Overseas Chinese so innocent [*chien tan*]?" was a revealing question put by a Kwangtungese ex-Red Guard to a young Overseas Chinese student. It suggests that Overseas Chinese activism was well known, at least in Kwangtung. The group of respondents was too small to support any generalization about the impact of provincial origin on participation, but Kwangtung students who had worked in North China regarded Northerners as far more independent and questioning (*t'iao-p'i ta-tan*) than their own coprovincials, whom they surprisingly characterized as more responsive to authority (*t'ing hua*).

Beyond the effect of background factors, the willingness to participate and the strategy of participation adopted was strongly influenced by certain widely shared procedural norms. One of the most striking findings of the present survey was the significant degree of confidence which respondents attached to certain "rules of the game," which they saw as mitigating risks. Respondents referred to the "right to speak" (*fa yen ch'uan*), a term which implied professional or work credentials which conferred eligibility to speak out. Mao's slogan "no investigation, no right to speak" (*mei yu tiao ch'a mei yu fa yen chuan*) is in this spirit. Old peasants or tempered political activists had the standing "to speak," depending on the policy issues to be addressed, though informants insisted that there was no absolute "right to speak." Further, the risk of being criticized for mistakes was reduced to the extent that one's viewpoint had a foundation in fact (*yu ken chu*). If one could prove entitlement to benefits or the accuracy of a complaint, the likelihood of severe criticism was lessened, and the chance of having one's action characterized later as reflecting an antagonistic class stand was reduced. Risk was also diminished if input in a particular policy area was legitimate in terms of existing statutes. For example, Overseas Chinese felt able to rely on the special protective features of Overseas Chinese policy to secure changes in their situations, and they frequently did so. On the other hand, surprisingly few rural respondents could cite instances where legislated guarantees of work-team and individual autonomy—the "Sixty Points"[12]—were used by peasants to protest state policy or cadre actions. They explained that in sensitive policy areas, invoking state policy to challenge state policy could be seen as "waving the red flag to oppose the red flag," a most dangerous charge.

One concrete example of reliance on statutory protection was provided by a sent-down youth who had been assigned to a county agricultural machinery plant in Ch'inghai. He was energetic and able and sought to establish a record of achievement that might make his return to East China possible. He concentrated on plant production innovations to distinguish himself in the "three great struggles" (class struggle, struggle for production, struggle for scientific innovation); but he was consistently balked by a conservative group of cadres in the plant, who refused to adopt his proposed improvements or even contemplate change. Despite his invocation of Mao's works and citation of the experience of other model units, he was unable to budge the leadership, which had been antagonized by his efforts. He was progressively assigned the most arduous and least creative tasks in the plant. Ultimately, he decided to appeal to the county bureau in charge of the plant. When his appeal was referred to the plant leadership for comment, the leadership reacted by ejecting him from the plant and strewing his personal belongings in the street in front of the dormitory. He returned to the county bureau, which offered him shelter for several days and eventually arranged his reinstatement, a self-criticism by the plant manager, and recognition of the innovator's contribution. The sent-down youth's calculation that he would be vindicated on appeal was sustained. His confidence in administrative "due process" as a basis for political action was shared in striking measure by most respondents.

Contextual Variations

In addition to individual and procedural variations, contextual variations clearly affected rates and modes of participation. When whole areas of state policy were deliberately opened up for mass debate—as in the current debate on education—citizen input in-

[12]The "Sixty Points" redefined the structure of rural communes in the wake of the Great Leap Forward and provided for the increased economic autonomy of both individuals and production teams. See Parris Chang, *Power and Policy in China*, University Park, PA, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1975, pp. 131-33.

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creased dramatically. Rural respondents had a keen sense of when prevailing state policy was under attack or reconsideration. Long-dormant demands could legitimately surface at such times, at much reduced risk. Even so, prudence was necessary in order to avoid problems when the next swing of the policy pendulum occurred. Moreover, nearly all respondents expressed doubt that mass campaigns offered much leeway for autonomous political participation. Pressure for uniformity and the careful monitoring of campaign results meant increased vulnerability for the individual. Too obviously personal a use of a major campaign might arouse the grave charge that one was trying to "divert the spearhead" of the movement. The best strategy for coping with campaigns, whatever one's personal enthusiasm for their aims, was to stick closely to officially enunciated state policy. The two respondents who used campaign-generated opportunities to advance personal goals got into trouble in the process.

Regardless of whether a campaign was going on or not, the "work setting" was a crucial contextual factor

Two members of a May 7 cadre school engaged in study. Cadre schools provide much of the leadership for the PRC's local participatory forums.

—Vincent Mentzel.

conditioning participation. Respondents described the countryside as considerably "looser" politically than the cities. While peasants were severely constrained economically, they enjoyed a well entrenched freedom to gripe, to curse, and in some villages even to listen to Hong Kong radio. Several urban respondents with long experience in the village expressed the view that the "control system" really applied to the 200 million Chinese who live in cities, not to the peasantry.

But while urban respondents were impressed by the relative directness and openness of rural society, peasant respondents were not convinced. Certainly, the conventional view that cadres have few real means with which to intimidate peasants appears to be an oversimplification. Rural respondents cited many instances, for example, where economic levers were used to press for political unity. "If they didn't like your views or behavior," reported one interviewee, "a militiaman might move into your house, refuse to let you go to work, make you study all day, deprive you of work points, etc."

Short of such direct pressure, social constraints in the countryside operated to restrict the scope and extent of participation. Peasants were tied to the land, and had to live with and cooperate with their neighbors. "Face" was an important consideration limiting criticism of the cadres. Unless a cadre's behavior directly impinged on one's livelihood, few peasants were inclined to challenge the leadership. Furthermore, most cadres were regarded as good, hard-working, honest people, who were entitled to the small benefits they got in compensation for the difficulties of their jobs. The small pool of eligible natural leaders—i.e., those with appropriate personality traits, production skills, experience, and lineage connections—narrowed the real candidate choices production-team members had. If one challenged the existing leadership, one might be asked to do the job oneself, thus entailing unrewarding and costly personal sacrifice. Alternatively, a successful challenge might lead to the appointment of someone less competent, with subsequent impact on the team's collective livelihood. Even where grievances were severe, peasants frequently preferred not to articulate them directly but to relay their complaints secretly to sent-down youths, who, with far fewer stakes in the village, might feed the information to investigating cadres.

In addition, constraints on participation in the countryside sometimes were inherent in the democratic process itself and in the application of the principle of majority rule. Membership in a small sublineage in a single lineage village, for example,

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often excluded one from effective participation, because of the dominance on the production committee of the main lineage. Similarly, sent-down youth complained that in the allotment of work points the democratic process operated to their disadvantage, since, despite a preferential state policy, local teams leaders and peasants would gang up to downgrade the work performance of the student outsiders. "You couldn't win," commented one informant.

In urban China, limitations on participation appeared to be more strongly felt. Informants reported a far greater sense of constraint in urban factories, where hierarchic command systems were in operation, than in rural settings. The constraints applied, moreover, both while the individual was at work on the factory floor and while he was at rest in the factory dormitory. Of course, even in the countryside the openness which respondents perceived appeared partly to be a function of and to vary according to differing systems of work organization. Respondents who had worked both on state farms and on communes, for instance, reported the latter to be far looser than the former, where quasi-military systems of organization were used. Differentiation in the countryside notwithstanding, however, respondents still reported less leeway to speak freely in urban than in rural settings. Similarly, sanctions were more severe and more readily applied in the city than in the village.

In all work units, rural and urban, the single most critical factor conditioning participation was the style of the individual leader. A representative comment by a young peasant conveys this:

When old Yang was in control, we could say what we wanted. He was not afraid of the views of the masses. When young Chang took over we had to be more careful. He didn't like listening to criticism and would get you into trouble.

Similar comments were made about the importance of the style of leading cadres for all work units represented in this sample.

The problem of leadership work style was seen by many informants as having been mitigated by the Cultural Revolution. There was a broad consensus that the Cultural Revolution had had a positive "democratizing" effect on society. Out of 37 respondents, 32 felt that the Cultural Revolution had made a "significant difference" in this regard. The difference specified was mainly atmospheric, but in the view of 25 interviewees, it represented an "important" and "permanent" change. One respondent added that its main effect was to permit differentiation between the CCP as a corporate entity and party members as individuals. After the Cultural Revolution, he said, "you could feel free to criticize party members without feeling that you were attacking the party. This is a big change." Few felt that the "great order" now being sought by CCP Chairman Hua Kuo-feng would have the effect of reducing the openess initiated by the Cultural Revolution.

Some of the thousands of Chinese who marched through Peking on October 20, 1976, to demonstrate their support for CCP Chairman Hua Kuo-feng and their condemnation of the Gang of Four.

—SYGMA.

Conclusions, Implications, Prospects

The data generated by the present study suggest that, organizational, social, and political constraints notwithstanding, significant nonritual participation does take place in China, under conditions well un-

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derstood by all participants. Although there appears to be infrequent use of formal "democratic" instruments, and although mobilization instruments do not often serve as effective input channels, alternate forums allow for important, if limited, forms of genuine participation.

In particular, informal lobbying and personal networks seem to constitute the basic techniques and resources by which citizens pursue their goals. Chinese citizens choose among alternative channels of political participation in a rationally calculating manner, balancing risk and incentive in light of the "rules of the game." And their strategies appear predicated on the basic predictability and fairness of the system. One can discern from this pattern of behavior a basic orientation toward politics which combines caution, respect, and defensive individualism.

How valid are these findings? There are grounds for confidence in the picture of participation generated by this study. Despite the skewed nature of the respondent sample, a consensus which cut across all class and occupational backgrounds emerged in regard to both the opportunities for and the constraints upon participation. It is of course possible to argue that the informants' views were "homogenized" by their common experience with the political system, i.e., experience leading to their departure from China. In other words, one might argue that theirs is the "refugee view." This would not necessarily be a valid inference, however. All respondents were asked to contrast their views with those of others in the work units to which they belonged prior to their departure from China. Their responses supported the hypothesis that their views, while not fully representative, were in all likelihood the views of China's "lukewarm" middle. The consensus portrayed, therefore, may not adequately reflect the enthusiasm of committed "activists," but it may capture the common perspectives of the relatively less "political" majority of citizens.

A final methodological question which might be asked is whether the conclusions reached are in part a consequence of the survey approach adopted. Does the study, by focusing primarily on efforts by individual citizens to advance their personal and ideological goals within the system, perhaps neglect forms of collective participation which might elicit significant, regular, and spontaneous involvement. I would suggest not. The efforts of the CCP to transform popular consciousness in the direction of collective community participation are well known, and no implication is intended here that such efforts have been unsuccessful. Nevertheless, the interview findings suggest that, regardless of a citizen's goals and values, in the PRC the system tends to teach a prudential stance vis-à-vis the risks and rewards of participatory action.

In conclusion, consideration should be given to the possibility that many of the views reported are associated with the contentious era of the Cultural Revolution and with the turbulence of the political environment during those years. Many critical charges involving the curtailment of "democratic rights" are now being laid at the feet of the deposed Gang of Four, which is attacked for intimidating Chinese citizens and enforcing surface conformity. The charges may be valid, and certainly cannot be rejected on the basis of the evidence presented in a study which has focused primarily on the post-Cultural Revolution years. One should keep in mind, however, that the Cultural Revolution was perceived by almost all respondents as "democratizing" in its impact on Chinese politics—a view which should qualify efforts to portray the 1970's as unrelievedly oppressive politically. It may well be that current efforts in China to open up more channels for critical input (e.g., the renewed emphasis on "letter columns") will serve to extend and consolidate the gains of the Cultural Revolution. But one could also hypothesize the opposite, that the open factional conflict of the 1970's served to legitimize public debate, and therefore that the official disgrace of those who inherited the legacy of the Cultural Revolution may mean a decrease in certain kinds of citizen participation. It will certainly affect differentially the participation rates of various groups in society, with intellectuals becoming more vocal and other groups less so.

The respondents, when asked to comment on the impact of the fall of the Gang of Four, challenged the idea that a new era of "liberalism" was dawning. Instead, they viewed recent events as contributing to a new era of conformism and orthodoxy. The changes evident since Mao Tse-tung's death were welcomed by older, more highly educated citizens, who saw them as bringing a new predictability and rationality to Chinese politics. But they were deplored by many younger respondents, who saw them as retrogressive and authoritarian. Both groups were skeptical about prospects that the new leadership of China could successfully recreate the authority patterns of the 1950's and 1960's. Both held that the psychological effects of years of open factional battle in China had been to produce a generation of young Chinese far bolder and more questioning (*t'iao-p'i ta-tan*) than themselves. To the extent that this proves true, a central Maoist goal will have been achieved.

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Caribbean Leftism

By W. Raymond Duncan

In the decade following Cuba's Revolution of 1959, international relations in the Caribbean were shaped almost exclusively by Havana's foreign policy, the consequent growth in the influence of the USSR, and US policy responses. Now a new force is at work in the region—the influence of leftist ideas and political movements, which is widely perceived to be increasing within the countries in and around the Caribbean. Leftism, as defined here, draws its force from a broadly shared desire to foster more equal income distributions and to improve the social and economic lot of the Caribbean's "common man." By the same token, many Caribbean leaders, some Marxist and others not, are prepared to turn to traditionally "leftist" governmental responses—i.e., state control of the economy, social mobilization, etc.—in the face of the severe policy dilemmas which today confront almost every country in the region. Thus, understanding the Caribbean's international relations in the 1970's requires us to go beyond the analysis of Cuban and Soviet foreign policies in the area and take into account more explicitly other forces generating growing leftist perceptions.

These newly emerging attitudes are rooted, first and foremost, in the region's generally stagnating economies and are intensified by the social strains arising from population growth and urbanization and from persistent, even sharpening, interethnic tensions. Leftist sentiments are generated by the very intensity of the search for policy solutions to these problems. But leftist forces also benefit from the popular tendency to associate slow economic growth and weak social development with the economies and political systems of the capitalist West. For many people—though not all—this image is bolstered by the proximity and example of Cuba and by a smoldering antipathy toward the United States that is part of the region's colonial legacy.

Not all Caribbean leaders, however, are uniformly convinced of the merits of leftist diagnoses and nostrums, or equally quick to deny the potential utility of Western economic aid and market-based economic policies. To be sure, almost all the governments of the region have significantly expanded their contacts with the Soviet Union and other communist states during the past decade. Yet this development must be understood in the light of the willingness of many political leaders to accept economic advice and assistance from wherever they are available. Furthermore, several governments and many political and economic officials continue to favor more gradualistic, less statist economic policies. A number also place relatively higher value on the political and civil freedoms emphasized by Western regimes. The result is that although growing leftism may be the main tendency on the contemporary political stage in the Caribbean, this leftism is marked by a striking range and diversity of opinions and groupings. When set against the background of great differences among the region's countries in social setting and level of development, the richness of this political spectrum warns against any easy generalizations about either the present state or future prospects of Caribbean leftism.

In the essay that follows, we first will sort out the social, economic, and political factors that contribute to the current turmoil in the region. Then, we will consider briefly the resulting diversity of perspectives and movements by looking at four important variants of contemporary Caribbean leftism. Finally, we will explore in greater depth the evolution and present situation of leftist forces in two countries, Guyana

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

A mass rally of the People's National Movement in Port of Spain, Trinidad, in support of the reelection campaign of the party's leader, Prime Minister Eric Williams of Trinidad and Tobago.

—Pictorial Parade.

and Jamaica. In this way, we should be able to identify the most important common sources of the region's volatility and increasing tilt toward the left, while also stressing the differences in specific policy dilemmas and domestic political contexts that distinguish the prospects of leftist forces in one country from those in another.

Economic and Social Strains

The most immediate cause of increasing leftist political influence in the Caribbean today surely is to be found in the economic stagnation that pervades so much of the region. In recent years, many Caribbean countries have suffered dramatically slowed and/or sharply erratic economic growth rates (see Table 1). Assessment of this fact, of course, is complicated somewhat by important differences among the area's countries in recent economic performance, as well as by striking disparities in level of development. Barbados, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Trinidad and Tobago, for example, appear to be in much better shape than Jamaica or, lately, Guyana, in terms of economic growth. On the other hand, Jamaica has a per capita national income that is nearly 45 percent greater than that of the Dominican Republic and approximately equal to that of Barbados (see Table 1).

Although these differences underscore the complexity of any summary judgment about the state of the regional economy, they do not soften very much

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Table 1. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for Selected Caribbean Countries, 1973–77.

Country	Annual growth rates, GDP (in percent) 1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	GDP in 1977[a] (US$ in millions)	Per capita GDP in 1977[a] (US$)
Barbados	3.1	−2.8	1.3	3.8	4.7	303.4	1,248.70
Dominican Republic	12.1	6.9	5.6	6.4	3.3	4,168.3	837.30
Guyana	2.2	4.5	7.3	1.8	−3.7	207.0	250.90
Haiti	3.0	3.4	1.3	4.3	2.5	896.6	189.20
Jamaica	−2.6	−2.1	−1.0	−6.9	−5.0	2,497.3	1,203.50
Trinidad and Tobago	−0.3	−1.2	1.0	5.7	4.1	1,510.8	1,328.70

[a]Measured in 1976 constant dollars.

SOURCE: Figures for GDP and per capita GDP were provided by the Statistics and Quantitative Analysis Section of the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), Washington, DC. Annual growth rates were calculated by the author on the basis of the numbers supplied. The author would like to thank especially the personnel in the IADB for making available the data in this table and in Table 2.

the view that regional economic conditions generally are bad. Indeed, the data reveal just how impoverished are the societies of Haiti and Guyana; and they suggest the frustrations which a slowed growth rate has produced among the population of Jamaica, whose expectations are geared to relatively much higher levels of development.

At the same time, additional burdens are imposed by high inflation rates that prevail throughout the Caribbean. Prices recently have been rising sharply in Barbados, the Dominican Republic, Guyana, Jamaica, Surinam, and Trinidad and Tobago.[1] While much less extreme than that in Latin American countries like Argentina and Chile (447 and 212 percent, respectively, in 1976), such inflation still presents a major threat to local economic—and political—stability. These price movements are partly linked to the enormous rises in international commodity prices during the last few years—especially fuel prices—although they are also related to rapidly mounting domestic wage costs. The wage hikes, moreover, have seldom been matched by corresponding increases in labor productivity. In fact, they serve as a good indicator of the strength of the Caribbean's powerful trade union movement (through whose organizations, incidentally, many of today's Caribbean leaders rose to prominence).

Most of the Caribbean's countries also suffer chronically high levels of unemployment. During the 1960's, the number of unemployed regularly ran from 15 to 20 percent of the working population in most of the region,[2] and the 1970's certainly have not witnessed significant declines in these figures. Currently, unemployment hovers around 20 percent in Barbados and Guyana. By the end of 1976, it had reportedly reached 26 percent in Jamaica and stood higher still in the slum areas surrounding Kingston. Even in oil-rich Trinidad and Tobago, unemployment has expanded continually since 1965; one projection estimates a rate of 20 percent by 1985 in this "showcase of the Caribbean."[3] Finally, to these official unemployment rates might be added perhaps another 10 percent now hidden in agricultural underemployment.

The roots of this at first glance paradoxical mix of high inflation and unemployment with slow economic growth derive, to a large extent, from the structural dualism of the regional economy. That is, there exists in most of these countries a predominantly high-wage, capital-intensive *modern* sector, typically owned and controlled by foreign-based multinational corporations, alongside a low-wage, labor-intensive *traditional* sector. The latter tends to be found in handicrafts, services, and agriculture; the former is characteristic of the minerals-extraction and -pro-

[1]The International Monetary Fund reports the following movements in consumer price indices in the Caribbean, with 1975 as the base year:

	1976	1977	1978 (first quarter)
Bahamas	104.3	107.7	111.1
Barbados	105.0	113.7	119.2
Dominican Republic	107.7	121.6	—
Guyana	109.0	117.9	—
Haiti	107.0	114.0	—
Jamaica	109.6	122.1	134.6
Surinam	110.1	120.0	—
Trinidad and Tobago	110.5	123.6	131.4

See International Monetary Fund, *International Financial Statistics* (Washington, DC), June 1978.

[2]See *Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implications for the United States*, prepared by the US Department of State and released by the US Department of Commerce, by country and by year.

[3]Rickey Singh, " 'Crisis' Unemployment in Trinidad," *Caribbean Contact* (Port of Spain), January 1978, pp. 1, 20.

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cessing industries, although investment in capital-intensive production in agriculture has been increasing.

The modern sector, of course, has experienced the most rapid growth and presents the most attractive opportunities for investment capital. Yet, this sector requires labor skills and training that not many among the native populations have, while offering far fewer total job slots than the region's rapidly expanding labor force could fill. Ironically, the recent tendency to raise the capital-intensiveness of agriculture is largely a response to chronically low agricultural productivity, a problem partly attributable to the ambivalent (often negative) feelings of much of the Caribbean's black population toward agricultural labor—feelings clearly linked to the historical experience of slavery. This ambivalence, moreover, has probably encouraged the current stream of rural-to-urban migrants, a movement reinforced by declining total agricultural employment opportunities. Such migration, not surprisingly, has merely swelled urban populations and added to burgeoning unemployment.

Tourism, meanwhile, which does provide an important source of employment and national income for most Caribbean countries, is much less the uniformly positive stimulus to economic development that it is frequently assumed to be. Many hotels and other tourist facilities are foreign owned, a factor which tends to limit the proportion of profits reinvested in the local economy. At the same time, much of the food and other products consumed by the visitors has to be imported. Moreover, the presence of many affluent tourists often seems to have an insidious "demonstration effect"—raising popular

Rapid population growth and increased migration from rural to urban areas have resulted in stark contrasts in housing development in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic. Above, modern apartments and shantytowns grow side by side.

—Carl Frank/Photo Researchers.

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Table 2. Demographic Trends in Selected Caribbean Countries, 1960–77.

Country	Total population, 1977[a] (in thousands)	Average annual population growth (in percent)		
		Total population, 1960–77	Total population, 1972–77	Urban population, 1960–77
Bahamas	(221)	—	(3.0)[b]	—
Barbados	243	0.2	0.3	1.0
Dominican Republic	4,978	3.0	3.0	6.0
Grenada	(108)	(1.0)[c]	—	—
Guyana	825	2.3	2.3	4.8
Haiti	4,739	1.7	1.6	3.9
Jamaica	2,075	1.5	1.5	7.1
Surinam	(429)	—	(1.9)[d]	—
Trinidad and Tobago	1,137	1.9	1.6	4.4

[a]Except for the Bahamas, Grenada, and Surinam, all figures are for June 30, 1977; figures for the three countries mentioned are for January 1978.
[b]For the period July 1973-July 1976.
[c]For the period July 1960-July 1975.
[d]For the period January 1970-January 1975.

SOURCES: Figures for Barbados, the Dominican Republic, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago were provided by the Statistics and Quantitative Analysis Section of the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), Washington, DC. Annual growth figures from 1960-77 for both total and urban population are available in Inter-American Development Bank, *Informe Anual 1977*, Washington, DC, 1978, pp. 80-81. Annual growth figures for 1972-77 for total population were calculated by the author, based on data supplied by the IADB.

Figures for the Bahamas, Grenada, and Surinam are taken from US Central Intelligence Agency, *National Basic Intelligence Factbook*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, January 1978, pp. 12, 82, and 196. Due to differences in estimation methods, *Factbook* numbers are not strictly comparable to those provided by the IADB, hence they are presented in parentheses.

aspirations to a consumer-oriented "good life" which the local economy cannot sustain, aspirations which nevertheless lead to a preoccupation with (imported) consumer durables on the part of those who *can* afford to buy them.[4] Such purchases have only a small (if any) multiplier effect on local economic activity, and they represent a further drain of resources which might otherwise be used to generate local economic development.

Thus, the central economic problem for the vast majority of countries in the Caribbean is most often perceived as one of how to accumulate internal savings—or obtain some other form of financing—in order to promote more balanced economic development which takes special account of growing urban labor surpluses. It is not surprising, then, that leaders such as Jamaica's Michael Manley believe that states must move to assert much greater local control over their economies, and over foreign economic interests in particular.

This perception on the part of some members of the Caribbean political elite has its counterpart, of course, among the Caribbean masses, where attitudes also arise from concrete circumstances. Thus, demographic realities and the accelerating rates of rural-to-urban migration and urbanization promise to continue to aggravate unemployment pressures and related social strains well into the future (see Table 2). Although the small size of the region's countries might easily lead one to suppose that urbanization hardly posed a problem, population growth, economic stagnation, and the tremendous desire for a better life have helped fuel an ever-widening flood of people from the countryside to the bright lights of capital cities. Furthermore, the Caribbean's population is preponderantly *young*. In 1973, over 50 percent of the populations of the Dominian Republic, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago were 19 years old or younger. In contrast, the corresponding figures for the US and Canada were 37 and 40 percent, respectively.[5] And while population growth rates—like economic conditions—vary throughout the region, the annual rate of net increase is above 2.0 percent in the Bahamas, the Dominican Republic, and Guyana.[6] Net population growth in Jamaica would

[4]See Mahmood A. Ayub and Eric D. Cruikshank, "The Political Economy of the Caribbean," *Finance and Development* (Washington, DC), December 1977, pp. 40-41.

[5]Secretary-General of the Organization of American States, *America en Cifras, 1974: Situacion Demografica* (America in Figures, 1974: The Demographic Situation), Washington, DC, 1974.

[6]That in Cuba, by way of comparison, runs at about 1.7 percent. See US Department of State, *Background Notes on Cuba*, Washington, DC, February 1978, p. 1.

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Table 3. Racial Distribution in Selected Caribbean Countries, 1977.

(in percent of total population)

Country	African/Negro	East Indian	Amerindian	Creole	Mestizo	Mixed	European/White	Others
Bahamas	80					10	10	
Barbados[a]	80					17	4	
Belize	51		19		22			8
Bermuda	63						37	
Dominican Republic	84[b]						16	
Grenada	100[c]							
Guyana	43	51	4					2
Haiti	100[d]							
Jamaica	76					20	3	1
Surinam[a]	10	37	3	31			1	19
Trinidad and Tobago	43	40				14	1	2

[a]Percentages do not add up to 100 because of rounding.
[b]Includes 73 percent mulatto.
[c]Source reports no other ethnic groups of significant size.
[d]Includes 10 percent mulatto.

SOURCE: US Central Intelligence Agency, *National Basic Intelligence Factbook,* Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, January 1978.

doubtless be much greater than its present 1.5 percent annual increase were it not for Jamaica's relatively high rate of emigration.

These figures paint a grim picture. Young people, who are now entering Caribbean cities and labor markets in increasing numbers, generally are inexperienced and unskilled or poorly trained. They face dismal job prospects in economies where capital-intensive production constitutes an increasing share of national income and a strong downward constraint on the expansion of total employment.

Meanwhile, urban growth has greatly increased the need and demand for public services, thus adding to the burdens of already overextended economic and political systems. In 1970 in central Kingston, for example, only 14 percent of all dwellings had water piped within the building, 80 percent of all households shared toilet facilities with others, and 43 percent of all dwellings consisted of one room only.[7] For the average black West Indian adequate police protection, water and sewage systems, and recreational opportunites are genuine rarities; breakdowns in public transport and deplorable health and postal services are a normal feature of everyday life. Crime, violence, and a high level of social tension are the most obvious results of these conditions. Together with the strains generated by the visibility of great income inequality,[8] such a social context provides fertile ground for radical sentiments and for the emergence of widespread popular support for leftist political leaders and movements.

Here, however, it is useful to enter a caution of sorts, for the extent to which economic factors determine domestic political alignments should not be overstated. Caribbean politics in general—and leftist politics in particular—are also conditioned in many countries by deeply rooted racial divisions and the serious impediments these present to the building of national unity. Throughout the region, the existence of racial fragmentation has shaped political institutions, obstructed the achievement of domestic consensus on economic development strategies, undermined the legitimacy of formal political authority, and even encouraged competing leftist political factions. The figures in Table 3 underscore the complexity and diversity of the region's racial settings.

Guyana, whose population is about equally divided between blacks and East Indians, presents a classic case of the importance of race in politics. Although Dr. Cheddi Jagan is a self-proclaimed Marxist and

[7]L. Alan Eyre, "Quasi-Urban 'Melange' Settlement and Its Problems," paper presented to the meeting of the Caribbean Studies Association, Santiago, Dominican Republic, January 1978. The author is Professor of Geography at the University of the West Indies, Mona, Jamaica.

[8]Reliable studies on income distribution in the Caribbean are rare. One study in the mid-1960's suggested that in Jamaica the top 5 percent of the island's wage earners were making roughly 25 times as much as the bottom 20 percent; in Trinidad and Tobago the situation was reportedly similar. See E. Ahiram, "Distribution of Income in Trinidad-Tobago and Comparison with the Distribution of Income in Jamaica," *Social and Economic Studies* (Mona, Jamaica), Vol. 15, 1966, p. 105.

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head of the Marxist People's Progressive Party (PPP), he is also an East Indian; the PPP draws its membership and support primarily from the same racial group. Guyana's Prime Minister, Forbes Burnham, although not a Marxist, has long been regarded as leftist in orientation; and his recent policies have revealed an even sharper slant in that direction. Yet his party, the People's National Congress (PNC), is predominantly black. Of course, each party attempts to project a racially neutral public image in the course of electoral campaigns. In fact, each party also makes available campaign resources at the grass-roots level for racially-based appeals for votes.[9]

In Trinidad and Tobago a similar racial balance prevails. Here too, blacks and East Indians comprise the two major racial groups, and as in Guyana they are separated by different values, life goals, customs, beliefs, and institutions. Members of each group also tend to adhere to common patterns of residence and employment—East Indians are predominantly rural residents engaged in agricultural work, while blacks dominate the country's urban settlements and urban-situated jobs—and each tends to be associated with a different political party. The People's National Movement (PNM), led by Prime Minister Eric Williams, is largely black; its chief opposition is the Democratic Labor Party (DLP), whose leadership is East Indian. However, the DLP has not proved an especially strong or effective alternative to the PNM. In fact, spurred on by the lack of political consensus in this ethnically fragmented country, a strong black-power movement erupted in 1970 and appears to offer serious potential *black* leftist opposition to the Eric Williams government.

Finally, Jamaica provides still another variant of racial politics in the Caribbean. Whites and light-skinned nonwhites traditionally have dominated Jamaica's politics and economy, although fully 80 pecent of the island's population is of African descent. This situation has over time given rise to considerable hostility among significant numbers of blacks toward whites and other, relatively more affluent racial minorities.[10]

Thus, the political significance of economic conditions in the Caribbean must be appraised against a background of complex multiracial settings. The joint influence of these two factors has led both to similarities and to important differences in the nature and array of political forces among the area's states. However, Caribbean politics is not the result of only economic and social causes. The region's history and certain geopolitical considerations also are important, especially in regard to the rise of Caribbean leftism.

Geopolitical Concerns

The two most obvious geographical features of the majority of Caribbean states are their small size and insular condition, both of which raise significant economic, social, and political problems. On one level, important barriers to economic development are posed by a vulnerability to violent windstorms, limited natural resources, the small size of individual consumer markets and diseconomies of scale, high transport costs of imports, and the scarcity of land in the face of expanding populations.

Insularity also seems to promote self-contained perceptions of the world, a tendency by each of the island's leaders to see their own state as superior to those of their neighbors. It would be inaccurate to describe these perceptions as conventional nationalism, at least in the sense that the latter usually is attributed to a homogeneous ethno-racial group of common self- and communal identity. As we have seen, many of these islands embrace ethnically fragmented societies of high color and racial consciousness. But such feelings of uniqueness and individuality do stimulate a kind of insular jealousy and rivalry that runs throughout the region, although only seldom does it break into open conflict.

The widespread sense of political, social, and economic distinctiveness presents, in turn, an obstacle to the realization of feelings of *regional* identity and/or unity. These sentiments, as well as the great distances that separate many of the islands, make it difficult to sustain a level of intraregional economic cooperation that might conceivably offer a partial solution to the region's collective development needs. The difficulties in maintaining regional unity were highlighted by the collapse of the Federation of the West Indies in 1962.[11] Although since then the Carib-

[9]Ralph Premdas, *Party Politics and Racial Division in Guyana*, Denver, CO, University of Denver Center on International Race Relations, 1972-73.

[10]See Carl Stone, "Race and Nationalism in Urban Jamaica," *Caribbean Studies* (Rio Piedras, Puerto Rico), January 1974, pp. 5-32.

[11]The Federation of the West Indies came into being in 1958 and comprised all the British Caribbean territories except Guyana and British Honduras. It was designed, among other things, to foster economic cooperation and political integration under a federal government. Its demise resulted from severe divisions caused by geography, history, and levels of economic development. See Sir Fred Phillips, *Freedom in the Caribbean*, Dobbs Ferry, NY, Oceana Publications Inc., 1977; G. Pope Atkins, *Latin America in the International Political System*, New York, NY, The Free Press, 1977, pp. 297-99.

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

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bean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA—founded in 1965)[12] and the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM—founded in 1972)[13] have experienced greater success, each of these organizations has endured continuing conflicts among its constituent member states.

Of course, the achievement of regional unity is hampered by factors other than those arising from insularity. The sea divides these states not only physically, but also politically. Governments vary in political status—from complete independence, to independence with British Commonwealth membership (e.g., Barbados, Jamaica), to self-governing colonial dependence (e.g., Belize). Both political cultures and languages differ according to whether countries have historically been most closely linked with England, Spain, France, or the Netherlands. Countries vary in their approaches to economic development. And in spite of their general smallness in comparison with most of the littoral states of the hemisphere, the Caribbean lands evince important differences in size, population, and natural resource endowments, leading to fears of potential domination by others (e.g., by Cuba), or simply to the kinds of geopolitical tensions which derive from Trinidad and Tobago's possession of oil at a time of escalating energy prices.

Not surprisingly, all of these forces bear upon the future of Caribbean leftism, insofar as they anticipate conflicts within and among governments that might otherwise be able to act together on the basis of shared economic perspectives. The reluctance of moderates inside Manley's PNP to accept more fully the relevance of Cuba's developmental experience (discussed in greater detail below), and the continuing friction between Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago over CARICOM affairs are cases in point.[14]

At the same time, the persistence of the "neo-

Rosalynn Carter, wife of the President of the United States, during her visit to Jamaica in 1977.

—*TIME* **(New York, NY) via SYGMA.**

colonial" economic status that attaches to every country in the Caribbean serves as a powerful unifying force for both masses and elites.[15] The simple facts of insularity, physical smallness, and a dependence on primary product or raw material exports did not

[12]An agreement to establish CARIFTA was signed in Antigua in late 1965, and the association was actually set up in May 1968. Its membership ultimately included those Caribbean members of the British Commonwealth which, following the CARIFTA Charter, formed a free trade area. Some members of CARIFTA, looking back to the days of the Federation of the West Indies, saw in the organization not only economic advantages but also the ultimate possibility of political union. Forbes Burnham was a key leader in CARIFTA's creation. See Rawle Farley, *The Economics of Latin America: Development Problems in Perspective,* New York, NY, Harper and Row, 1972, pp. 269-70.

[13]CARICOM grew out of the CARIFTA movement. Its central objective has been economic integration through a common market in order to achieve greater independence vis-à-vis the outside world. CARICOM also performs a variety of noneconomic functions.

[14]Friction between Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago dates back to the demise of the Federation of the West Indies. See Phillips, op. cit., pp. 62-73. Most recently, Prime Minister Eric Williams has shown displeasure over the decisions of Jamaica and Guyana to cut back on imports from Trinidad and Tobago in their efforts to preserve hard currency reserves. It is reported that Trinidad and Tobago intends to adopt retaliatory measures in response to this perceived "trade squeeze." Raoul Pantin, "Dr. Williams on the Troubled Caribbean Scene," *Caribbean Contact,* January 1978, p. 5.

[15]"Neocolonialist" status here refers to the high prices Caribbean countries pay for goods they purchase abroad, the relatively lesser amount they receive for the things they sell, the high interest rates they frequently have to pay for loans, the profits which foreign investors expect to make, and the tendency for foreign investment to be capital-intensive rather than productive of more jobs for the local population. Resentment directed at this "neocolonialist" setting runs strong in the Caribbean. The pressure for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) now exerted by a number of Caribbean countries along with the Third World in general (to be discussed in more detail later) is aimed at alleviating some of these obstacles to economic development. For representative viewpoints on neocolonialism, see Singh, loc. cit., and *The Economic Crisis, Broadcast by the Prime Minister, Honorable Michael Manley, January 5, 1977,* Kingston, Government of Jamaica, n.d.

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disappear with political independence. And the extensiveness of foreign economic ownership and control confuses and frustrates populations which are seeking greater economic development and self-reliance, as well as cultural independence. The depth of this sensitivity to neocolonialist relations is demonstrated clearly in the speeches and writings of Caribbean political and intellectual leaders such as Forbes Burnham, Michael Manley, and Eric Williams.[16] Certainly, both the existence and the perception of continued neocolonialism at least in part pushed Cuba in the increasingly radical direction that Havana assumed after 1959, a tendency now visible, albeit to a lesser extent, on the part of the governments of Guyana and Jamaica. Yet even these and other *leftist*-oriented governments in the region have so far experienced only minimal success in the effort to assert greater practical independence, and many a West Indian continues to feel deep frustration with the pervasiveness of external influences and his inability to control them.

Finally, it is against this background that Caribbean states' activities in the broader international context should be evaluated. To be sure, the Caribbean now appears to have entered a period in which it is the object of limited competition for influence by the major powers, although this contest is not as intense as that found in Africa. The renewed attention to the Caribbean on the part of the US has been amply demonstrated by recent visits to the region by President Carter's wife Rosalynn, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Terrence Todman, and US Ambassador to the United Nations Andrew Young. Jamaica's receipt of a line of credit of US$63.4 million from the US in 1977, a $75 million loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1977, credits worth $21.8 million from Norway in January 1978, aid valued at 20 million British pounds from Great Britain in January 1978, and a $30 million loan from the World Bank in early 1978 is further evidence of Western concern.[17]

By the same token, the Caribbean also is of interest to the Soviet Union. From Moscow's point of view, the Caribbean lies in North America's "strategic rear"; to weaken the grip of "imperialism" in the region would shift the correlation of forces between imperialism and socialism to the advantage of the latter.[18] Thus, Moscow applauds the growing prestige and acceptance of Cuba among the latter's Caribbean neighbors. And it tends to view as confirmation of its own analysis the continuing decline of the role of the US in the inter-American system, a gradual if discernible trend toward intraregional unity within the Caribbean (demonstrated further in the recent formation of the eight-country Caribbean Shipping Company[19]), and the predilection of some Caribbean leaders (in particular, Guyana's Burnham and Jamaica's Manley) for socialist models of change.

The expansion of Moscow's interests in the Caribbean is illustrated dramatically by the striking increase in the range of formal relations between Caribbean states and the USSR and its allies (see Table 4). Yet these ties, most Caribbean leaders will argue, are motivated not by any anti-American designs, but by the desire to enlarge the range and number of possible foreign aid and trade options. Furthermore, Caribbean states also have increased their ties with communist countries that are weakly linked—or even antagonistic—to the USSR. The People's Republic of China (PRC), for example, has established diplomatic and trade relations with several of the region's most important countries, and both Moscow and Havana decry Peking's involvement.

At the same time, many Caribbean leaders have tended to identify their countries increasingly with other Third World states and especially with the demands for vastly greater contributions by the world's developed nations in the northern hemisphere to the economic development of the "South."[20] Relations with African countries are likely to acquire increasing

[16]Burnham's statements can be gleaned from Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Latin America* (Washington, DC) over the years and from the pro-PNC daily and Sunday newspaper, *The Chronicle* (Georgetown). For representative expressions of Manley's perceptions, see his *The Politics of Change: A Jamaican Testament,* London, Tonbridge Printers Ltd., 1974, and *The Search for Solutions,* ed. by John Hearne, Oshawa, Ontario, Canada, Maple House Publishing Co., 1976. On Williams' sentiments, see his *History of the People of Trinidad and Tobago,* New York, NY, Frederick A. Praeger, 1964; *Capitalism and Slavery,* New York, NY, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1966; *From Columbus to Castro: The History of the Caribbean 1492-1969,* New York, NY, Harper and Row, 1970; *The Negro in the Caribbean* New York, NY, Haskell House Publishers, Ltd., 1971.

[17]*Keesing's Contemporary Archives* (London), 1978, pp. 28881-82.

[18]See, for example, S. Mishin, "Latin America: Two Trends of Development," *International Affairs* (Moscow), June 1976, p. 54.

[19]The joint Caribbean Shipping Company was established in 1975, with initial capital of US $30 million. Its members include Cuba, Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Panama, and Jamaica.

[20]Thus, several Caribbean states—among them, Guyana and Jamaica—joined other Third World countries in signing in 1974 the Declaration of a New International Economic Order (NIEO). This document calls for compensation of colonially-related economic exploitation, closer regulation of the activities of multinational corporations, active associations of producer nations, and UN support for nationalization of the means of production. See Guy F. Erb and Valeriana Kallab, Eds., *Beyond Dependency: The Developing World Speaks Out,* Washington, DC, Overseas Development Council, 1975, especially pp. 165-202; Richard N. Cooper, "A New International Economic Order for Mutual Gain," *Foreign Policy* (New York, NY), Spring 1977, pp. 66-120.

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Table 4. Diplomatic and Trade Representation of Communist Countries in Selected Caribbean States, 1971–76.

	USSR	Bulgaria	Czechoslovakia	German Democratic Republic	Hungary	Poland	Romania	Cuba	People's Republic of China	North Korea	Vietnam	Yugoslavia
On June 30, 1971												
Bahamas												
Barbados												
Colombia	E,T	C	C,T	T	C	NRA C,T	NRA,T					
Costa Rica		T	C,T			NRM						NRA
Dominican Republic												
Grenada												
Guatemala												
Guyana	NRA											
Haiti						NRM,T						
Honduras						NRM						NRA
Jamaica								C				
Nicaragua						NRM						
Panama						NRM,T						NRA
Surinam												
Trinidad and Tobago												
Venezuela	E		E,T		NRA	E	E					E
On December 31, 1976												
Bahamas								NRA				
Barbados								NRA				
Colombia	E,C,T	E,C,T	E,C,T	E,C,T	E/NRA C,T	E,C,T	E,C,T	E,C,T				E
Costa Rica	E,C,T	T	E/NRA T	NRA	NRA	NRA	E,C,T			R	R	NRA
Dominican Republic												
Grenada									R			
Guatemala												
Guyana	E		R	NRA,T	R	NRA L	NRA	E	E,T	NRA		E
Haiti												
Honduras			NRA			NRA	NRA					NRA
Jamaica	R		R		R	NRA	NRA	E	E	R	R	E
Nicaragua						NRA						
Panama		R	NRA	R	R	E/NRA	NRA	E			R	E
Surinam	R						R		R			R
Trinidad and Tobago	NRA				R		R	NRA	E			NRA
Venezuela	E	E	E,T	E	E	E	E	E	E	R		E

NOTE: This table does not cover Albania, Cambodia, Laos, and Mongolia. No Caribbean states have relations with either Cambodia or Laos. Costa Rica and Venezuela have diplomatic relations with Albania, but no representatives have been exchanged in either case. In addition, Costa Rica has diplomatic relations with Mongolia, although neither has representatives in the other country.

Key to table:
C—consulate
E—embassy
L—legation
NRA—nonresident ambassador
NRM—nonresident minister
R—relations established but no representatives exchanged
T—trade office

SOURCE: US Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, *Communist Diplomatic, Consular, and Trade Representation in Latin America and the Caribbean,* Report No. 681, Jan. 11, 1977.

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importance in this context, as evidenced by a growing number of visits to the Caribbean by African leaders. Particularly notable was the effort by Mozambique's President Samora Machel to draw Guyana and Jamaica into a Mozambique alignment during his visit to Georgetown and Kingston in October 1977.[21]

In sum, the argument that the Caribbean's leftist governments have become increasingly pro-Soviet (or pro-Cuban) seems weak. The evidence suggests more strongly that most governments in the region—leftist or not—intend to maximize their development opportunities and their flexibility, favoring whatever financial channels are available and consistent with their development objectives.

Nevertheless, Cuba's geographical presence and growing influence in the Caribbean are such as to warrant some additional comments. First, Havana, too, is sensitive to the international "correlation of forces" and to the relative gains to be had from weakening further the role of the US in the region. Cuba's concern in this regard naturally is strengthened by the fact that Havana's regional security and authority are so directly affected by the physical and ideological threat which the US represents in Cuban eyes. Certain policy imperatives follow from this perspective. Thus, Cuba publicly supports socialists in Guyana and Jamaica, as well as Marxists in those two countries, Puerto Rico, and other Caribbean states; it demands independence for Puerto Rico and Belize; and it campaigned for the treaties between the US and Panama which will eventually transfer complete operational autonomy over the Panama Canal to Panama. The Cuban government no longer advocates the path of violent revolution in the Caribbean; since 1968 it has toned down considerably its regional image of revolutionary militancy and encouraged the growth of peaceful state-to-state relations. Increasingly, Havana has stepped forward as an active participant in Latin American diplomacy and as a spokesman for Third World interests in general.

Second, Cuba serves as an accessible and—for many Caribbean political figures—attractive alternative model of political and economic development that cannot but influence significantly the perceptions and prescriptions of neighboring leftists. Its geographic proximity encourages both avowed Marxist-Leninists and others to travel to Havana, as the frequent exchanges of visitors between Cuba, on the one hand, and Guyana, Jamaica, and Puerto Rico, on the other, illustrate. For these observers, Cuba becomes a model to be studied and even emulated. Certainly, Prime Minister Michael Manley of Jamaica has been impressed with a number of Cuban achievements—for example, the construction of mini-dams and schools. Other leftist ministers in the Manley government have been similarly receptive to the smaller-scale Cuban technologies which seem better suited to the Caribbean's economic and geographical conditions than the more expensive and sophisticated technologies available elsewhere. Cuba's emphasis on the sea as a resource and its rapid development of a merchant marine, a fishing industry, and domestic fish-processing operations also seem to have inspired a number of Caribbean leaders to pay greater attention to the economic potential of the oceans.

Third, Cuba has made an active effort to reshape international economic relationships in the Caribbean and, more specifically, to reduce the influence of the US. In October 1975, Cuba joined with other states in the region to form the new Latin American Economic System (*Sistema Económica Latinoamericana*—SELA).[22] Havana was a prime moving force behind the creation of the multinational Caribbean Shipping Company. And Cuba's membership in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) seems to have encouraged other Caribbean governments to consider the possibility of affiliation with the Soviet-dominated organization. Jamaica announced such a desire in January 1977. So did Guyana, whose Minister of Economic Planning and Development, on a visit to Cuba during the same month, presented his government's application for "formal association" with CMEA.[23]

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[21]At least one Latin American correspondent reported that while Machel's trip to Guyana, Jamaica, and Cuba was billed as a goodwill affair, it was also an effort to build support for black Africa's struggle against the minority white government of Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith. See James Nelson Goodsell, *Christian Science Monitor* (Boston, MA), Oct. 12, 1977. See also the report of Machel's trip to Guyana in *New Nation* (Georgetown), Oct. 9, 1977.

[22]The creation of SELA was proposed by Mexican President Luis Echevarría and strongly supported by Venezuelan President Carlos Andrés Peréz. This organization has become an instrument for joint economic and social coordination among its member states, comprising 25 South American, Central American, and Caribbean countries but excluding the United States. Both Moscow and Havana have naturally looked upon such coordination as an impressively favorable trend that reduces American power in the region while ipso facto enhancing Cuba's position there.

[23]*Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, 1977, p. 28377. The Minister of Economic Planning and Development, Desmond Hoyte, stated that the form of "formal association" would be subject to negotiation. Establishment of such a tie, according to Hoyte, was intended to supplement, rather than to replace, existing bilateral relations between Guyana on one hand and Cuba, East Germany, Romania, the USSR, and Yugoslavia on the other. Moreover, it did not indicate a change in (*continued on page 45*)

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Cuban President Fidel Castro greets workers at the recently nationalized Barham cooperative sugar estate in Barham, Jamaica, during his October 1977 visit to the island.

—UPI.

Not everyone in the Caribbean, however, shares the view of Cuba as a potential and/or desirable model of change or a valuable advocate of intraregional unity. Cuban overtures to Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago have aroused considerable unease throughout the region. Moderates and conservatives in Jamaica are unhappy with their government's expanding links with Havana, and this concern has caused sharp rifts even within the governing PNP. Not surprisingly, Cuban support for Puerto Rico's Socialist Party and the cause of Puerto Rican independence has provoked intense displeasure there among nonsocialists. The governments of Haiti and the Dominican Republic were uncomfortable with Cuba's large size and potential influence long before the ascent of Fidel Castro, and their fears certainly have not lessened any.

The result is that in some countries there is a tendency toward a polarization of views, between those who embrace the Cuban model and those who resist it. It is clear, of course, that economic conditions and ethnic tensions alone are serious enough to account for much of the advance of leftism in the Caribbean, as well as the depth and diversity of political conflict there. Cuba's geopolitical presence is important not because Havana advocates the escalation of political violence or deliberately encourages destabilization, but because Cuba serves as a constant frame of reference for the region's more radical leftists and a feared source of political and economic influence for moderates and conservatives.

But Caribbean leftists are not all of the same stripe; the divisions among them—both between countries and within the same country—are strengthened, not weakened, by the great differences in socioeconomic

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Guyana's "willingness to cooperate with western countries on a basis of equity, mutual advantage and respect for sovereignty." See ibid., p. 28377.

Subsequently, in April 1978, Prime Minister Burnham paid a visit to Moscow, with stopovers in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the German Democratic Republic. Furthermore, relations between Guyana and the USSR expanded after mid-1977 to include cooperation in the field of fisheries, Soviet provision of educational scholarships in the USSR to Guyanese, bilateral exchanges of cultural groups and trade unionists, and Soviet donation of medical supplies to Guyana. See the *Sunday Chronicle* (Georgetown), Apr. 16, 1978, pp. 6, 16.

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context that set these countries apart from one another and by the consequences of insularity and intensely held feelings of national independence. In appraising the overall growth of leftism in the Caribbean, it is now appropriate to consider several of the main types of leftism that have emerged.

Currents of Leftism

The term leftism is used here as a terminological net to capture a variety of political perceptions that share, at their base, a desire to change existing social and economic conditions to the advantage of the Caribbean's "common man." Furthermore, with the objective of fostering more equal income distributions and improved socioeconomic standards for all, "leftists" generally favor increased state control over economic processes and tend to place greater emphasis on social, cultural, and economic rights than on civil and political rights. But the term should by no means be construed as simply a code word for anarchism, communism, or revolutionary militancy, for the Caribbean's political Left varies greatly in its style and in its approach to its goals. At the same time, it must be said that the growing momentum of leftism reflects increasing tensions within the region; and as economic and social strains sharpen, while governments struggle over the proper policy responses, societies and groups can easily become polarized in considering prescriptions for what should be done. With these caveats in mind, then, it is possible to identify four major strands of Caribbean leftism.

Marxist-Leninists. Aside from Cuba's Communist Party (PCC), the only electorally significant Marxist-Leninist party in the Caribbean is Guyana's PPP, which has been recognized formally by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and which attended the latter's 25th Congress in Moscow in March 1976 as a fraternal party. At the same time, Marxist-Leninists are politically active in a variety of forms, frequently open, in most other Caribbean countries. For example, there are several small electoral parties such as the recently-legalized Dominican Communist Party (PCD) in the Dominican Republic; the Puerto Rican Socialist Party (PSP), which received less than one percent of the votes in the 1976 national elections; and the Jamaican Communist Party (JCP), which resurfaced not long ago. Self-avowed Marxists are members of Jamaica's ruling PNP, and several have served as government ministers. Marxist-oriented groups and movements include Trinidad and Tobago's United Labor Front; Jamaica's Workers' Liberation League; the Antigua-Caribbean Liberation Movement (ACLM); the Movement for a New Dominica (MND); and the St. Vincent Youlou United Movement (YULIMO), which advocates a Cuban-style political system for St. Vincent. Finally, there exist numerous Marxist splinter groups, many of which are illegal, that in a given country are in competition with one another as often as with the governing regime.

However, with the exception of the PCC and PPP, and in strong contrast to most of the region's leading socialists, the Caribbean's Marxist-Leninists are remarkably lacking in political organization at the grass roots. This is evidently the result of the weak popular appeal of Marxist-Leninist ideology, which is in turn due largely to local social and political conditions. Conflicting ethnic, racial, and cultural identities contribute to an imposing social divisiveness that is particularly hard to overcome in situations where appeals to national unity are intrinsically ineffectual.[24] Important political issues are framed as often—if not more so—on the basis of racial allegiances as of class ties.[25] Trade unions and other mass organizations frequently cut across class and racial lines; but instead of thereby becoming softened, such cleavages persist in their intensity, thus making concerted action by these organizations more difficult. Finally, Marxist-Leninist elites are often university-linked intellectuals. To the extent some scholars are accurate in discerning a deep strain of anti-intellectualism among Caribbean masses, there may be widespread inherent hostility or suspicion directed at Marxist leaders otherwise lacking in charisma and attempting to communicate in a language which few understand.[26]

Of course, support for Marxist-Leninists may well grow in the future, to the extent continuing social and economic strains spawn a greater popular receptivity to Marxist-Leninist goals and rhetoric. That is, segments of the Caribbean masses may come to view Marxism-Leninism more as a fundamentalist, emancipatory religion—a path to economic, social, and political redemption—than as a sterile discussion of the logical connections relating capitalism, imperialism, and communism. The potential for this occurring was apparent, according to one observer, in the popular emotional response which greeted Fidel

[24]See David Lowenthal, *West Indian Societies*, New York, NY, Oxford University Press, 1972, Chap. 7

[25]See Carl Stone's monograph, *Class, Race and Political Behavior in Urban Jamaica*, Mona, Jamaica, Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies, 1973, pp. 36 ff.

[26]See Warren D. Armstrong, "Patterns of Politics Splitting the Country," *Trinidad Express* (Port of Spain), March 1970, p. 1.

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

An ethnic East Indian agricultural worker on a poultry farm near Port of Spain, Trinidad.

—Carl Frank/Photo Researchers.

Castro's visit to Jamaica in October 1977.[27]

Caribbean Socialists. Caribbean socialists—principally Jamaica's PNP and Guyana's PNC—offer approaches to economic development that are less radical than those advocated by Marxist-Leninists but significantly more statist and egalitarian than the policies favored by moderate reformers such as Trinidad and Tobago's Eric Williams. In the effort to free their countries from a history and social psychology of dependence, both the PNP and the PNC have stressed greatly increased state control over the economy, additional nationalization of foreign-owned enterprises (e.g., in the bauxite industry), greater worker participation in economic management, and other novel forms of social mobilization. Both parties want expanded foreign trade options, including relations with the Soviet Union, Cuba, other CMEA countries, and the PRC. The leadership of each party publicly identifies with developing countries of the Third World and is strongly anti-imperialist in philosophy. Insofar as economic policy is concerned, the PNC under Forbes Burnham has probably moved more decisively in the direction of greater state control than has the PNP under Michael Manley. The latter leader continues to voice a desire for a "mixed economy" in Jamaica, while the former has emphasized that private enterprise in Guyana has only a limited future, even though some Guyanese ministers evince an interest in attracting foreign capital for financing development of Guyana's energy sector.[28]

At home, the parties try to appeal to their respective countries' large poor working class, to whose socioeconomic improvement each party is ideologically dedicated. In both countries, however, this class is divided. In Jamaica, the PNP competes for poor working-class support with the allegedly "capitalist" Jamaican Labor Party (JLP), headed by Edward Siega. Moreover, divisions among Jamaica's working poor have a long and violent history, as reflected in the brutal gun wars that until recently racked West Kingston.[29]

In Guyana, the working class is split between parties but also, and more important, between races. As we have seen, the PNC draws most of its support from among urban blacks, while support for its rival, the PPP, is concentrated among rural East Indians. Thus, the efforts of both the PNP and the PNC to bring about a socialist transformation in their respective countries are made difficult and uncertain by the fragmented social bases on which these parties rely.

Ethnic Nationalists. From one perspective, interethnic tensions in the Caribbean can be viewed as threatening the disorganization or fragmentation of a general leftward movement among the broader population. However, it is also possible to regard leftist sentiments and leaders as coalescing around and building upon a more fundamental base of ethnic nationalism.[30] Guyana's PPP, for example, is suspected by many observers of deriving its unity much

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[27]David D'Costa, "Fidel Speaks Straight to Our Heart," *The Jamaican Daily Gleaner* (Kingston), Oct. 28, 1977, p. 8.

[28]See "Kissing the Hand You Just Bit," *Forbes* (New York), June 15, 1977, pp. 964-65.

[29]Although the warring factions, led by old rivals Claude Massop (JLP) and Aston Thompson (PNP), agreed to end the violence in a moving scene in January 1978, it is still too early to predict the long-term outcome of this impressive positive step.

[30]By ethnic identity we mean the sense of a common past, present, and future, that is shared by those of similar race, color, linguistic, or cultural communities. We describe a self-identifying ethnic group (those who conceive of themselves as being alike by virtue of their common ancestry and who are so regarded by others) as equivalent to a national group. The translation of ethnic identity into social and political action is at the heart of ethnic nationalism. See Walker Connor, "Nation Building or Nation Destroying," *World Politics* (Princeton, NJ), April 1972, pp. 319-55.

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Black Power leader Geddes Granger addresses a massive demonstration in Port of Spain, Trinidad, in early March 1970.

—UPI.

less from its membership's devotion to Marxist-Leninist ideology than from its members' ethnic identity.

In Trinidad and Tobago, a black-East Indian conflict has roots in a social setting similar to Guyana's and, increasingly, has demonstrated its importance for leftist politics there. Trinidad and Tobago's East Indians also are concentrated among the rural poor, and they face black domination of the oil workers' unions and the civil service, in which blacks are felt to deny East Indians those positions commanding relatively higher wages and status. Prime Minister Eric Williams' chief opposition, the Democratic Labor Party (DLP), is predominantly East Indian in composition. But the DLP has been plagued for years by poor, ineffectual leadership. The failure of East Indians to obtain a more powerful voice within the political system serves to further the polarization between blacks and East Indians and the support for radical politics on the part of the latter.[31]

[31]See the Rev. William Watty, "Race—the African-Indian Conflict," *Caribbean Contact*, February 1978, p. 6.

Tensions between blacks and East Indians, while clearly the most salient today, are only the most recent of significant ethnic conflicts to trouble Trinidad and Tobago. In the early 1970's a cultural awakening among blacks throughout the region fueled a Black Power movement that rocked Caribbean politics, especially in Trinidad and Tobago. There, Black Power advocates appealed first to the oppressed poor of black African heritage, but soon thereafter to poor East Indians (also described as "black") as well. Their targets were the white (or lighter) middle and upper classes, which leading Black Power leaders associated closely with Prime Minister Eric Williams and his government. Following what became known as the February (1970) Revolution, at least three radical groups emerged, each inspired by some element of black consciousness. The United National Independent Party (UNIP), led by James Millette, called for "black reconstruction"—"black" including those of both African and East Indian descent. The National Joint Action Committee (NJAC), headed by Geddes Granger, emphasized blackness as the basis for a political movement against white oppressors. And the Tapia House Movement, developed under Lloyd Best's leadership, stressed radical change promoted from below. The momentum of the Black Power movement as a whole, however, seemed to have diminished somewhat by the mid-1970's; black-East Indian conflict has now become the more volatile issue.

The Black Power movement was not restricted to Trinidad and Tobago. With roots in the writings of Haiti's Jean Price Mars and in the work of Marcus Garvey in the 1920's, Black Power also became a force in Curaçao and Jamaica in the late 1960's. One should not underrate its potential to resurface in these lands in the future if unemployment and poor economic conditions persist. In addition, black-white tensions, a decade of intermittent racial violence, and growing black militancy pose a major challenge to "white" economic and political power in Bermuda, a country where an old white aristocracy has benefitted substantially from a record of impressive economic growth. The black-dominated Progressive Labor Party (PLP) has represented the interests of blacks in the name of revolutionary socialism. In 1964, the United Bermuda Party (UBP) was created in an attempt to unite white Bermuda and to capture enough of the black vote to forestall the development of the PLP. A decade later, a Black Caucus was formed to represent black demands for better education and job training, and for greater black representation in the political process. That black-white conflict and

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the economic grievances of blacks continue to be major features of Bermuda's political scene was demonstrated by the race riots of December 1977.[32]

The leftist appeal of Black Power is widespread but polarizing, representing different futures to different people: for trade unions, higher wages and better living conditions; for the young, the end of white domination and more political and economic independence; but for the more affluent middle and upper classes, the fear of uncertainty and perhaps even the specter of communism.

Finally, elements of ethnic nationalism and their significance for leftism can be found in several more unusual forms and groups. The Rastafari Brethren of Jamaica (*Rastas* in the local writing), who are extremely poor and who live principally as squatters in the Kingston slum areas, offer one such example. While the basic religion of the *Rastas* is centered on the hope of going back to Africa—to live in the land of happiness and well-being—and although some of the *Rastas* keep aloof from the rest of Jamaican society, a number of young Jamaicans see in them a symbol of strong black identity and reaction against white domination. Given their presence in the poor sections of Kingston, where unemployment is high, the *Rastas* must be considered one contributor to black consciousness and leftism within the Jamaican cultural milieu.

It is interesting in this connection that in 1972 Michael Manley defeated the incumbent Jamaican Labor Party (JLP) in part by harnessing Rastafari enthusiasm. Manley rallied the support of major song writers and performers, whose music contained themes of Rastafari dreams and imagery. In some songs, Manley was depicted possessing a rod that was presumed to have been given to him by former Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia (regarded as God incarnate by the Rastafari)—the "rod of correction" to right all wrongs. Furthermore, one report claims that 68 percent of those voting for the first time who cast their ballots for the PNP in 1972 were supporters or sympathizers of the Rastafari. According to this same observer, Manley's "democratic socialism" has spurred a new political consciousness among some Rastafari, who increasingly are joining in the struggle against capitalism which is led by the PNP.[33]

[32]See Frank E. Manning, "Bermudian Politics in Crisis: Economics and Ethnicity," paper presented to the meeting of the Caribbean Studies Association, Santiago, Dominican Republic, January 1978.

[33]See Barry Chevannes, "The Literature of the Rastafari," *Social and Economic Studies*, June 1977, p. 259.



One of Jamaica's Rastafari—members of a sect that preaches a gospel of the divinity of late Emperor Haile Selassie and a home for all blacks in Ethiopia.

—Camera Press.

Moderate Reformers. Although moderate reformers too are faced with the strains of developing economies and are sensitive to threats posed by imperialism and capitalism, they, unlike the Marxist-Leninists or Caribbean Socialists, are more inclined to encourage private foreign investment and are less favorable to expanding the role of the state in economic life or to promoting worker participation in cooperative economic ventures. Two examples of moderate reformers are Lynden O. Pindling, Prime Minister of the Bahamas and leader of the Bahamian Progressive Liberal Party (PLP), and Dr. Eric Williams, Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago and head of the PNM.

In July 1977, Pindling's PLP won the first general elections held in the Bahamas since the establishment of independence from the United Kingdom in 1973. Pindling campaigned on a platform calling for greater government participation in a mixed economy—in tourism, banking, agriculture and fisheries—while at the same time promising a reduction in unemployment, which had risen from 8.6 percent in 1973 to nearly 20 percent in 1977. However, the

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Two of the Caribbean's moderate reformers: left, Eric Williams, Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago; right, Lynden Pindling, Prime Minister of the Bahamas.

—Pictorial Parade and UPI.

PLP's opposition, particularly the Bahamian Democratic Party (BDP) and the Free National Movement (FNM), argued that the PLP program threatened *too much* state participation in the economy and would lead to socialism on the Jamaican scale. In calling for free enterprise and more foreign investment, the FNM and the BDP illuminated the "leftist" nature of the PLP in the Bahamian political context.

Dr. Eric Williams and the PNM, even though criticized by the opposition for their authoritarianism and lack of egalitarian principles in political life, also must be assessed as a variant of moderate reformism. To be sure, the Williams government has gone far in extending state control over the economy. For example, all or part of 32 companies in Trinidad and Tobago are publicly owned; of seven domestic oil-producing concerns, the government owns one entirely and has equity in two others. The government also has become the major investor in the islands' sugar industry. In addition, the Ministry of Planning and Development has drafted major five-year plans of economic development activity to be carried out by the publicly-owned Industrial Development Corporation.

Still, the government has continued to draw criticism from the left for failing to reduce unemployment, for permitting the continuing influx of foreign capital, for not favoring more decisively labor-intensive over capital-intensive development projects, for bureaucratism and confusion in policy implementation, and for its reluctance to act as a more cooperative partner in such regional organizations as CARICOM.[34] Such critiques and the rise in 1970 of the Black Power movement testify to the fact that Eric Williams and the PNM stand to the "right" of much of Trinidad and Tobago's political spectrum.

Up to this point, we have tried to sketch out the multiple social, economic, and geopolitical factors that lie at the root of Caribbean leftism. Differences in the specific nature of these conditions and in the way they combine have resulted in a rich variety of leftist responses, ranging from the radical programs and political challenge presented by Marxist-Leninists to the more cautious, less statist approach of the moderate reformers. A further result is wide divergences in the particular authority and prospects that leftist forces enjoy in any given country. To demonstrate this, and in order to illustrate the connection

[34]See *Caribbean Contact*, December 1977, p. 9, and February 1978, p. 9.

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between socioeconomic and political context, on the one hand, and the rise of leftist movements, on the other, we turn now to a more detailed inspection of the current political situation in two countries, Guyana and Jamaica. It is in these two states, moreover, that Caribbean leftism recently has experienced its most dramatic growth.

Guyana: Socialism and Race

Guyana achieved its independence from the United Kingdom in 1966. The leaders of the country's two principal political parties, the PNC's Forbes Burnham and the PPP's Cheddi Jagan, have vied for power since the late 1940's, when together they founded the PPP. In 1955, the PPP split, and Burnham eventually formed the PNC, which has been in office in Guyana since 1964, although with strong opposition from the PPP throughout the period. The PPP has accused the PNC of a variety of sins, including persistently rigging elections and interfering with the judiciary. Despite a partial rapprochement between the two parties in 1976, by early 1978 tensions between them were mounting again as the PPP increasingly attacked the PNC for failure to stimulate greater economic development and, in particular, for the government's harshness in crushing a 135-day sugar strike that ended in January 1978.

On the surface, the economic policies of the PNC and the PPP do not appear very different. Each party supports centralized economic planning, extensive state control over economic enterprises, and a more diversified agricultural economy (one must remember that Guyana's economy still is basically agrarian and extremely dependent on sugar and, more recently, rice). Each party has pressed for the nationalization of foreign firms; and today approximately 80 percent of Guyana's economy is state controlled, including the bauxite and alumina operations of Alcan and Reynolds Metals. Finally, each party characterizes its economic program as "socialist." Since 1970 Guyana has been known offically as the "Cooperative Republic of Guyana," while Burnham requests that he be called "Comrade."

Beneath these commonalities in economic policy, however, are the deep racial divisions that make national unity and political consensus so difficult to achieve in Guyana. As we have already noted more than once, PPP support is derived primarily from East Indian agricultural laborers, including the sugar workers whose four-month strike was recently crushed by the PNC-led government. PNC support, of course, comes from black urban dwellers, who hold most of

Leftist government and opposition leaders in Guyana: at the left, Prime Minister Forbes Burnham; at the right, Cheddi Jagan, Marxist-Leninist leader of the People's Progressive Party.

—Camera Press and UPI.

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

Visitors at Guyana's largest bauxite mine, at Linden. The mine has been nationalized along with the entire bauxite industry by the government of Prime Minister Forbes Burnham.

—China Photo Service via Eastfoto.

the jobs in the civil service. Studies of Guyanese politics have stressed repeatedly the importance of the bitterness and mutual stereotyping that exist between these groups. East Indians frequently think of blacks as spendthrift, lazy, and careless, while the latter consider East Indians to be miserly, if hard-working. Both groups remain divided by religion, a low rate of intermarriage, and continued residential segregation. Political campaigns at the grass roots still carry a heavy dose of racial stereotyping, even though each party tries to portray racially mixed participation on the surface.[35]

In this context, the long sugar strike of 1977-78 could only exacerbate racial tensions. The PPP-backed Guyana Agricultural and General Worker's Union (GAWU) had demanded changes in its profit-sharing agreement with the state-owned Guyana Sugar Corporation. When first the company and then the government failed to satisfy these demands, the GAWU called a strike that lasted for months and resulted in a 33 percent shortfall from the previously predicted 207,809-ton sugarcane harvest. The loss to Guyana's economy is estimated at Guy.$80 million, which surely will be felt acutely by Guyana's blacks. The Burnham government used a variety of severe measures to break the strike, including the arrest and prosecution of union organizers, the setting of excessive bail, the banning of public meetings, the seizure of relief supplies intended for the striking workers and their families, the widespread use of military and paramilitary troops, and the recruitment and use of "scab" labor. The strike, the government's response, and the economic consequences only intensified Guyana's already sharp interethnic animosities.[36]

[35]See Premadas, op. cit., pp. 8 ff.; and E. E. Mahantl, "The Strange Fate of Liberal Democracy," *The Round Table* (London), January 1977, pp. 78-89.

[36]See *Caribbean Contact*, February 1978, p. 8.

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Guyana's socialism is faced with a number of development-related difficulties as well. Financial support from the Soviet Union and Cuba is not great, and the capital required to implement various needed projects is difficult to come by. For example, one major development objective is the construction of a 3.1 million kilowatt hydroelectric power complex on the Upper Mazuruni River. The first-stage cost of this project is estimated at between $US800 million and $1.2 billion, a sum considerably greater than Guyana's current gross domestic product. The cost prompted the Burnham government to attempt to interest noncommunist lending agencies and equipment suppliers in the project, thus far without great success. Such a situation illustrates the economic constraints imposed by energy scarcities which cost a great deal to overcome. The proposed energy complex would help Guyana move away from the dependence on suger, bauxite, and rice exports—all primary products—that it inherited from colonial days, and toward a greater utilization of such energy-based industries as fertilizer, steel, and pulp and paper. So far, neither the PNC nor the PPP has offered a version of leftism that promises to make much headway in this direction.

It is just this type of dilemma that seems to be encouraging some Guyanese officials—and some officials in Jamaica, too—to perceive the United States as a more friendly investment and trading partner and a more attractive source of economic aid. Renewed attention to the Caribbean by the Carter Administration and especially the visit of UN Ambassador Young to Georgetown in 1977, has led to a more positive Guyanese response concerning the possibility of future American investment and aid that would help Guyana cope with its economic ills.[37] Burnham, like Manley, appears to want to maximize his development options with both the West and the East, on the basis of a socialist model, but one less pro-Cuban or pro-Soviet than pro-Guyanese. Although a socialist, Burnham is not a Marxist like Dr. Jagan and, in comparison with his opposition, may be more flexible and pragmatic in his ultimate economic decisions.

Still, the problems facing Burnham's leftist government were plentiful as of early 1978. The state of health services merely reflected the overall stagnant economic situation: a shortage of doctors, overloaded hospital facilities, long waiting lists and lines at public hospitals, minimal public dental facilities, and an unwillingness on the part of urban doctors to leave the cities and provide badly needed service in rural areas—which, incidentally, visiting Cuban doctors *have* been willing to do.[38] In addition, socialist education was coming under fire for allegedly producing students aware of socialist ideology but unable to read upon completion of primary school.[39] The Guyana National Service (GNS), established in 1974 as a vehicle to mobilize the masses in order to spur economic development, has not proved an overwhelming success, as indicated by a special report finding extensive internal dissatisfaction, corruption, mismanagement, as well as disdain for GNS employees by government officials. (The report, it must be added, was firmly refuted by the government, with contradictory evidence.[40]) The PPP, meanwhile, has continued to hammer away at its erstwhile brethren in the PNC, chastising them for their "attack on civil liberties" and their failure to move ahead more strongly in economic development.[41]

Jamaica: Divided Leftism

With the exception of Cuba and Guyana, Jamaica has traveled down the leftward path more forcefully than any other Caribbean country, and for this reason it merits close attention. It makes an especially interesting case in light of its geographic proximity to Cuba, which permits easy communication and travel between the two countries—a fact of substantial political importance for Jamaican politics.

The economic strains in Jamaica, it is clear, are enormous; one simply must be careful not to underestimate either how resistant to resolution these problems are or the magnitude of their impact on the Jamaican political scene. Overall, the economy continues to be troubled by a stagnating agricultural sector, a faltering tourist trade (even though there are signs of some improvement in this realm at the time of writing) resulting from the recent upsurge in domestic violence, and the continuing preference for capital- rather than labor-intensive industry on the part of prospective investors. In the mid-1970's, perhaps 85 percent of the country's population could be characterized as living in poverty. At the same time, a large proportion of the labor force was unskilled, a factor that is partly responsible for Jamaica's unemployment rate staying at such a high level. Income

[37] *The New York Times*, Aug. 11, 1977, p. 2.

[38] See *Catholic Standard* (Georgetown), Feb. 26, 1978, p. 1.

[39] See *Caribbean Contact*, June 1977, p. 9.

[40] Ibid., February 1978, pp. 10-11.

[41] See, for example, *The Mirror, the People's Paper* (Georgetown), Feb. 5, 1978, pp. 8-9.

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Michael Manley, Prime Minister of Jamaica since 1972.

—Camera Press.

inequality remained extreme. In 1974 the lowest 60 percent of Jamaica's income earners received only 24 percent of all individual income, although this figure was up from 18 percent in 1958 and 20 percent in 1963. In contrast, the top 5 percent accounted for 24 percent of total income in 1974, the figure having decreased from 29 percent in 1963.[42] And one study demonstrates that a substantial proportion of Jamaica's political elite believed in 1974 that poverty was still a largely unresolved problem,[43] a perception that may have contributed to the further push to the left since then.

In addition, Jamaica suffers from serious balance-of-payments problems and a steadily growing foreign debt. In January 1978, the government, under pressure from the IMF, was once again compelled to devalue the Jamaican dollar by 10 percent in order to assure receipt of a second IMF drawing.[44] Of course, devaluation led to immediate price increases for gasoline and certain basic foods (such as rice and bread), a result felt by all Jamaicans, but especially the poor ones.

Finally, Jamaica's economic difficulties have been accompanied by worsening social strains. Rising crime and violence have plagued urban areas in particular. In June 1976, the government finally was forced to impose a state of emergency, lifted a year later in June 1977.

To be sure, the roots of these economic and social strains can be traced back to the colonial period. British rule certainly did not lead to much in the way of economic equality or social justice for the island's poor. This situation, of course, persisted after independence was achieved in 1962. Jamaica's first postindependence government was organized by the Jamaican Labor Party (JLP), then (and still in part) under the leadership of Alexander Bustamente. Bustamente, a light-skinned black who served as Prime Minister during 1962-67, based his appeal on the interests of black skilled and semiskilled workers (primarily the members of the Bustamente Industrial Trade Union), on the one hand, and those upper- and upper-middle-class businessmen who were more interested in immediate profits than in long-term economic growth, on the other.

In 1972, however, the JLP lost power to the PNP, led by Michael Manley. Founded in 1938 by the new prime minister's father, Norman Manley, the PNP originally espoused a form of British Fabian socialism, aspiring to a "Jamaican socialism" based on the growth of Jamaican national consciousness, a cautious, evolutionary approach to economic development of "Christian inspiration," public control of the island's natural resources, and a more equitable income distribution. Like the JLP, the PNP also had a trade union foundation. More important, the PNP's traditional emphasis on internal democracy has meant that it frequently has been challenged from within by more radical leftists. Such challenges have triggered sharp reactions from the JLP and the country's less political churchgoers, as well as from among strong moderates in the PNP itself. Thus, both the organization and the philosophy of the PNP have sharpened its sensitivity to conflicts arising from Jamaica's political fragmentation and increased the potential for this divisiveness being transmitted back into the party.

Michael Manley's leadership of the PNP reflects

[42]See Wendell Bell, "Inequality in Independent Jamaica: A Preliminary Appraisal of Elite Performance," *Revista/Review Interamericana* (San Juan), Summer 1977, p. 303.

[43]Ibid.

[44]As noted earlier, the Jamaican government had negotiated a loan from the IMF in mid-1977 totaling US $75 million. Of this sum, roughly half ws to be disbursed in 1977, and the balance, in 1978. The initial $22.4 million drawing on the loan took place in October 1977 and was accompanied by a devaluation of the Jamaican dollar against the US dollar. Before the IMF would allow the second drawing ($11 million), however, it insisted on another devaluation. See *Keesing's Contemporary Archives,* 1978, pp. 28881-82; *Caribbean Contact,* February 1978, p. 7.

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his father's philosophy, although with a more refined sense of the meaning of socialism and its underlying leitmotif of equality in human relationships. Current PNP philosophy can be summarized essentially as follows: a commitment to the democratic political process; a belief that socialism best gives expression to the Christian ideal of the equality of all God's children; a determination to prevent exploitation of Jamaicans by foreign peoples; an emphasis on the ideals of equal opportunity and equal rights; and a view of the role of government in the economy that specifies the need to secure public interests but that also allows for mixed forms of economic ownership and participation in Jamaican national life. These values have been pursued in a variety of ways since the PNP's 1972 electoral victory—e.g. by an industrial development program led by the public sector and designed to increase gross domestic product, employment, and exports; increased state control over the bauxite and alumina industries; and expanded worker participation in Jamaican enterprises in an attempt to break down the old psychology of dependency and authoritarian employer-employee relations with which, Manley argues, Jamaican society has been burdened for years.[45]

Yet the PNP has moved continuously leftward throughout the period of Michael Manley's stewardship. This trend was clearly evident by 1974, a year that witnessed a series of widely publicized statements and acts resulting in the government's acquisition of several sugar plantations, Radio Jamaica, the island's electric company, and a larger share holding in bauxite and alumina operations. Indeed, the PNP began to announce publicly that the days of capitalism were numbered.

Medium-sized industrial enterprises like this shoe factory in Kingston, Jamaica, employ only a part of the island's expanding labor force.

—Carl Frank/Photo Researchers.

The trend leftward was demonstrated even more plainly prior to and immediately following the national elections of December 1976, in which the PNP decisively defeated the JLP. In the months preceding the elections, the PNP made an effort to attract the support of a number of charismatic left-wing leaders to help broaden the party's electoral base. Among these individuals was Donald K. Duncan, who subsequently became head of the new Ministry of National Mobilization, with responsibility for supervising the government's People's Programs in worker participation in industry and in the "democratization" of education. In the latter case, Duncan pressed for adaptation of some aspects of the Cuban model that combined education and work (e.g., children's planting of agricultural products as part of school work), a policy reported to have produced some conflict with elements in the Ministry of Education over how education should be organized. Duncan later quit the Ministry of National Mobilization for reasons still obscure but evidently connected with internal party frictions between moderates and those of a more leftist bent. Other well-known left-wingers in the PNP's new government following the 1976 elections included Hugh Small, Minister of Youth and Sports; Anthony Spaulding, Minister of Housing; and Arnold Bertram, who was appointed Minister of State in the Prime Minister's Office and made responsible for Information, Broadcasting, and Culture.[46]

Continued movement to the left also was visible among members of the radical youth wing of the PNP, in the government's overtures to CMEA, and in the government's proposal for a new constitution that some observers have described as a "Cuban-style"

[45]See *Report on Worker Participation in Jamaica*, Kingston, Government of Jamaica, February 1976, and the *Green Paper on Industrial Development Programme—Jamaica, 1975-80*, Kingston, Government of Jamaica, n.d.

[46]It should be noted that left-wing views are well publicized throughout Jamaica in local newspapers and the other media. This state of affairs makes the political environment one in which there is no special incentive to hide one's political philosophy. Public identification with radical leftism has become an acceptable political stance, so it is not so difficult for the outside observer to discern who believes what.

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document. However, the PNP government did appoint moderates to some ministries, including those of Agriculture and of Industry and Commerce. This step indicates that the PNP's increasingly leftist orientation by no means conforms to that of Cuba. Nor is it even as advanced as Guyana's.

By late 1977 and early 1978, there appeared to be developing in Jamaica an intensification of friction within the PNP as well as escalated JLP opposition. Moreover, this seemed to be occurring in a context in which the Jamaican public was expressing a deepening concern with unemployment, crime and violence, internal party divisions, radical rhetoric, and government mismanagement.[47] The higher level of political conflict may in part be related to Cuba's geographic presence, the increasing frequency of travel to Havana by left-wing members of the PNP, the favorable attitude on the part of the Manley government concerning the applicability in Jamaica of certain of Cuba's policies—e.g., the building of mini-dams—and the visit to Jamaica by Fidel Castro in October 1977 on the invitation of Prime Minister Manley.

We must remember that Cuba is not advocating violence or armed struggle in Jamaica, quite the contrary. Furthermore, President Castro's visit was low-key, although boycotted by the JLP. Still, this visit and the factors enumerated above seemed in early 1978 to be effecting a polarization of Jamaica.

The future impact of this situation on Jamaica's democratic political processes can only be speculated about at this point. Over the long haul, the actual political base of the leftists may be more shadow than substance, less a function of true ideological sentiments than a result of the coming and going of charismatic personalities. Moreover, the availability of economic support from the IMF and the US may well counter some of the force of Cuban appeals. But a struggle does now seem to be going on between those who would like to see still closer ties with the Cuban government through a variety of channels—for example, sports programs—and those who would prefer to develop closer ties with Western governments that are not a part of the Soviet economic system. The depths of this struggle are not easily captured by a simple reading of economic data, new trade agreements, or the firing or appointment of a new minister in the government. For even those closest to the Jamaican political scene confess an inability to fathom completely just exactly what tensions are operating within the leftist-oriented PNP.

* * *

In sum, Caribbean leftism, though far from a unified movement with a sharply defined outlook, represents a significant force in international relations in the 1970's. To some extent, it reflects the tenacity and impact of Cuba since that country underwent its own revolution in 1959, as well as the limited, but still important, aid and moral support supplied by the USSR. Indeed, as detailed above, it would be quite erroneous to take the position that Cuban and Soviet policies in the Caribbean have had no effect on leftist trends in the region. But Caribbean leftism marches essentially to its own drumbeat. No amount of stress on the "Cuban" or "Soviet" threat changes this fact.

Leftist leaders who advocate socialist prescriptions for change—and are most visible in Guyana and Jamaica—display a strong philosophical commitment to the notion of *equality* and, therefore, to the general improvement of the lot of the common man.[48] But attachment to this general egalitarian principle seems to be increasing throughout the Caribbean, regardless of precise political allegiances. So too does acceptance of the corollary precept that the state must increasingly become the chief organizational device to forge new and more equitable economic, political, and social systems.[49]

Behind this growing preoccupation with egalitarianism lie many influences. By no means least is the legacy of colonialism. Caribbean lands are inhabited by ex-colonial peoples highly attuned to inequalities of race, class, and nationality associated with their former colonial status and easily identifiable with the perceived "neocolonialist" conditions of their statehood. Although not heavily stressed in our previous discussion, religion—from traditional African to more modern Western variants—has also had a pronounced impact on local political cultures, as a visit to the region or a reading of its newspapers will quickly demonstrate.

Assessing the accomplishments of equality-oriented leaders thus far is difficult, for evidence with respect to social legislation, educational policy, and income distribution for separate countries has only begun to accumulate and be measured. However, one must admit that, in the short run, the overt record on economic development does not look particularly impressive, whether one takes the average annual growth

[47]See the public opinion polls conducted by Dr. Carl Stone between Oct. 15 and Nov. 15, 1977, as published in *The Jamaican Daily Gleaner*, in late 1977 and early 1978.

[48]See Wendell Bell's incisive examination of the egalitarian principle at work in Jamaica's democratic socialism in his "Inequality in Independent Jamaica: A Preliminary Appraisal of Elite Performance," loc. cit., pp. 294-308.

[49]These things appear to be happening in Jamaica, for example, regardless of party preference. See ibid., p. 303.

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rates, as expressed in per capita gross domestic product, or rates of unemployment or inflation. Nor, as the Jamaican case suggests, has the improvement in income distribution been especially encouraging, although there has been some forward movement in social legislation and education.[50]

This negative judgment may be unfair in light of the newness of the phenomenon of Caribbean leftism and the constraints of the international setting in which it operates. Nonetheless, the preliminary evidence of performance by leftist governments leaves a question about the degree to which (as well as the general level at which) their policies will bring a closer correlation between their stated egalitarian objectives and de facto economic and social realities.

This is particularly true since the region is plagued not only with high levels of unemployment and inflation but also with perpetual internal and regional disagreements which make coordinated economic and social progress quite hard to achieve and which set up the conditions for continued political unrest—thus closing a vicious circle. In Jamaica, for example, early 1978 saw strikes of the City Bus Service, unrest in the cement industry, strikes at Salada Food Jamaica Ltd. and by 18,000 teachers, and a riot which left three people dead.[51] Guyana, meanwhile, was torn apart by the sugar strike examined above and by heated debate over the Constitution Amendment Bill, designed to give strong new powers to the ruling PNC.[52] Earlier, in December 1977, Bermuda experienced a race riot by discontented blacks—the third such riot in a decade.[53]

These violent outbreaks underscore the enormous problems faced by all development-oriented governments, whether they are committed to egalitarianism or not, in the strife-torn Caribbean. Each must forge a political system capable of restructuring the economy—in the case of the leftists, along more equitable lines—in a situation where there exist deep ethnic and class cleavages, regional suspicions, and a variety of economic obstacles such as debt-servicing, capital-intensive rather than labor-intensive foreign investment, and urban as opposed to rural development priorities. What these governments require is, first, a political system that can establish and maintain legitimacy—i.e., acquire and retain a popular following that *willingly* supports the government rather than cooperates only under threat of coercion, as happens in some Latin American countries. In addition, they need to create a development-oriented attitude among their populations and to strengthen grass-roots institutions that can serve as channels for implementing development policies.

While Cuba provides one leftist Caribbean model for achieving links between the polity and the economy, it does not to date appear that any other Caribbean country with a leftist government will emulate that model in anything close to total fashion. For the most part inheritors of British constitutional traditions rather than Spanish authoritarianism, non-Cuban leftists seem inclined to follow their own unique paths of internal democracy and to reconcile private and public interests in some type of evolutionary democratic format. This inclination precludes revolution and strong military stewardship.

Beyond these observations, it is impossible to predict the precise nature of leftist struggles for more governmental direction over the economies and societies of the Caribbean. We are left, then, with the conclusion that diverse forms of leftism will be around the Caribbean for a long time to come, shaping and being affected by other internal and international currents there.

[50] Ibid., pp. 298-305.
[51] *Caribbean Contact*, May 1978, pp. 1-2.
[52] Ibid., June 1978, pp. 8-9.
[53] Frank Manning, "Anatomy of a Riot," *Caribbean Review* (Miami), June 1978, pp. 4-12.

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Books

French Communism: Theory and Practice

By Henry W. Ehrmann

JEAN ELLEINSTEIN. *Le P.C.* (The CP), Paris, Grasset, 1976.
JEAN ELLEINSTEIN. *Lettre ouverte aux Français sur la Republique du Programme Commun* (An Open Letter to the French on the Republic of the Common Program). Paris, Albin Michel, 1977.
ÉTIENNE BALIBAR. *Sur la Dictature du Prolétariat* (On the Dictatorship of the Proletariat). Paris, François Maspero, 1976.
ROGER GARAUDY. *L'Alternative* (The Alternative). Paris, Éditions Robert Laffont, 1972.
JEAN-PIERRE CHEVENEMENT. *Les socialistes, les communistes et les autres* (Socialists, Communists, and Others). Paris, Aubier, 1976.
DOMINIQUE LABBÉ. *Le Discours Communiste* (The Communist Discourse). Paris, Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1977.
BERTRAND BADIE. *Stratégie de la greve* (Strike Strategy). Paris, Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1976.
RICHARD JOHNSON. *The French Communist Party versus the Students*. New Haven, CT, and London, Yale University Press, 1972.
MARCELLO MONTANARI. *Teoria e Movimento nel Partito Comunista Francese, 1959-1963. Antologia Critica* (Theory and Change in the French Communist Party, 1959-1963. A Critical Anthology). Bari, De Donato, 1974.

IN THE EARLY 1960's, the French Communist Party (PCF) began to abandon the model for a socialist future that the Soviet Union had furnished for more than four decades. Simultaneously, the party sought to overcome its isolation on the French political scene by promoting the formation of a new leftist coalition. These two developments, while different in origin, eventually combined to provide the direction for the party's altered political practice.

The interaction between ideology and PCF practice is discussed in all of the books reviewed here. The authors offer a variety of perspectives and prognoses, their differences stemming in part from their different positions inside or outside the party. Jean Elleinstein, an *agrégé* in history, a party activist since 1944, and presently codirector of the party's Marxist Research Institute, had by the eve of the March 1978 elections, become a sort of public-relations agent for the PCF.[1] Étienne Balibar, a philosopher, remains a party member, although in earlier times his sharp criticism of the party's recent ideological stance might have easily led to his expulsion. Because just such a fate befell Roger Garaudy in 1970, that one-time member of the PCF Central Committee must now offer his own version of Marxism-Leninism from outside the party. Jean-Pierre Chevènement, a Socialist Party deputy and leader of his party's organized left, the CÈRES, took a prominent part in the negotiations leading to the Common Program of the Left in 1972. Dominique Labbe and Bertrand Badie offer scholarly contributions, based on doctoral dissertations, to the ongoing research on French political life sponsored by the *Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques*. The American Richard Johnson and the Italian Marcello Montanari

[1] It should be noted that since the March elections, Elleinstein has turned to the columns of a noncommunist newspaper to make outspoken attacks on the overall orientation and strategy of the PCF. See *Le Monde* (Paris), April 13, 14, and 15, 1978.

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are both young authors whose criticism of the PCF is informed by sympathies for the New Left. Montanari presents writings and statements by party intellectuals (Garaudy and Louis Althusser among them) and functionaries, prefacing the collection with his own lengthy introduction. The other books also offer a wide choice of party statements, accounts of intraparty discussions, and quotations from the party press—not to mention those culled from the classics, i.e., from Marx, Engels, and Lenin.

THE FRENCH PARTY's disillusionment with the policies of its Soviet counterpart developed gradually rather than suddenly. While the PCF had approved of the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956, in 1966 (two years after the death of Maurice Thorez) the PCF newspaper *l'Humanité* openly criticized the USSR for its trial of Yuliy Dan'yel and Andrey Sinyavskiy. Finally, in 1968 the party publicly condemned the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Loosening of the bonds with the Soviet Union afforded the PCF's accredited ideologues more freedom to roam, and the Communist discourse became less monolithic. But, as Labbé stresses (pp. 22 and 193), party ideology was still charged with the functions of structuring PCF views of the domestic political environment and of cementing the party's organizational unity.

This search for acceptable new theories to underpin PCF practice became more pressing as a result of a major turn in party policy in 1962 toward a new alliance strategy, a shift that can rightly be compared to that of 1934 leading to the Popular Front. Several factors combined to bring about this shift. First, President Charles de Gaulle's constitutional referendum of 1962 encouraged formation of a temporary alliance of major political forces against the Gaullist regime. The PCF seized eagerly upon this opportunity to leave the political ghetto to which it had been confined by the cold war and the first years of the Fifth Republic. Second, it was in this same period that Maurice Thorez understood at last that his efforts to stall destalinization would find no support in Moscow.

Labbé traces the evolution of PCF ideology during this critical period through a detailed linguistic and lexical analysis of three party resolutions—those adopted at PCF congresses in 1961, 1964, and 1967. (It should be noted that this period saw leadership of the party pass from Maurice Thorez to Waldeck Rochet and, increasingly in practice if not in title, to Georges Marchais.) The shift away from an isolated, Stalinist posture is also evident from a comparison of statements made by Thorez in 1959 and 1963 (cited in Montanari, pp. 117 ff.). Typically, both declarations reasserted the thesis of the "relative pauperization of the working class," a belief to which Thorez held with fundamentalist fervor throughout his career. But in 1963, almost incongruously, Thorez no longer pictured the Socialists as the class-enemy; they were instead invited to join with the Communists in a broad democratic front. Moreover, Thorez's earlier classification of the Gaullist regime as "fascist" was abandoned.[2]

For all the insight provided by Labbé's study, one cannot help wondering whether the author has not tried to prove too much. Participant observers have described how PCF resolutions are in fact thrown together, how phrases are chosen that have lost all significance but serve to gloss over controversies or to cover unavowed changes in policies.[3] Evaluated against such testimony, Labbé's analysis conveys a far more rational process of ideology-formation and of decision-making than would seem to exist in reality. The same objection can be made to the equally thorough and methodologically sophisticated study by Badie on the PCF's role in strike movements.[4]

During the short stewardship of Rochet (he was effectively PCF leader only from 1964 to 1970), it was boldly stated that dogmatism had become the main obstacle to the development of the correct party line; opportunism no longer constituted the most condemned deviation (see Rochet's 1965 report on "Marxism, Humanism and the Role of the Intellectuals" in Montanari, pp. 214 ff.). It was felt that to stress the humanistic aspects of Marxism would facilitate the desired rapprochement between Communists and Christians. Those were the years when Garaudy was given free rein to fraternize with progressive Catholics and to join the intellectual community at large in the rediscovery of Marx's early writings and in the reinterpretation of Hegel. At the

[2]Before this could happen, Laurent Casanova and Marcel Servin, ranking PCF members who had warned early against the political consequences of the party's misinterpreting the nature of the Gaullist regime, had to be expelled. The conflict, which pitted the ailing Thorez against his closest collaborators, provides a case study of the use of controversies over questions of theory for the settling of intraparty competition for power. On this episode, see Phillippe Robrieux's brilliant and almost moving account in *Thorez. Vie Secrète et Vie Publique* (Thorez. The Secret Life and the Public Life), Paris, Fayard, 1975, pp. 511 ff.

[3]See, for example, Robrieux, op. cit. There is now an abundance of similar testimony available in the "confessions" of such former party leaders as Charles Tillon, Auguste Lecoeur, and others.

[4]Indeed, Annie Kriegel voices this criticism in her interesting preface to Badie's book.

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same time, it is worth noting that Louis Althusser—another prominent party intellectual—was reprimanded only slightly, not censured, when he denounced humanist Marxism as a falsification of mature Marxist and Leninist thought with possibly disastrous consequences for the party's practice.[5]

In this period ideological uncertainties and shifts among the various groups competing for the top leadership positions in the PCF were aggravated by governmental policies which blunted the party's opposition to the regime. France's withdrawal from NATO, French opposition to any supranational development of the European Economic Community, and official criticism of the United States were policies which made the PCF and its affiliated trade union movement less sensitive than it might otherwise have been to the discontent that was developing in the country against Gaullist rule. The party's links to its own student and youth movements were weakened by rifts over questions both of doctrine and of practical policy.

AS A CONSEQUENCE of such developments, the party was ideologically unprepared for the events of May 1968—when students staged violent riots and when spontaneous strike movements of millions of workers outstripped the Communist trade unions with their radical demands. The loss of votes in the June 1968 elections to the National Assembly was painful enough. But more ominous for the party was the twofold danger of being outflanked on the left and at the same time being frustrated in its desire to reintegrate the French polity.

The authors reviewed here pay considerable attention to an explanation of the party's reactions to the events of May-June 1968. In Johnson's opinion, ideological differences were at the heart of the bitter rivalry among the PCF, the students, and various other elements of the Left. His analysis of the respective ideological positions leads him to the correct conclusion that within the party, "bureaucratization has reduced theory to stereotyped ideological discourse" (p. 160). His study suffers, however, from an insufficient knowledge of the many-sided traditions of the French labor movement. For, while Johnson sees nothing but "rigidity" (which would have proven disastrous), Badie's extensive discussion of the same events explains why the party and its trade-union arm, the General Confederation of Labor (CGT), rapidly regained the control which they had momentarily lost.[6]

Badie's functional analysis demonstrates quite convincingly how throughout its history the PCF and Communist union leaders have drawn inspiration, and often success, from Lenin's nuanced prescriptions for the correct relationship between party and trade unions. In contrast to Johnson, Badie seems at times to be overimpressed by the party's performance and to underplay its fail-

[5]On the differing views of Garaudy and Althusser, see the articles by Maurice Cranston, "The Thought of Roger Garaudy," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), September-October 1970, pp. 11-18, and "The Ideology of Althusser," ibid., March-April 1973, pp. 53-60.

[6]Of considerable interest in this regard is the lengthy report on the 1968 events by Georges Séguy, General Secretary of the CGT (in Montanari, pp. 241-57), a document that Johnson seems to have ignored.

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ures. Nonetheless, his discussion of the party's ability to mobilize time and again significant parts of the working class by applying Leninist fundamentals complements Georges Lavau's earlier characterization of the party's function as mainly "tribunal."[7] Badie demonstrates that, beyond its role as a tribune through which certain social groups could voice their protests and demands, the PCF has frequently been able to turn labor conflicts into political struggle.

Within the party, recriminations over the events of 1968 caused the ouster of Roger Garaudy, to date the last expulsion of a prominent PCF spokesman on grounds of ideological errors. There is no need to retrace here Garaudy's metamorphosis from a hard-line Stalinist to a bitter critic of the party's insensitive attitude toward the students during the events, and subsequently to a wholehearted partisan of the Czechoslovak Spring.[8] The further course of his intellectual evolution following removal from the PCF in 1970 is suggested by his work *L'Alternative,* published two years later. Shunning the customary *mea culpa* of an ex-Marxist-Leninist, Garaudy finds in the early Marx and the late Lenin[9] scriptural justification for a new utopia. *Autogestion* (self-management) becomes the key concept for his alternative of a "constructive" rather than "convulsive" revolution. Besides Marx and Lenin, he invokes other preceptors: Georges Sorel, Antonio Gramsci, and, frequently, Jean-Jacques Rousseau. It is quite striking how easily Garaudy, who spent most of his adult life in the communist "counter-society" (to use Annie Kriegel's term), rejoins traditions of French social theory far more informed by moral idealism than by historical materialism. His version of Marxism frequently approximates the language of Jean Jaurès and does not avoid the confusions of Jaurès's eclecticism. But while Jaurès forged a party of democratic socialism as his vehicle, Garaudy will probably remain isolated.

AT THE same 1970 PCF Congress which ostracized Garaudy, Georges Marchais, who had first become notorious outside of party circles for his brutal attacks against the student leaders in 1968, developed at length the concept of an "advanced democracy," which he coupled with the strategy of "the union of the Left."[10] Actually, the concept of an "advanced democracy" had made its first appearance as early as 1968 in the party's so-called Manifesto of Champigny.[11] At that time, the PCF countered the criticism from the left to which it was then exposed by emphasizing the party's perennial claim to form *the* revolutionary vanguard (see Labbé, pp. 160). In 1970, by contrast, Marchais described advanced democracy in more innocuous terms, designed to make it more palatable as a common goal for Communists and Socialists, and eventually for the entire Left. And, as his own "contribution" to the polycentrism of the international communist movement, he christened the stages leading to advanced democracy (which one day, if the electorate so decided, might "open the way to socialism") as "socialism in French colors."

The concepts of "advanced democracy" and "union of the Left" have remained ambiguous over the last decade despite numerous out-of-context references by the party to the *Communist Manifesto* and to the "teachings of Lenin." The notions have been used widely in support of the aggressive alliance policies inaugurated by Rochet and pursued by his successor Marchais. Inasmuch as the overwhelming majority of Frenchmen were the victims of state monopoly capitalism, Rochet had proclaimed, nothing stood in the way of enlisting to the cause "the whole people with the sole exception of the feudal barons of big business."[12] Apart from the reference to feudalism, this statement—wittingly or unwittingly—seems a reedition of Abbé Sieyes's denunciation on the eve of the French Revolution of the narrow base of the *ancien regime* (200,000 individuals in a nation of 26 million, he had said).

One may ponder whether the Marxists in the PCF have unlearned what they once knew about the difference between a "bourgeois" and a "socialist" revolution. It at least seemed that a colossal subjectivism had triumphed, and that

[7]Lavau coined the term in his article, "The Communist Party in the French Political System," in Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, *Le communisme en France*, Paris, Armand Colin, 1969, pp. 32-33. It should be noted that this characterization of the PCF is accepted by Elleinstein in his *Lettre Ouverte* . . .(p. 35).

[8]On the controversies between the PCF and Garaudy, see Cranston's article on Garaudy cited in footnote 5, and also Johnson, pp. 101 ff.

[9]His main reference is to one of Lenin's last articles, an indeed interesting discussion of cooperatives and of the need for a cultural revolution. The article was reprinted under the title "On Cooperation," in V. I. Lenin, *Selected Works*, Vol. 3, Moscow, International Publishers, 1975, pp. 698-704.

[10]Portions of his address are presented in Montanari, pp. 258 ff. For the full text, see *Cahiers du communisme* (Paris), February-March 1970, pp. 25-102.

[11]Reprinted in ibid., January 1969, pp. 120-42.

[12]Large portions of his report are presented by Montanari, pp. 214 ff. For the full text, see *Cahiers du communisme,* May-June 1966, pp. 281-322.

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all Marxist insight into false revolutionary "consciousness" had been forgotten when the PCF proclaimed in 1974 that the "union of the French people" (against the small number of its enemies) was being forged. References to "building socialism" were replaced by terms such as "new democracy" and "democratic change."[13] In this context, it also became obvious that the "union of the French people" was regarded as a broad people's front transcending the partnership with the Socialist Party.[14]

There followed, at the 1976 PCF Congress, the elimination of the term "dictatorship of the proletariat" from the party statutes.[15] The principled discussions which this change precipitated before and after—but not during—the congress are recorded in Balibar's book. Balibar's contention that the dictatorship of the proletariat was the very essence of socialism and that the party might court disaster if it forgot Lenin's insights was challenged by another party intellectual, Political Bureau member Guy Besse. Besse, however, offered little in the way of refutation except that the founding fathers had declared the struggle for socialism and the struggle for democracy to be inseparable. Whatever stood in the way of a successful broadening of democracy, Besse contended, should be eliminated.[16]

In connection with this debate, it is noteworthy that throughout his book Balibar is also highly critical of the writings of his colleague Jean Elleinstein. According to Balibar, Elleinstein, by picturing the Soviet regime as a classic example of a perverted dictatorship of the proletariat had contributed to the discrediting and eventual abandonment of the concept by the PCF.[17]

Whatever the merit of Balibar's specific critique of Elleinstein, it would certainly appear that it has become Elleinstein's assignment to describe the PCF in the most endearing terms possible. In his book on the PCF, published by a bourgeois publishing house, Elleinstein gives what purports to be an open and comprehensive view of the structure and the personnel of the party, its working methods, and activities. Seemingly factual and quite interesting information abounds, leaving the impression that there is nothing to hide. The discussion of program is avoided, but it is couched in terms that make an updated Marxism-Leninism seem a most sensible proposition for all reform-minded Frenchmen. It is obviously most important to the author to dispel any notion that the leadership and the militants of the party operate in a subculture estranged from the mainstream of French society.[18]

PURSUIT of its alliance strategy has presented the PCF with the sort of theoretical problems which, as Georges Lichtheim so accurately pointed out, can only be resolved in practice.[19] As Marchais made clear at the 1976 Party Congress, abandonment of the term "dictatorship of the proletariat" in no way involved abandonment of the organizational principle of democratic centralism and the claim of the PCF to be the vanguard of the French working class.[20] As long as these two fundaments of what the party considers its Marxist-Leninist legitimacy are safeguarded, broad and extravagant alliance policies can do no harm.

Consequently, since the mid-1970's, the PCF's practice has consisted in combining the call for a union of the French people with efforts to intensify party influence in the factories and other places of work. The more the Socialist Party gained ascendancy over the PCF in public opinion, the more strenuous and effective

[13]Althusser applauded this turn toward a broad alliance in a *l'Humanité* article reprinted in his *Essays in Self-Criticism*, London, New Left Books, and Atlantic Highlands, NJ, Humanities Press, 1976, pp. 208 ff. To the outsider, this article—and for that matter the entire volume—appears to be an intellectual debasement of the worst kind. It leads one to wonder whether in the eyes of the party leadership such doctrinary exercises have any significance.

[14]The Socialist Party attacked the emphasis by the PCF on "the union of the French people" as a new strategy threatening the leftist coalition. See a report summarized in *Le Monde*, Jan. 29, 1976.

[15]The proposal was made by Georges Marchais, who had declared in 1964 that "to abandon the concept [of the dictatorship of the proletariat] would mean to slide to bourgeois democracy." On this and on the checkered history of the concept prior to its official elimination, see Labbé, pp. 179 ff.

[16]See Balibar, pp. 185-92. Despite these differences, the two opponents are coauthors of a philosophical treatise published by the PCF's publishing house. See Étienne Balibar, Guy Besse, et al., *Sur la Dialectique* (On the Dialectic), Paris, Éditions Sociales, 1977. Yet one is probably not justified in concluding from this that the controversy over the dictatorship concept is mere shadowboxing.

[17]See Elleinstein's monumental *Histoire de l'U.R.S.S.* (History of the USSR), 4 Vols., Paris, Éditions Sociales, 1972-75, and his incisive article, "The West and the Lesson of Petrograd," *Le Monde*, Nov. 7, 1977. This is just some of the evidence that controversies about the Soviet Union continue to create divisions within the PCF.

[18]The picture provided by two outsiders, André Harris and Alain de Sedouy, *Voyage à l 'intérieur du Parti Communiste* (A Journey Inside the Communist Party), Paris, Éditions Seuil, 1974, is in many ways similar. But in this case the authors do not pretend that what they were able to see and evaluate is all there is to the PCF.

[19]See Georges Lichtheim, *Marxism in Modern France*, New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1966, p. 94.

[20]Chevènement (pp. 220 ff.) gives an excellent and trenchant analysis of Marchais' report. For the text of the report see *Cahiers du communisme*, February-March 1976, pp. 12-72.

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became the efforts of the Communist Party to assert its role as the vanguard of the proletariat. The books by Labbé, Badie, and Chevènement offer ample evidence that mobilization of the workers—mainly, though not exclusively, through its 8,000 factory cells—has remained the focal point of the PCF's efforts and that its activities often surpass in effect those of the Communist-controlled trade union movement, the CGT. Indeed, the tensions arising between the Communists and Socialists over the PCF's attempt to entrench itself as the vanguard of the working class had reached the breaking point a number of times in many parts of the country long before central negotiations between the parties actually broke down.

The ostensible cause of the rupture was disagreement over the issue of nationalizations. However, it is difficult to assess how important the issue of nationalization has truly become for the PCF. Public ownership of industry before a socialist society has been secured had never previously been high on the party's agenda except during the relatively short post-liberation period, when party and union influence in the newly nationalized concerns had opened possibilities for a power play. Has this attitude changed in spite of the fact that "advanced democracy" is described as being just the anteroom for socialism? Certainly the accounts of the party debates of the last decade provided by the books reviewed here reflect precious little discussion about the economic significance of nationalizations. Indeed, for a Marxist party, the dearth of serious economic analysis (and of qualified economists) is astounding. The one comprehensive party-sponsored economic treatise, of which Montanari publishes some passages (pp. 272-88), lacks originality and compares unfavorably with the far more serious analyses by such Communist dissenters as Ernest Mandel and Serge Mallet.[21]

The unwillingness of the PCF to discuss the consequences for the French economy of the targeted nationalizations suggests that its interest was from the very beginning confined to the political capital it could derive from the proposals. After the events of 1968, the demand for a substantial extension of the public sector was the PCF's answer to the New Left's demands for *autogestion,* disliked by the party because it might leave too much room to spontaneity and too little to party and union control. During the negotiations over the Common Program, differences between the Socialists and the Communists about the appropriate extent of nationalizations were downplayed. It was only more recently, when such differences appeared a welcome issue to demarcate the PCF from the "reformism" of the Socialists that they were revived. Even then the debate over what were the "commanding heights" that a government of the Left would have to secure paid little attention to economics. Rather, the dispute served as a pretext to abandon the strategy of the Common Program.[22]

ELLEINSTEIN'S *Lettre Ouverte,* written hastily after the break, is a curiosity in terms of traditional intraparty alignments. It presents an apologia for a leftward turn in the party line by a spokesman of the PCF's right wing. In this work the author's criticism of the USSR and of countries in the Soviet orbit reaches a high pitch. He argues that since the Russian experience had lost all significance for developments in France, it became of utmost importance to drop the reference to the dictatorship of the proletariat in the party statutes. Because of its contribution to the party's long-range strategy, the 1976 Party Congress is likened to that of the December 1920 Congress of Tours, which consecrated the split with the Socialists. Marxism is condescendingly praised as an "ideology whose scientific methodology as well as its political expansiveness[!] has proved attractive to intellectuals because of its interdisciplinary character" (p. 84). But since Lenin had not developed a generally valid theory of the transition to socialism, it might be better to discontinue references to "Marxism-Leninism" (p. 90). While Thorez is scorned for having clung to an obsolete pauperization theory, Rousseau, Pierre Proudhon, and Gramsci are praised for their insights. In order to win the allegiance of the proponents of a "cultural *gauchisme,*" including the ecologists, there is even faint praise for practices of *autogestion.* "Far from contrasting reform and revolution we must unite both in a totality that is radically new in contemporary history" (p. 43). Yet what the Socialists are doing is wrong (because it is the Socialists that are doing it?), for they are moving toward the political center and thereby endangering the "project" to which the CP is

[21] For the complete PCF treatise, see *Le Capitalisme monopoliste de l'État. Traité marxiste d'économie politique* (State Monopoly Capitalism. A Marxist Treatise on Political Economy), 2 vols., Paris, Éditions Sociales, 1971 and 1974. Both Althusser and Balibar have criticized in their writings the concept of "state monopoly capitalism" as a deviation from Marxist theory. (Some excerpts from Mallet are also published by Montanari, pp. 176-94.)

[22] One of the party's principal economists, in charge of instruction in economics at the Central Party School, has discussed these questions with as much arrogance as naiveté. See Philippe Herzog, "The Will to Break in Order to Change," *Le Monde*, Dec. 16, 1977.

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committed. Hence the break.[23]

Writing before the break, Chevènement provides a far more serious analysis of the reasons underlying the conflict. His and Elleinstein's evaluations of the place occupied by the Left in the present French political scene are in many ways concordant. But unlike his Communist counterpart, the Socialist author treats the earlier and recent ideological development of the two parties in a manner devoid of sectarianism and propagandistic deformations. What is more important, Chevènement is well enough versed in the history of Marxism and of organized labor, French and foreign, and experienced enough a politician to know that what is at stake is not different interpretations of doctrine.[24]

The rivalry is over power, not over ideology. The root problem is mutual suspicion that the other partner will seek to abuse the power which the partnership might provide. As for Marxism-Leninism, it continues to serve the PCF as it has so often during the party's long history, even though the present level of intellectual discourse is particularly low. It remains a pseudoscientific language which serves to interpret and reinterpret past and present party policy, and to hold together a disciplined working-class movement.

[23]Despite this attempt to justify the PCF's current strategy, Elleinstein has more recently (see footnote 1 above) published comments critical of it in the noncommunist press. He is not the only Communist in an important party post to criticize PCF strategy in the aftermath of the 1978 parliamentary elections. Even more vehement and far more searching were the recriminations voiced by Althusser, spokesman of the party's Left and of many of its intellectuals. See *Le Monde*, April 25, 26, 27, and 28, 1978.

At the time of this writing, it is impossible to determine how far the internal criticism of the party will spread and what the outcome of the crisis will be. But there is little doubt that the ongoing discussion will continue to touch on many of the problems raised in the present article.

[24]Even in regard to strategy, the differences appear in no way fundamental, since the formation of a "class front" (which the Socialist Party has accepted as a description of its own strategy) does not vary substantially from the alliance policies of the PCF. Since the break, Chevènement has pursued the questions raised in his book in the article "A Crisis of Will," ibid., Dec. 17-18, 1977.

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Alexander Yanov — Writing Between the Lines

By Walter C. Clemens, Jr.

"Social Contradictions and the Social Struggle in the Post-Stalinist USSR: Essays by Alexander Yanov." Translated as a separate issue of *International Journal of Sociology* (White Plains, NY), Vol. 6, Nos. 2-3, Summer 1976.
ALEXANDER YANOV. *Détente After Brezhnev: The Domestic Roots of Soviet Foreign Policy.* Berkeley, CA, University of California, Institute of International Studies, 1977.

RUSANOV in Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's *Cancer Ward* always demanded to be the first to get the newspaper, because only he knew how to decipher its coded messages. Only he knew how to ascertain the real meaning of articles from their location, what they said and did not say.[1] Likewise, Leonid Brezhnev's speeches, Alexander Yanov tells us in one of the two volumes reviewed here, often convey an "underlying meaning" not immediately apparent to the casual reader. "The art in this kind of communication," Yanov says, "consists in being able to set forth one's ideas in such a way that those for whom they are intended understand everything, while those against whom they are directed find nothing to take offense at."[2]

Writing for many years in a variety of central and regional periodicals of the USSR, Yanov himself became astute at this art. Like many other Soviet writers and leaders, he managed to put forward his own views in ways apparently compatible with the limits of the party line. In the West since 1974, he has continued to publish widely, but now with the liberty to spell out what could be said only elliptically in his previous incarnation.

Many writers in the USSR and in other countries subject to political censorship have cultivated the art of esoteric communication, some more boldly and at greater risk than Yanov, but the collection of his essays published in a wide range of Soviet publications from 1966 to 1973 and translated in the Summer 1976 issue of the *International Journal of Sociology* provides a vivid illustration of how one man worked for liberalizing change within (and around) the establishment. His full-length book, written in the West, permits us to assess the contributions such a writer can make, as well as the problems he faces, in a new and freer environment.

YANOV'S WORK in the USSR should be seen as part of a renaissance of critical analysis emerging there since Stalin's death, moving forward in fits and starts, impelled and then repressed by a variety of factors. This movement has been spurred in part by important figures in the party leadership who have wanted the economy—indeed, the whole Soviet system—to function more efficiently. This goal, they concluded, required some criticism of prevailing attitudes, structures, and modes of operation. Thus, Yanov's exposé of collective farm abuses in Smolensk was published in 1966—despite some powerful opposition—because of support extending all the way to the CPSU Politburo.[3]

But one could never know the precise limits of official toleration. Less than one tenth of the articles which Yanov submitted were ever published in the USSR, he says, with most seemingly rejected on political grounds rather than for stylistic or substantive reasons.[4] Persistence paid off, however, and Yanov managed to be a member of the Writers' Union for many years and to publish his work in sources so diverse as *Komsomol'skaya pravda, Voprosy literatury, Novyy mir,* and *Literaturnaya gazeta.* His themes, too, were diverse—from collective farm life to Slavophile criticism to an ap-

[1]Pavel Nikolayevich Rusanov in Solzhenitsyn's *Rakovyy korpus* (Cancer Ward), Paris, YMCA Press, 1970, p. 183.
[2]*Détente after Brezhnev* . . ., p. 16.
[3]From an oral communication to the author in Washington, DC, in 1977.
[4]Ibid.

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preciation of a new book on Hegel. But buried in each essay was an outlook toward life which, if lifted from the specific context, contained drastic implications for Soviet life.

By reviewing 19th-century and contemporary literary debates, Yanov portrayed the deep, almost irrational wellsprings of Soviet sensitivity to foreign criticism. He quoted Catherine the Great's view that "the enemies of Russian glory try to portray Russia the way they would like this country to be but not the way it is: as a flourishing and mighty land."[5]

The Slavophiles, Yanov noted in the same essay, led the struggle against the political idolatry which held the Tsar could do no wrong. They also struggled for a secularization of authority and for unlimited freedom of speech. But, like the Tsarist censors, they erred in demanding that literature present an invariably positive attitude toward life in Russia. They did not understand that to love one's people and country it is necessary first to understand them. As Yanov puts it,

One can and must truly love one's people only if one knows why one loves them. It is only in the process of the most unsparing analysis and investigation, through discovering what is true and what is good—what has withstood the blows of criticism—that one can be sure that he loves what is really good and genuine and not something that is false and evil.[6]

Slavophiles objected to the "natural school," which lumped together the sins of both the "people" and the "public" and which, by its "total disregard for the bright side," became in effect the agent of a Germanized "public," an instrument of ideological subversion of the "people." But the ideology of the Tsarist establishment was also against foreign subversion. It saw Russian society as unique, "formed from one material, the only one of its kind." It called for tightening ranks around the autocratic Tsar to block the spread of base Western ideas. The society is healthy; evil comes from without. Uvarov's triad[7] had tried to shift the blame for the infection of Russian society from the rottenness of the social mechanism to the realm of ideology. In Yanov's words, "just as irrational parents attribute their children's mischief to what they learned on the streets, so the lordly father of the Russian nation explained the Decembrists by the evil ideological influence of the West."[8]

In another essay, reviewing a book on Hegel, Yanov noted that observation of contradictions may stimulate one's thought. Hegel's notion of contradiction "teaches us to think, and however strange it may seem . . . it teaches us to think in a modern way, systematically, concretely, in a structured manner . . . ." Yanov asserted that we are all philosophers to some degree, and that "all, or almost all of us, at some time, at some moment, however unique and fleeting" become "independent thinkers"—"demiurges of our own conception of things, like Prince Andrey on the battlefield of Austerlitz . . . ." He cautioned, however, that "to think independently and originally is an art, a science."[9]

Despite his liberal reformist tendencies, Yanov was far from being a defender of art for its own sake in the USSR. Instead, he worked within the didactic tradition, arguing that art must serve the people—in a progressive manner. We see this in Yanov's writings on the role of the hero in literature and film.

In the Soviet Union, the positive hero of the long Stalin years began to fade as early as 1952, and the process picked up momentum through the decade. By 1962 Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn had introduced to the Soviet reader Ivan Denisovich, a prometheus who held out against aspects of the system rather than cheerfully serving it. However, by the late 1960's the screw had turned again, and a conservative critic, A. Lanshchikov, attacked the "self-searching" or "confessional" prose of the 1960's for portraying persons concerned primarily not with the question of their vocation but with how to ensure a comfortable future—"anything you like, only not a worker, peasant, or soldier." On what basis could such protagonists claim a special role in social life? They pretended to be innovators and creators so formidable as to warrant attention. Such persons have no social ties with the laboring masses but exhibit "a frank tendency toward "elitism."[10]

Refuting Lanshchikov, Yanov wrote that the nature of the hero must change with the evolution of

[5] In "The Riddle of Slavophile Criticism," *Voprosy literatury* (Moscow), No. 5 1969, as translated in the reviewed issue of *International Journal of Sociology*, p. 186.

[6] Ibid., p. 192.

[7] S.S.Uvarov, Tsar Nicholas I's Minister of Education from 1833 to 1849, upheld the three principles of "Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and the National Principle."

[8] "The Riddle of Slavophile Criticism," loc. cit., p. 206.

[9] "The Living Hegel," *Novyy mir* (Moscow), No. 7, 1971, as translated in the reviewed issue of *International Journal of Sociology*, pp. 181 and 183.

[10] Lanshchikov's views are detailed and referenced in the Yanov essay "The Young Hero," *Novyy mir*, No. 7, 1972, translated in ibid., pp. 118-75.

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society and the economy. Contradictions will well up within the individual, but society's future depends upon the members of the comfortable generation with diplomas in hand. Yanov contended that it was sufficient in the 1960's for a hero to struggle basically alone, adapting to the system; in the 1970's, he argued, the hero must become an individualistic manager eager and able to change the system. The literary hero, like the economy, must shift from quantitative to qualitative improvements.[11]

As for Soviet films, these, too, should and did reveal societal conflict, Yanov asserted in another essay. Here he quoted P.N. Demichev, the Soviet Communist Party's watchdog for cultural affairs, who had said that "current social processes are distinguished by the tremendous complexity of different tendencies and by the interplay and conflict between them." Such conflicts, Yanov went on, are intensified by the scientific-technical revolution, which gives rise to competing and often incompatible programs backed by innovators and conservatives. "Both in art and reality all these contradictory programs and tendencies are personified in actual people, are embodied in human relations." Conflicting programs are sustained by the real interests of individuals concerned. Art thus becomes an indicator and monitor of social struggle.[12]

NOW THAT HE is out of the USSR and can express himself openly, Yanov continues to stump for liberal ideals, supplementing the information acquired during his life there with ideas and data gleaned from several years in the West. His views have been set out, inter alia, in *Kontinent,* several essays in *The New York Times,* and in *Détente After Brezhnev.* In these works one finds some insights that Yanov developed in the Soviet Union but did not express in print there—even between the lines. Two of these ideas seem especially important and, to me, plausible if not fully demonstrated.

First, Yanov argues that the USSR "is ruled in practice by two Central Committees: the Central Committee apparatus—i.e., six thousand clerks in Staraya Square in Moscow headed by fifteen oligarchs (the Soviet variant of the US executive branch), and the Central Committee Plenum, dominated by the little Stalins (the Soviet variant of the Legislative branch)." It is this dyarchy, Yanov contends, that has paralyzed Brezhnev's will in recent years, because the plenum members, though personally selected by Brezhnev, "are members of their social groups first and functionaries second."[13]

A second intriguing idea is that industrial projects of the type of the mammoth Kama Truck Plant, built with substantial Western assistance, may harm the Soviet economy more than they help it. This, Yanov argues, is because their managers acquire a priority claim on resources like those enjoyed by military plants, leading them to pillage and disrupt the rest of the economy.[14]

Yanov castigates the West for not doing more to build a left-of-center coalition to succeed Brezhnev. The "leftists" whom Yanov wants the West to bolster are the disgruntled managers of the USSR, men wanting more freedom to innovate, hire, and fire as they please, in order to make their system more efficient. Greater managerial autonomy, Yanov argues, threatens the party clerks who now broker and mediate most economic transactions. Yanov contends that the only "natural ally" for the West is the middle managerial class of the USSR. Socialist managers offer the "only real mass [*sic*] opposition to the regime."[15]

Surely no Western government wants a neo-Stalinist regime to seize control in Moscow, but Yanov provides no evidence to persuade the reader that the managers he would support are "liberal" or "leftist." At best, some want more autonomy to make their system more efficient and to aggrandize their own roles in it. Convergence in industrial organization, as Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington noted long ago, does not assure political convergence.[16]

It is difficult to conceive, furthermore, how Western governments could do much more than they are already doing to draw the Kremlin into a deeper web of interdependent ties—commercial, cultural, scientific, and security. Yanov warns that prolongation of the status quo in East-West relations could provoke a right-wing reaction in Russia,[17] but he has little to propose other than an intensification of détente and trade, i.e., more of the same.

THOUGH he has read much history and has been exposed to cen-

[11] Ibid.

[12] "Cinema and the Scientific-Technical Revolution," *Iskusstvo kino* (Moscow), No. 11, 1972, translated in the reviewed issue of *International Journal of Sociology,* pp. 114-15.

[13] *Détente After Brezhnev* . . ., p. 41.

[14] "Economic Colonialism in the Soviet," *The New York Times,* Aug. 11, 1977, p. A-17.

[15] "Détente and the Soviet Managerial Class," ibid., Aug. 21, 1975, p. 35.

[16] *Political Power USA/USSR,* New York, NY, Viking, 1963.

[17] This danger is analyzed by Yanov in his recent volume, *The Russian New Right: Right-Wing Ideologies in the Contemporary USSR,* Berkeley, CA, University of California, Institute of International Studies, 1978.

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ters of power in Moscow and the West, Yanov's intellectual tradition leads him to disregard alternative explanations and prescriptions. Like some other Russian dissidents, Yanov sometimes runs the risk of becoming, as Dostoevksy once called himself, a political pamphleteer.

Yanov is virtually an archetype of the Russian intellectual who operates gracefully at the interface between history and literary-artistic criticism. For such minds, ideas are informed and inspired, but not tightly organized to produce a scientific analysis. Thus, in his book on détente Yanov presents us with some evidence of a growing right-wing movement in the USSR, but he does not systematically weigh this against other tendencies or assess the conditions in which each may thrive or wither. The prolix style of Soviet journalism once helped Yanov to generate lines between which he could plant somewhat heretical ideas. This style, carried over into his essays in the West, permits him to attract the Western reader, but it also serves to fudge or obscure the process by which his mind moves from A to Z.

Finally, Yanov probably needs to trim his expectations about the power of free thought and expression. He writes that the Western intellectual community "could work out a precise and detailed program to reconcile all the positive sociopolitical forces in the USSR," one that would show "that the aristocratization of the elite is impossible without human rights and that a general reconstruction of the economy is impossible without political support from the elite as it becomes an aristocracy."[18] Even if Western scholars could work such wonders at home or abroad, the day is not imminent, to paraphrase Plato, when commissars and philosophers will become one.

Besides ideas, Yanov supplies a wealth of factual observation serving to amplify viewpoints already current in Western discussions. Thus, he details the ways in which "tens of thousands" of Soviet citizens now benefit materially from East-West exchanges, serving to "hook" them on détente.[19] In this Yanov portrays a new "big deal" between the regime and its constituents, one far broader than Stalin concocted.[20]

Though Yanov's life conditions have hardly been conducive to the construction of a grand and solid synthesis, the breadth of his investigations has laid foundations which, given more time and concentration, may yield one. Meanwhile, one can relish the ideas he gives off like sparks and—stimulated by his past and present essays—look with renewed interest to what Soviet writers are saying, between and in the lines of the official publications, as well as in *sam-* and *tamizdat*.[21]

[18] *Détente After Brezhnev* . . ., p. 15.

[19] Ibid., pp. 3-5.

[20] An analysis of Soviet literary works suggests that the Stalin regime proffered substantial material rewards for production and scientific achievements as well as holding a Damocles' sword over suspected troublemakers. See Vera S. Dunham, *In Stalin's Time*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1976.

[21] *Samizdat* describes materials circulated privately in the USSR in either printed or recorded form; *tamizdat* refers to materials by Soviet authors published *tam* ("there"), i.e., outside the USSR.

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Minorities of Inner Asia

By David R. Staats

JUNE TEUFEL DREYER. *China's Forty Millions: Minority Nationalities and National Integration in the People's Republic of China.* Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1976.
WAYNE S. VUCINICH, Ed. *Russia and Asia: Essays on the Influence of Russia on the Asian Peoples.* Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1972.
EDWARD ALLWORTH. *Soviet Asia: Bibliographies.* New York, NY, Praeger, 1975.

SOME DECADES AGO, George Orwell commented that one of the major British objections to socialism was the popularly held belief that the poor—the presumed beneficiaries of socialism—smelled bad.[1] Whatever the validity of his proposition, the comment itself makes the point that the way in which one group perceives another is oftentimes the product of conditioned historical reflex which frustrates their making common cause.

This observation seems borne out by an examination of relations between ethnic groups in multinational communist states, relations which remain troubled despite the public commitment of ruling parties to the goal of harmonious integration of all nationalities. Indeed, one may ask to what extent contemporary attitudes of the majority peoples in states such as the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China have been altered by the spirit of Marxist-Leninist internationalism and to what extent such attitudes continue to reflect traditional outlooks inherited from the prerevolutionary pasts of these countries. Has Soviet nationality policy in the past 60 years been able to develop a dynamic alternative to ethnic nationalism capable of serving as a collective basis for the convergence (*sblizheniye*) of Soviet nationalities before their final merger (*sliyaniye*)? What has been the experience of the Chinese Communists in nationality affairs?

Each of the books reviewed here provides some insight into the complex matter of interethnic relations under communist rule. By focusing on what these studies reveal about the perspectives of the Russian and Chinese majorities regarding the Inner Asian[2] minorities of the Soviet Union and the PRC and the responding attitudes of these minorities, one can attempt to assess the impact of traditional attitudes on the nationalities policies of these two communist states.

JUNE DREYER'S study of the theory and practice of national integration in the People's Republic of China is without question the most important contribution in recent years to the study of the national question in communist societies. While her analysis of the national question basically begins with the Revolution of 1911, it is useful to review briefly China's earlier history in this regard.

Throughout China's imperial period (from 221 B.C. to A.D. 1911, i.e., from the rise of the Ch'in dynasty to the fall of the Ch'ing dynasty), a primary concern of the Han was to protect their civilization from the destructive forces of the Inner Asian "barbarian" peoples inhabiting the frontier territories. In the Ch'in period, Emperor Shih Huang-ti and his general T'ien Meng completed construction of the Great Wall, which established the boundaries of the Chinese state and of Chinese culture and symbolized the determination of the Han to exclude the Inner Asian peoples from their civilization. In the early period, China sought to keep out the Hsiung-nu, Yüeh-chih, and Hsien-

[1] In *Road to Wigan Pier*, New York, NY, Harcourt, Brace and World, 1958.

[2] Inner Asia encompasses the Transcaucasus, the Volga-Ural region, Siberia, Soviet Central Asia and Sinkiang, Tibet and the Himalayan states, the Mongolian People's Republic and Inner Mongolia, and Manchuria and the Soviet Far East. For the historical geography of Inner Asia, see Denis Sinor, *Inner Asia*, Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 1969, pp. 8-17.

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pi; in the Middle Ages, the Han fought the encroachments of the Inner Asian steppe empires of the Juan-Juan, T'u-chüeh (Turks), and Uighurs, to name but a few. However, the exclusion of these peoples was not always possible. When military resistance proved futile, and when Han diplomacy proved unsuccessful in using one "barbarian" people to control another (*i-i-chih-i*), the Chinese encouraged the sinification of their conquerors (*lai-hua*). Since the latter found Chinese culture superior to their own, the assimilation of the "barbarians" by the Han was in all cases swift, complete, and voluntary. Thus, Inner Asian "barbarian" dynasties (Wei, Liao, Chin, Yuan, and Ch'ing) may have ruled China or parts thereof for 860 years of the present millenium, but by the time they fell, there was little substantive difference between them and native Han dynasties.

Although, as Dreyer demonstrates, the conflict between Han and "barbarian" persisted in the thinking of the Republican period (1911-49), the Nationalist government adopted no comprehensive policy toward the non-Han national minorities. Sun Yat-sen's contradictory pronouncements on the national question did little to alleviate the ambiguity. Sun favored the "dying out" of individual nationalities in order to "unite them in a single and political whole," but he also called upon the government to "help and guide the weak and small racial groups within [China's] boundaries toward self-determination and self-government."[3] Policy in practice was left up to local administrators, who were little inclined to advance the national well-being of "barbarians."

The Theory of the Greater Han (*Ta Han Chu-i*), popularized by Chiang Kai-shek and right-wing elements of the ruling Kuomintang, was perhaps the most notorious innovation of the Republican period. Scientific evidence notwithstanding, the theory holds that the "five nationalities" of China—Han, Tibetan, Mongol, Manchu, and Tatar (the last being a collective name for all Turkic Muslims)—derive from the same racial stock (*tsung-tsu*) and are separated from one another by "artificial" factors of language, religion, and accident of geographic distribution. That Chiang and his followers meant to eradicate the divisive characteristics and reunite the Greater Han race through forcible assimilation cannot be doubted. But the war with Japan and the Civil War left him little opportunity to apply the theory.

When the Chinese Communists came to power in 1949, their first task in nationality affairs, Dreyer writes, "was to convince these peoples [the national minorities] that they [the Communists] were Han of a different sort: not the greedy land thieves of past antiquity, but the bearers of freedom and equality for all" (pp. 67-68). It was not at first possible to develop a comprehensive policy for all national groups because of the different levels of development of individual nationalities. For example, the Olunchun (Orochon) were aboriginal; scattered Yi communities in Yunnan and Szechwan practiced slavery; and the Tibetans had a developed theocracy, a written language and extensive literature, and a distinct culture. Hampered by ignorance of actual conditions in minority areas and uncertain of their own position there, the Chinese Communist leaders moved cautiously to integrate these areas into the Chinese state. They sought to pay attention to the peculiarities of local circumstances and were scrupulously careful not to repeat the mistakes of the Kuomintang.

Thus, one cannot speak of a definite policy for nationalities during the early period of communist rule in China (1949-55), only of the broad goal of national integration. It was a time of patient experimentation, combining recognition of the "special characteristics" of minority peoples with efforts to build up national cadres. And there were strong signs that this liberal approach to the national question was succeeding.

However, these moderate policies of national integration came under sharp attack from radical factions of the Chinese Communist Party during the rectification campaign that followed the setbacks of the Hundred Flowers campaign and during the Great Leap Forward (1956-58). The "special characteristics" of the non-Han nationalities were held to be repugnant, and direct measures were taken to eliminate them. This frontal assault on national traditions undeniably eradicated many customs and institutions, but it likewise stiffened the resolve of the minority peoples to resist further sinification.

The flight of the Dalai Lama to India in 1959 constituted another major turning point in nationality policy, for soon thereafter the gradualist policies returned. But from that time forth a duel between liberalism and radicalism has characterized the development of Chinese nationality policy.

The emergence of organized, active, and hostile émigré communities of Tibetans in India and of Uighurs and Kazakhs in Soviet Central Asia—after their flight from Sinkiang in the wake of the up-

[3]Dreyer, p. 17.

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rising in Gulja (Ining) in 1962 at a juncture when Sino-Soviet relations were deteriorating steadily—had a profound effect on PRC nationality policy (as well as on Soviet policy in this area). Although Dreyer touches on this point, she does not develop it. After 1959, the goal of national integration came to take on a more explicit and narrow definition. The issue separating liberal and radical theoreticians with regard to Chinese nationality policy was only timing; both groups agreed that the ultimate end should be assimilation.

With the onset of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, there was another swing in the radical direction. The policies of the late 1960's further eroded basic national rights and forced the economies of minority nationality areas into greater conformity with the economy of Han China. An invigorated *hsia-fang* movement—more specifically, the "sending down" of Han cadres from disbanded Red Guard units as settlers—also upset the traditional ethnic balance in minority nationality regions. The mass influx of Chinese not surprisingly aggravated tensions between races, particularly in those national minority areas where Red Guard behavior had been excessively cruel.

Mass resettlement of Chinese in the frontier regions of Sinkiang and Inner Mongolia was doubtless motivated by Peking's desire to ensure the loyalty of populations of areas bordering the Soviet Union at a time when China's relations with the USSR were at their lowest point and Moscow was attempting to play on the cleavage between the national minorities and the Han. Ironically, the Sino-Soviet conflict may likewise have been the prime reason for Peking's decision to return to a liberal line in nationality policy in 1970, a line that still prevails today.

THE RUSSIAN experience with Inner Asian peoples closely parallels that of the Chinese, with one important distinction: although successive "barbarian" conquests of China never seriously interrupted the continuity of Chinese civilization, the Mongol conquest of Russia profoundly altered the development and direction of Russian culture. By sealing Russia off from Europe for two and a half centuries, the "Tatar yoke" insulated Russia from the influence of Reformation and Renaissance. While in China Khubilai and his successors patronized Buddhism and absorbed Chinese culture, the Muslim heirs of Batu never became Russified. The initial Russian view of Asia—suspicion overlaying fear—was cast in this period of conquest and rule by Inner Asian peoples.

The nature and evolution of Russian attitudes to oriental peoples and the Russian impact on traditional Asian societies—among them, those of Inner Asia—are the central themes of the volume edited by Wayne Vucinich. Nicholas Riasanovsky's essay "Asia through Russian Eyes" stands out as a concise, well developed survey of Russian intellectual concepts of Asia, the Russian role there, and the factors that shaped it. Riasanovsky's division of the changing Russian view of Asia into three historical periods—Conflict, Imperialism, and Eurasianism—seems both chronologically and culturally legitimate.

The first of these periods, of course, alludes to the epoch of Tatar dominance. The resulting mood of suspicious apprehension vis-à-vis Asia and Asians has already been noted.

During the Imperial period (from the advent of Peter I to 1917), Asians no longer seriously threatened Russia, and the latter's attention was drawn westward. Although Russian intellectuals continued to disagree on the relationship of Russian to European culture, they were unanimous in their rejection of Asian civilizations as crude, barbaric, and even dirty. At the same time, a desire to civilize Asia did gain some popularity among mid-19th-century Russian thinkers who foresaw Asia transformed by the elevating doctrines of Christianity and Progress. In China, for one, this kind of "altruistic" crusading clashed with the Han spirit of exclusiveness. There, the maxim "Do Nothing" (*wu-wei*) typified a self-confidence that Chinese civilization would ultimately overwhelm and assimilate "barbarians" by sheer force of example. (This is not to argue that Imperial China had not manifested its own expansionism, but only to reiterate that a desire to make converts to its civilization did not inform its aggressive spirit of self-aggrandizement.)

The Bolshevik successors to Russia's Tsars faced the serious dilemma of reconciling Russian nationalism with Marxist internationalism. This dilemma was initially resolved in theory by the doctrine of Eurasianism, popularized by the 1921 publication in Sofia, Bulgaria, of *Exodus to the East* by Prince N. Trubetskoy et al. Eurasianism postulates that the peoples of Russia share unique cultural and political experiences which bind them together in a community equally as foreign to Europe as to Asia. The clear implication, Riasanovsky comments, is that Eurasianism seeks to protect the unity of the Russian Empire by denying that it is an empire. This point also emerges from Edward Allworth's essay "The Controversial Status of Soviet

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Asia," with which he prefaces his guide (unfortunately unannotated) to the bibliographical literature on the Turkic, Mongol, and Iranian peoples of Soviet Inner Asia. Analyzing the debate over Eurasianism in the Soviet period, Allworth attributes the failure of this doctrine to forge organic bonds of genuine partnership between Russians and Inner Asians in large part to Russian "ambivalence" brought on by their refusal to forswear their own ethnic nationalism.

Contemporary Russian nationalism has provoked, indeed compelled, other Soviet nationalities to question the basic tenets of the nationalities policy of the Soviet Communist Party. Among the Turkic nationalities of the USSR, and particularly those in Soviet Central Asia, this process of reassessing fundamental Marxist-Leninist assumptions within the context of contemporary Soviet society has produced an introspective search for sources and historical origins of their individual cultures, an endeavor that frequently transcends current definitions of nationality. This process of reassessment, known as *mirasism* (from the Arabic word for "heritage"), has thus far only built the framework within which these nationalities conduct their debate on the relationship of their cultures to those of the rest of the Soviet Union, and especially to Russian culture. Moscow has to a degree been encouraging this debate, but with an eye to limiting its scope. However, the Turkic-language press of Soviet Central Asia has shown a potential for pushing the debate beyond acceptable limits. As an example, one could cite a Kazakh-language article that praises centuries-old ties between one Turkic nationality and another with no reference to the Great Russian "elder brother" or to proletarian internationalism.[4]

At the present time, *mirasism* has no overt political platform, nor does it show separatist overtones.[5] The principal goal of this intellectual movement appears to be to build up elites in each Soviet Turkic nationality—elites based broadly enough that any concerted repression by central authorities, such as during collectivization or the purges of the late 1930's, cannot extinguish the national spirit.

The intensely bitter polemic of Moscow with Peking has had the unintended effect of accelerating and sharpening the process of *mirasism.* In recent years, Soviet Central Asians have taken full advantage of the Sino-Soviet split to air their views with increasing candor, careful always, of course, to keep the discussion within the approved context of an anti-Chinese polemic.[6]

There seems to be a consensus in the Allworth and Vucinich volumes that although Soviet Russia has had and continues to have a positive influence on the Inner Asian peoples of the USSR in a variety of ways, it still has not come to grips with basic issues in nationality relationships. The awkard official retreat to "class solidarity" whenever challenged on nationality policy, coupled with solicitations of fulsome tribute to the Great Russian people from Soviet minority nationalities, suggests that the CPSU is not capable of bold and imaginative leadership in this area. Attempts to forge a psychological identification of "Russian" with "Soviet" perhaps reflect a response to the trauma the Russians may perceive on the horizon—the fate of becoming a minority in what they feel to be their own country, as the share of Asiatic peoples in the total USSR population continues to rise. The unresolved Sino-Soviet conflict has not eased Russian anxieties in this regard.

WHAT DOES all this suggest for our examination of communist nationality policies? In both the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union, communist authorities have sought to integrate national minority peoples in the mainstream of "socialist" life. Some 29 years of Chinese Communist power and 60 years of Soviet rule have left enormous and indelible impressions on the Inner Asian peoples of the two countries. Modern technology has improved the efficiency of their economic activity, health care has reduced their rate of infant mortality and improved average life expectancy, Marxism-Leninism has secularized their cultures to a considerable degree, and expanded education has enabled their youth to compete with Han and Russian youth for skilled jobs.

Nevertheless, the results have at best been mixed. Although the Chinese Communist Party has succeeded in breaking down some of the national barriers between Han and non-Han, the local application of CCP policies has reinforced ethnic self-awareness, stiffening resistence to sinification. "The Communist government of China," Dreyer writes, "may be said to have inherited a policy of trying to facilitate the demise of national identitites through granting self-government to minorities," a contradictory approach that bedevils Peking to this day (p. 17).

Within the USSR, Soviet policies

[4] "Historical Friendship," *Mädäniyät janä turmish* (Alma Ata), No. 9, 1977, p. 9.

[5] Even the *samizdat* works of the Crimean Tatars have yet to yield evidence of separatist tendencies.

[6] See Tania Jacques, "Elements of Pan-Turkism in Kazakhstan," *Radio Liberty Dispatch* (Munich), 353/74, Nov. 15, 1974.

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have been successful in eradicating both pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism as active criteria among Central Asians. However, until Russian chauvinism itself is overcome, the Turkic nationalities of Soviet Central Asia can be expected to pursue a precise definition of their role within Soviet society by deepening the process of *mirasism,* which for the time being is restricted to the building of national elites, but which must ultimately assume political dimensions, the more so if the negative Great Russian stimulus is unabated.

Thus it is that in both societies traditional attitudes of the ruling ethnic majorities continue to stand as serious obstacles in the path of attaining the professed goal of internationalist integration of all subject nationalities in a single socialist populace.

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Perspective on the Allende Experiment

By Yale Ferguson

PAUL E. SIGMUND. *The Overthrow of Allende and the Politics of Chile, 1964-1976*. Pittsburgh, PA, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977.
JOAN GARCÉS. *Allende et l'Expérience Chilienne* (Allende and the Chilean Experiment). Paris, Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1976.
JORGE EDWARDS. *Persona Non Grata*. Trans. by Colin Harding. New York, NY, Pomerica Press, 1976.
IAN ROXBOROUGH et al. *Chile: The State and Revolution*. New York, NY, Holmes and Meier, 1977.
WILLIAM E. RATLIFF. *Castroism and Communism in Latin America, 1959-1976*. Washington, DC, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1976.

LATE IN THE afternoon of September 11, 1973, the elected President of Chile, Salvador Allende, lay dead; La Moneda, the presidential palace in Santiago, was aflame from aerial rocket attacks; and in ruins as well was the oldest constitutional democracy in Latin America, to be replaced by an unusually harsh military dictatorship. Thus culminated nearly a decade of political conflict and socioeconomic change which had been intensified by Allende's three-year attempt to achieve "socialism" through parliamentary processes (*la vía chilena*). All of the volumes under review, although from differing perspectives, help us to comprehend the Allende experiment and why it failed.

Paul Sigmund's book is the best to appear to date on the Allende years. Sigmund, a Princeton professor, became embroiled through his earlier writings in a heated debate as to how extensive the "invisible blockade" of the Allende administration was and how significant external factors were in Allende's overthrow.[1] His earlier essays were a bit defensive and suffered from the fact that new information continued to come to light. Sigmund has now had time to reflect on the evidence, however, and the result is a remarkably balanced, scholarly, and well written volume—a landmark study.

Two of the works under consideration are by participants in the Allende government. Joan Garcés, an adviser and confidant of Allende, is currently writing as a political scientist from exile in Paris. The Garcés volume is neither a memoir nor a tract, but rather a serious analysis in the Marxist mold. Jorge Edwards' book is mainly a diary-like account of the author's three-month sojourn in Cuba when he served as Allende's envoy to reopen relations with the Castro regime. His stay was brief because he became persona non grata, having irked the Cuban government by publicly sympathizing and consorting with out-of-favor local writers like Heberto Padilla. A writer himself and a socialist (despite his belonging to a branch of the powerful and conservative Edwards family in Chile), he was deeply distressed by this experience and immediately turned his substantial literary talent to the task of self-justification. His work is strange but fascinating, with vivid portraits of Fidel, Pablo Neruda, and other Cuban and Chilean personalities, as well as a chilling description of what he terms the "Kafka-esque" atmosphere in Havana. More to the point for our purposes, Edwards finds a parallel for his own plight in that of the Allende government, caught between political extremes both domestically and interna-

[1] See, for example, Paul E. Sigmund, "The 'Invisible Blockade' and the Overthrow of Allende," *Foreign Affairs* (New York, NY), January 1974, pp. 322-40; "Chile: What Was the U.S. Role? Less Than Charged," *Foreign Policy* (New York, NY), Fall 1974, pp. 142-56; and "Allende in Retrospect," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), May-June 1974, pp. 45-62.

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tionally.

Ian Roxborough and coauthors Phillip O'Brien and Jackie Roddick offer in *Chile: The State and Revolution* general background and a wealth of detail about developments in Chile from 1970 to 1973, drawn in part from Roxborough and O'Brien's residence in the country during the Allende period. Nevertheless, a Marxist bias, apparent even in the dedication ("To all those who fought for Socialism in Chile"), undermines interpretation throughout. The "class struggle" jargon is bad enough, but particularly disturbing are the author's naive criticisms of Allende, which are presented in the best dogmatic, armchair-revolutionary fashion from the relative security of the University of Glasgow.

William Ratliff's volume is a straightforward, succinct, and nicely documented examination of the spectrum of "Marxist-Leninist experience" in Latin America. Chapter 7 focuses on the conflict within Allende's coalition between the Moscow-oriented Chilean Communist Party and more radical groups, especially the extremist Movement of the Revolutionary Left (*Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria*—MIR). Additional chapters discuss Soviet and Chinese policies in Latin America, Cuban Castroism, and Latin American pro-Soviet parties, pro-Chinese organizations, and rural and urban guerrillas. Ratliff's brief concluding section highlights the difficulties that Latin American leftists have had in agreeing on any but "the most basic of long-term objectives, such as the need to eliminate US influence in the area and to carry out a socialist revolution."

TWO CLOSELY RELATED questions are central to most of the literature on the Allende years, including the works at hand: Why did Allende fail? Why did Chilean democracy break down? As Sigmund observes, the answers advanced to these questions are often ideological and polarized:

The left blames external and internal "reaction"—the alliance of imperialism (the US government), the multinationals, and the domestic oligarchy who combined to overthrow Allende because he threatened their vital (that is, economic) interests. The right. . . sees the coup as an unfortunate necessity, in order to prevent a violent seizure of power by the left or a civil war and to put an end to the runaway inflation that was destroying Chilean industry and agriculture. The external actors involved in the rightist interpretation are the Soviet Union and Cuba. . .

However, as Sigmund maintains, the "reality is much more complex" (p. 275).

Any explanation for the *golpe* (coup) of 1973 must go back to Allende's 1970 electoral victory, and indeed further, to the six years of experimentation with a "revolution in liberty" that was guided by Eduardo Frei and his Christian Democratic Party (*Partido Demócrata Cristiano*—PDC). Frei won the presidential election of 1964 by a clear majority, 56.1 percent of the vote to Allende's 38.9 percent and the Radical Party candidate's meager 5 percent. Frei's six years in office witnessed the establishment of Chilean majority ownership in the copper industry, modest income distribution, advances in education and housing, and agrarian reform. With regard to such indicators as unemployment, monetary reserves, balance of payments, and exports, the Chilean economy substantially improved. In fact, according to Sigmund, Frei's personal popularity remained so high in 1970 that he was "almost certain" to have been reelected if he had been allowed to run (p. 110). However, the Chilean constitution forbade a president to serve two successive terms.

Despite these gains, the PDC found itself inextricably caught in a pattern of polarization. Middle-class voters, who had given the PDC a strong endorsement in 1964, were distressed by rising inflation (30 percent in 1969 and early 1970), increased taxes, strikes, and occasional urban terrorism. In 1964 these voters had really had no other place to go, for the conservative National Party (*Partido Nacional*) had decided not to run a presidential candidate because it feared that such a step might lead to a victory by the Left. This was not the case six years later. Sensing a drift of many voters to the right, the National Party nominated for the presidency its best-known figure, former president Jorge Alessandri. The PDC chose a candidate to the left of Frei, Radamiro Tomic. Sigmund argues (p. 108) that this decision probably did not cost the PDC many middle-class votes, most of which were going to go to Alessandri in any event, and may have kept to a minimum the defections to Allende from the growing left wing of the PDC.

Allende's Popular Unity (*Unidad Popular*—UP) coalition of Socialists, Communists, left-wing Radicals, the Movement for Unitary Popular Action (*Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitario*—MAPU, a group headed by Jacques Choncol that had broken away from the PDC), and two fringe parties (Independent Popular Action [*Acción Popular Independiente*] and the Social Democrats) carried the 1970

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election with 36.2 percent to Alessandri's 34.9 percent and Tomic's 27.8 percent. Because no candidate had received a majority of the votes, the election went into the congress, where Allende had some 80 supporters, the PDC 75, and Alessandri 45. After 50 days of frantic maneuvering, the congress by a wide margin (153 votes for Allende, 35 against, and 7 abstentions) bowed to the result of the popular election.

How exactly should the outcome of the 1970 election be interpreted? Allende was the victor, yet he was a minority president, the first choice of only a little over a third of Chilean voters and, in fact, of a slightly lower percentage of them than he had captured in 1964. Nearly as many voters had opted for the conservative Alessandri; seeing an erosion in PDC support, the Right had thought it could win and almost succeeded in doing so. Certainly there was no movement to the left among voters as a whole in 1970.

Yet, looked at another way, the 1970 election found 64 percent of the voters choosing a candidate whose platform promised radical assaults on Chile's capitalist economic structure. Tomic's formal position was not all that different from Allende's in this regard. To be sure, some Tomic votes may have been less *for* him than *against* either conservatism or "Marxism." But, it is safe to assume that a majority of Chileans in 1970 were not averse to further socioeconomic changes and surely would have vehemently rejected any idea of a military coup or the kind of repressive reactionary regime that was imposed late in 1973. That the will of the majority in these respects was ultimately frustrated is the most profound tragedy of the Allende years.

The tragedy was presaged by the decline in the fortunes of the political Center, represented by the PDC in the 1970 election. The decline of the Center accelerated in the ensuing years. Sigmund states that "by 1972, if not before, the center which had dominated Chilean politics for decades had largely disappeared" (p. 277). The result was a serious polarization in politics, to the point that by late August 1973, the Chilean congress overwhelmingly adopted a resolution that Sigmund interprets as effectively demanding either a transfer of most administrative power to the military or an outright military coup (pp. 232-33).

A Chilean Communist Party newspaper reported the outcome of the 1973 congressional elections: "The People, 43 percent. The Mummies: 55 percent" (Ratliff, p. xi). However propagandistic, the words fairly accurately reflected political alignments at that stage. In the years 1970-73, the UP coalition maintained a relatively consistent base of support. Its showing in the 1973 elections was about what the Left had won in the congressional elections of 1969, some 6 percentage points less than in the 1971 municipal elections, and 8 percentage points *more* than in the 1970 presidential election. In effect, after actually *declining* somewhat in the year of Allende's election, UP support picked up with the enthusiasm of his first year in office and thereafter returned to its 1969 level.[2] With the PDC joining forces with the Right to counter Allende, the Center virtually vanished. Chile was divided into two warring camps, one of which had greater access to the sympathies and firepower of the military than the other. What might well have been a variable-sum game was increasingly perceived by all the players as zero-sum, and the military finally overturned the table.

WE AND OTHERS have used the word "tragedy" to describe the breakdown of Chilean democracy in 1973. In its classic Greek sense, the notion of tragedy involves an element of inevitability in the march of events—one or more well-motivated characters with "fatal flaws" acting out their roles under circumstances that are almost certain to lead to death and disaster. In retrospect, the Chilean case does have a "tragic" dimension.

It was clear almost from the outset that continuing polarization and breakdown of the system were one possible, even probable, outcome of the Chilean political drama. As Frei before him, Allende faced severe constraints in Chile's domestic environment, constraints summarized by Sigmund as follows:

...a hyperpoliticized country in which ideological parties, frequent and staggered elections, and an expanding electorate combined to raise high hopes at the beginning of each president's term and subsequently to frustrate those hopes; and an economic system which appeared to give the president and the state apparatus great power only to undercut that power because of excessive state expenditures, chronic inflation, balance-of-payments deficits, and dependence on unstable world market prices for a single export. (p. 276)

If Frei found these obstacles formidable, Allende was to find them still more so, because he was attempting to engineer more drastic

[2]For the 1969-73 electoral data, see the Sigmund book under review, pp. 74, 107, 143, and 199. Sigmund reports, more accurately than the PCC newspaper, the UP share of the 1973 vote as 43.98 percent.

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changes in a shorter time frame.

The authors of all the books under review agree, as do most observers, that Allende personally was sincerely committed to democratic procedures, and (except for Roxborough et al.) that Chile's long tradition of constitutionalism and civilian control of the military offered some hope that the political system could withstand considerable conflict. However, the wave of military takeovers in Latin America over the previous decade had left Chile one of the region's few remaining democracies and placed the Chilean military under pressure to act with the same sense of "destiny" as their counterparts elsewhere.

Finally, the Chilean drama was unfolding at a time when cold war tensions, although less severe than in the immediate postwar era, had not sufficiently abated to allow the concept of "ideological pluralism" to enjoy much appeal. Edwards comments perceptively:

Allende's electoral victory came about as a natural result of an internal process.... But this event, which was the product of our own political history, forced us to join in an international struggle which had not been envisaged by us, and which would inevitably escape from our control. (p. 257)

Given the domestic and international systemic constraints, then, there was a substantial degree of inevitability about what happened in Chile during 1970-73. In this perspective, the wonder is perhaps not that Allende failed and Chilean democracy broke down, but that both lasted as long as they did. Major credit in this regard must be given to Allende's political acumen, honed through many years' apprenticeship in the national legislature and electoral politics. Though one may question his long-range goals and strategy, he must be given credit for defusing a series of crises in the short term.

Nevertheless, Sigmund argues (pp. xii, 289-91) that if Allende and other leading actors had adopted different policies at critical junctures, they might have averted the "tragic" outcome. As we shall see below, it is easy, especially in retrospect, to identify some of the unfortunate choices particular actors (individuals and groups) made and thus to assign to them a large measure of awesome "personal" responsibility for what occurred. Such an approach is satisfying in that it suggests that political actors are not ultimately at the complete mercy of their environment. Where the approach may mislead and the "tragic" perspective enlighten is in those instances where actors' choices are constrained not only by their environment but also by *themselves*—by their own pasts, accustomed behavior, and assumptions. The actors in the Chilean drama behaved largely "true to form" under exceedingly inauspicious circumstances and with predictable consequences. To this extent, they "self-destructed" and took Chilean democracy with them.

FOCUSING ON Allende, one would have to single out as his most basic failure the inability to broaden his base of support beyond the UP into at least the remaining left-leaning sector of the PDC. Both Allende and the PDC had a common stake in the survival of democracy, and *eventually* Allende's own view—sustained by the Communists and the moderate wing of the Socialists in his coalition—was that some broader cooperation was possible and desirable. Yet, in the end, most of the PDC moved to the right rather than to the left.

Allende himself was responsible for some of the polarization. During his fairly successful first year in office, he evidenced little interest when PDC leaders suggested such cooperative steps as running joint electoral slates. Sigmund notes (p. 289) that Allende seemed determined "not to repeat the experience of the Chilean Popular Front [1938-42], when a left-wing government was compelled to adopt an increasingly conservative course" in order to keep its allies in the fold. Only after mid-1972, when his political fortunes and the Chilean economy had begun to sag, did Allende actively seek cooperation. He looked for PDC backing on the crucial issue of increasing the proportion of votes required in the legislature to override presidential vetoes of constitutional amendments—in this case, amendments conceived by the opposition as barriers to UP programs. However, an alliance with PDC elements was blocked at this stage by the UP left wing and was soon too late to effect in any event (Sigmund, pp. 169, 290).

The Allende administration's Marxist ideology and rhetoric were serious impediments to cooperation with the PDC. They also alarmed a great many "ordinary" middle-class Chileans (not to mention Washington) and drove conservatives into a frenzy. One example, which escalated conflict after the 1973 elections, was a plan to reorganize public and private, primary and secondary education into a single curriculum that would serve what the Ministry of Education infelicitously termed "the construction of a new socialist society" (Sigmund, p. 202). Allende, too, often articulated his goals in an "alien tongue" that greatly undercut his programs' inherent appeal to sentiments of nationalism and

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social justice.

Cooperation with the PDC was further impeded by what the PDC leadership increasingly perceived to be ambivalence in Allende's own positions. On the one hand, Allende declared his allegiance to democracy, the rule of law, and civil liberties—concepts which were embodied in the Statute of Democratic Guarantees that he had accepted in 1970 as the PDC's price for supporting his election by the Congress. On the other hand, Allende told Régis Debray that his agreement to the Statute was a mere "tactical necessity"; he proposed major changes in constitutional structures, including the jettisoning of a recalcitrant bicameral legislature in favor of a unicameral parliament; he proceeded with nationalizations of enterprises by decree, utilizing loopholes in obscure laws (*resquicios legales*); he failed to act vigorously against MIR violence and illegal seizures of property; he looked the other way while leftist organizations imported arms from Cuba; and he attempted to take over the country's only private paper company (owned by Alessandri), thereby threatening the supply of materials that the Statute of Democratic Guarantees had mentioned as essential to a free press.[3]

Why this ambivalence? The present authors attribute it not to wavering in Allende's personal convictions, but to the man's concern for maintaining unity within the UP. There was ample reason to worry. Ratliff terms the lack of unity among leftist parties "the most important of several factors contributing to the downfall of the Popular Unity government" (p. 185). Fear of criticism from within his own movement may have strongly influenced Allende not to compromise on the copper issue by offering the companies at least token compensation (Sigmund, p. 141-42). Also, when a government raid on a shantytown controlled by the MIR (Lo Hermida) resulted in several deaths and a chorus of complaints from the Left, Allende was forced to let some heads roll in his administration and to express his regrets for the "massacre" (Sigmund, pp. 177-78).

More important, opposition from the left wing in the UP was principally responsible for aborting Allende's first overtures to the PDC in 1972 (Sigmund, pp. 149, 290).

Of course, Ratliff asserts that if an understanding of sorts had been reached between the UP and the PDC, "the original Popular Unity Alliance and President Allende's own [Socialist] party . . . would almost certainly have been split down the middle." Moreover, he believes that an accommodation with the PDC would not have garnered Allende significantly greater popular support outside the UP (p. 187). If Ratliff is correct, Allende was indeed in a bind, for the "united-UP" strategy obviously came to naught in 1973. Reaching out to the PDC might have left Allende with a net loss of "hard-core" support; paradoxically, however, this may have been his government's only chance for survival. A final stalemate in the Allende-PDC talks was a major factor later cited by the military as justification for intervention (Sigmund, p. 224).

The left wing of the UP embarrassed Allende at every turn. Particularly damaging, aside from MIR violence, were the inflammatory speeches of Senator Carlos Altamirano, the leader of the left branch of the Socialist Party. He repeatedly predicted that Allende would eventually have to abandon constitutionalism and "bourgeois legality," and, not long before the coup, Altamirano infuriated the military by encouraging naval enlisted men to revolt against their officers (Sigmund, pp. 140, 240-42). Edwards puts it well:

> *. . . the Chilean Left . . . failed to understand the danger of undermining the foundations of the political system that had enabled it to achieve power, and did not realize on whose behalf it was working when it scorned what it called "bourgeois legality."* (p. 252)

Allende may also be faulted on his economic policies, which even many of his supporters (including Garcés and Edwards) recognized simply did not work. Allende's basic plan was to stimulate demand by increasing government spending and extending wage hikes to workers, trusting in the industrial sector's idle capacity and in official price and exchange controls to keep inflation within acceptable bounds; meanwhile, he set about taking over large farms, industries, and banks. For the first year, these policies seemed to be reasonably effective. Then suddenly the indicators turned negative: the inflation rate soared to 100 percent in 1972 and over 300 percent in 1973; there were grave declines in investment, production, and tax receipts; balance-of-payments deficits mounted; shortages of essential commodities developed; and an extensive black market appeared. Sigmund (p. 282) judges that "no democratic system, no matter how stable initially, could have withstood [these] pressures." They, not ideological or

[3] See ibid., pp. 140, 141-42; 133-34; 139-40 and 177-78; 226, 288; and 157-58. Sigmund notes that "right-wing activities have been cited in order to defend the arming of the left, but this ignores the important chronological fact that the organization of paramilitary groups began on the left" (p. 288).

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political differences per se, provided the principal impetus for the strikes of truckers, various organized interest groups (*gremios*), and El Teniente copper miners that swept Chile beginning late in 1972. They also provided the motivation for demonstrations like the much-publicized "March of the Empty Pots."

The situation which had been allowed to arise brought sharp conflicts over economic policy within the UP administration. Edwards reports:

Already in mid-1971 an Unidad Popular economist, who had been sent on a mission to Europe, had told me in Paris that an ideal basis for fascism was being created in Chile. He had called a high-level meeting in Santiago and had suggested urgent measures to put things right. Some highly-placed politician had replied, "Are we here to make a good job of running a capitalist economy or to construct socialism?" The high official had added that inflation would help to destroy the economic power of the bourgeoisie. I can still recall Pablo Neruda's comment, "Inflation isn't going to destroy the bourgeoisie, it's going to destroy us!" (p. 253)

That an economist and a poet-diplomat both could see what a "high" UP official could not tells us something about the deep trouble that Allende was in.

SOME CRITICS of Allende (not the present authors) have maintained that he should have made use of his option under law to call a plebiscite to resolve some of the constitutional and policy controversies between his administration and the legislature. Allende often spoke of his intention to do so, if necessary, but he continued to demur until the eleventh hour. He is reported to have planned a speech proposing a plebiscite, which was to have been delivered on the day the coup occurred (Sigmund, p. 239). Why did he wait so long? The explanation is that the UP left wing adamantly opposed a plebiscite and that Allende was all too aware that he would very probably lose any such electoral showdown. Lose he certainly might have, but a plebiscite or two could have settled some outstanding issues and thus helped to stabilize a rapidly deteriorating situation.

Allende is definitely *not* guilty of moving too slowly to discard "bourgeois legality" and confront "reaction" head on, as the left wing of the UP and the MIR insisted at the time and some radical critics have asserted since. Roxborough et al. condemn Allende's strategy as "reformist" and "suicidal." In their view, the Socialist left wing (Altamirano and supporters) should have pulled out of the UP, tried to create a "vanguard party" with a "consistently revolutionary line," and prepared to defend themselves against rightist violence (pp. 264-70). Sigmund wryly observes (p. 291) that many of those who counseled violent confrontation were among those who quickly sought asylum or exile when it actually came to pass. In any event, such a "revolutionary" alternative was never more than a dream, as Allende well knew. Had he tried it, the coup would have taken place that much earlier.

OTHERS AS WELL AS Allende must bear some of the blame for the collapse of Chilean democracy. This includes the Christian Democrats. The PDC's finest hour was the decision of the party's leadership, despite Frei's provocatively noncommittal stance until the last possible moment, to throw PDC support to Allende in the 1970 congressional runoff—albeit having first extracted from Allende the Statute of Democratic Guarantees. There had certainly been enticing pragmatic reasons to back Alessandri in the runoff, since he offered to resign if selected and not to be a candidate in the ensuing election, which presumably would have assured Frei a second term (Sigmund, p. 111). And, as we have noted, the PDC left did extend a tentative olive branch to Allende in 1971. Thereafter, though, it was all downhill.

The constitutional issue between Allende and the legislature, in which the PDC held the balance, was essentially a political struggle that was legalistic only on the surface. There was at least as much natural logic to Allende's position—that overriding a presidential veto of constitutional amendments required the same two-thirds majority of each house that was needed for ordinary legislation—as there was to that of the opposition, which argued only an absolute majority sufficed. What was unforgivable, in the context, was the way the PDC continued to advance the latter interpretation as the only legitimate one, meanwhile painting Allende as attempting to subvert the constitution—precisely what the far Left was simultaneously complaining that Allende was refusing to do. The climax came after the opposition failed to discredit the Left in the 1973 congressional elections. At this point, as we have noted, the PDC joined the Right in the Congress in formally condemning Allende for all sorts of real and imagined abuses, and in calling upon the military ministers in his cabinet to put a halt to them. This was a thinly-disguised plea for a coup. No doubt, the PDC—itself outlawed by the subsequent regime of Major General Augusto Pino-

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chet—has now had ample opportunity to reflect on the wisdom of summoning the military genie out of the bottle.

External actors, especially the United States, also played roles in the Chilean drama. Active US involvement in Chilean domestic politics extended back to the Frei period and included financial support for his 1964 campaign and later reforms. Then came the 1970 election. Sigmund relates that thereafter the Administration of Richard M. Nixon conducted a systematic campaign against Allende. He attributes this campaign to a variety of motives—visceral anti-Marxism, defense of the traditional US sphere of influence in Latin America, fear of the spread of the parliamentary-road-to-socialism model (and radicalism in general) to other countries in Latin America and Europe, and anger at the cavalier treatment of US companies. Sigmund describes US efforts to precipitate a coup to keep Allende from even taking office after the 1970 election, and continuing contacts between the US Central Intelligence Agency and disgruntled Chilean officers until early 1973, when a coup seemed virtually inevitable. In addition, he states that during 1970-73 the CIA channeled significant funds to a wide variety of opposition parties, media, unions, and *gremios,* and hence had a hand in the crippling antigovernment strikes and demonstrations of 1972-73. Finally, Nixon Administration hostility is given primary responsibility for curtailing the flow of US and international credits to Allende's government at the same time that US aid to the Chilean military continued. Some US multinational corporations in Chile, most notably the copper companies and International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT), also launched their own anti-Allende campaigns.[4]

By contrast, Soviet and Cuban assistance to Allende appears to have been minimal. Sigmund regrets that "we do not know more about the intervention on the other side, especially by Cuba." In any event, he does not regard the Soviet Union's modest financial assistance to the Allende government as "a significant factor" (pp. 284-85).

To what extent did the external pressures contribute to Allende's downfall? Sigmund addresses this question in some detail (pp. 283-87). He does not deny what he aptly calls the "malevolence" of US policy, the absolute determination of Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon to put an end to the Allende challenge, nor that US pressures were indeed "important." However, he regards them as decidedly "secondary" to Chilean domestic political and economic developments—at most reinforcing and amplifying some of the negative trends. For instance, the credit cutoff was neither "complete, immediate, nor effective," because it affected mainly long-term US and international development loans; Allende, in fact, succeeded in securing needed short-term loans and credits from West European and other sources. Likewise, the strikes may have precipitated the coup, but, Sigmund concludes, it would have occurred within a few short months anyway. Moreover, the involvement of external actors in some respects had an opposite effect from that intended. Allende made good political capital out of press reports about CIA and ITT plots, just as the opposition got propaganda mileage from Castro's state visit and Cuban arms shipments.

The final scene in the Chilean tragedy continues to be debated: Did Allende commit suicide or was he murdered? Sigmund's careful sifting of the evidence on this matter is useful, if not conclusive. The suicide theory rests principally on the "eyewitness" account of a La Moneda doctor and on Allende's own frequent assertions that he would never surrender the presidency alive. Others give versions of Allende being "suicided." Writes Sigmund: "The weight of evidence seems to point toward suicide, but the possibility of the staging of the suicide . . . cannot be excluded" (p. 247).

CHILE'S TRAGEDY raises some broader questions. As Sigmund observes, even developed countries are not entirely immune to many of the problems that Chile under Allende faced: " . . . political and economic centralization and rising demands for equality, participation, and social justice place strains on economic and political institutions and produce conflicting ideological solutions which in a period of economic crisis could bring heightened social conflicts, institutional breakdown, and demands for, or toleration of, authoritarian rule" (pp. 291-92). The furor over Eurocommunism in Italy and France springs to mind, although the parallels with Chile are not, of course, exact.

Whether Western democracy survives, Sigmund maintains, "would seem to depend partly on economics—whether rising costs of food, energy, and social services can be absorbed without producing runaway inflation and group conflict; and partly on politics—whether the faith of political leaders and the public in the democratic process, and their willingness to propose and accept partial solutions and incremental changes can carry the constitutional democ-

[4]Ibid., pp. 112-18, 120-22, 131-32, 152-57, 174-75, 184, 221-22, and 283-87.

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racies through the difficult readjustments required . . ." (p. 292). As the Chilean experience suggests, the resolution of these issues in any given country is a complex function of objective circumstances, external factors, and—last but not least—the predilections of individual actors.

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Cuba's Maturing Revolution

By William M. LeoGrande

MARTA HARNECKER. *Cuba: dictature ou démocratie?* (Cuba: Dictatorship or Democracy?). Paris, François Maspero, 1976.
PIERRE GOLENDORF. *7 ans à Cuba* (7 Years in Cuba). Paris, Éditions Pierre Belfond, 1976.
FRANK MANKIEWICZ and KIRBY JONES. *With Fidel.* Chicago, IL, Playboy Press, 1975.
HERBERT L. MATTHEWS. *Revolution in Cuba.* New York, NY, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1975.

EACH JANUARY 2, Cuba celebrates the anniversary of the revolution with a mass rally in Havana's Plaza de la Revolución. At the rally, the new year is christened with a name symbolizing the major goals to be pursued in the months ahead. If the Cubans named decades as well as years, the 1960's might have been called the decade of experimentation. The 1970's, in contrast, might be labeled the decade of maturing revolution.

With unbridled and sometimes reckless enthusiasm, the leaders of the revolution believed during the 1960's that nothing was impossible if the proper pitch of revolutionary fervor were maintained. Limiting objective conditions were considered no barrier to success. As a consequence of this, the Cuban national economy was sacrificed in 1970 to an ill-fated campaign to produce 10 million tons of sugar. The record 8.5 million ton harvest of that year was thus transformed from triumph to defeat, politically as well as economically. After 1970, overoptimism and naiveté were replaced by greater realism, which, in turn, has fostered the calm self-assurance of a nation that confidently views itself as moving smoothly through a well-defined process of socialist construction.

THE COMING OF AGE of the Cuban revolution is reflected in all aspects of Cuban society, but nowhere so clearly as in the realm of politics. During the 1960's, Cuban politics featured a kaleidoscope of political forms. Institutions were created, altered, and abolished in seemingly endless parade. All institutions were "provisional," built not so much to provide the political process with an enduring structure as to serve the immediate needs of the revolutionary leadership. When changing circumstances altered the leadership's needs, the leadership altered the polity's institutions.

This pragmatism with regard to political structures was possible because the fundamental requirements of the regime—to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of the people and cohesion within the leadership—were met not through the legal-rational authority of institutions, but through the charismatic authority of Fidel Castro. The Cuban people's confidence in Fidel has been one of the revolution's greatest strengths, and during the 1960's it appeared to be an inexhaustible resource. It eased the transition to socialism by minimizing internal opposition, and it allowed the regime to survive a number of serious policy errors without losing its basic legitimacy. At the same time, Castro's prestige among fellow members of the leadership assured the unity of a highly volatile revolutionary coalition. On several occasions, his role as the ultimate arbiter of intraelite conflict prevented the leadership from fragmenting into warring factions.

Understandably, the leaders of the Cuban revolution—Fidel Castro foremost among them—were unwilling to risk the loss of such political assets by institutionalizing Castro's charismatic authority too quickly. Throughout the 1960's, an often articulated fear existed that institutionalization might freeze the revolutionary process in the "straightjacket" of an inadequate institutional framework. This fear was aggravated by the failures of early efforts to build new political institutions. The government apparatus shaped in the early 1960's grew into a bureaucratic nightmare snarled in red tape; and the new communist party formed in 1961, the Integrated Rev-

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olutionary Organizations (*Organizaciones Revolucionarias Integradas*—ORI), quickly became a nest of privilege seekers and petty tyrants. Instead of systematizing the integration of the revolutionary elite in an institutional framework that would outlast Castro's personal presence, the early institutions so enflamed intraelite antagonisms that only a reassertion of Castro's prestige prevented an explosion. Instead of institutionalizing the mass support enjoyed by Castro personally, they began to dissipate it. Maintenance of a polity based upon Castro's charisma thus proved a superior course to institutionalization in the early 1960's. Only when the costs of a polity without stable, developed institutions became acute did the process of institutionalization resume.

Apart from its failure to resolve the fundamental problem of the regime's ability to survive its maximum leader, Cuba's reliance on provisional institutions also entailed immediate problems of administrative efficiency. The underdeveloped character of Cuban institutions and the absence of clear functional boundaries between them severely limited the government's ability to effectively implement its policies. Furthermore, the absence of institutional channels for introducing popular opinion into policy-making processes led to the formulation of policies that were unrealistic in that they were unable to gain the popular support essential for their success.

These problems became clear in the 1970 campaign to produce 10 million tons of sugar—a goal upon whose attainment Castro had staked both his personal prestige and the prestige of the revolution. Failure to achieve the target was a defeat made even more bitter by the damage done to the rest of the economy for the sake of increasing sugar production. During the harvest, the sugar sector was given absolute priority in resource allocation. The result was massive dislocation in virtually every other economic sector. Beyond the purely economic damage, moreover, production shortfalls meant further austerity for a populace already pushed to the limits of its tolerance. The result was a serious erosion of the regime's popular support.

The leaders of the revolution recognized that the crisis of 1970 was in large measure a result of the system of provisional political institutions that they themselves had created during the previous decade. Consequently, they initiated a "new phase" of the revolution, one in which "institutionalization" and "democratization" became the watchwords for a thorough reorganization of the political system.

Institutionalization involved, in the first instance, a reduction in the polity's dependence on Fidel Castro's personal involvement. The nation's political structures and institutions were strengthened and reorganized to improve their internal operations and to clearly delineate their relationships to one another. This process continued for six years and culminated in the convocation of the First Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba (*Partido Comunista de Cuba*) in 1975 and the ratification of the new socialist constitution in 1976.

Democratization involved creating institutional mechanisms through which public opinion could systematically become a factor in the policy-making process, especially at the local level. Mass organizations were made more responsive to their memberships, workers were afforded greater opportunities for participation in work-center management, and for the first time, elected representative government assemblies were introduced. These assemblies, the Organs of People's Power, were to oversee administration. In theory, the governmental apparatus is subordinate to them, but their real significance is that they constitute the primary institutional mechanism for mass input to policy-making at the local level. Delegates to municipal Organs of People's Power are elected in multi-candidate, secret-ballot elections after candidates are nominated by neighborhood meetings. The delegate's role is to act as a "vehicle of communication" between his constituency and local government. To this end, delegates must meet with their constituents every few months to report on municipal affairs, hear complaints, and solicit proposals to be brought before their respective municipal assemblies. The creation of the Organs of People's Power has thus constituted the most significant expansion of mass participation in Cuban politics during the revolutionary period.

IN HER BOOK *Cuba: dictature ou démocratie?,* Marta Harnecker examines not only the Organs of People's Power, but also a variety of other institutions through which Cuban citizens participate in politics. The volume is a series of narratives describing the proceedings of a People's Court, a local meeting of a Committee for the Defense of the Revolution,[1] a factory production assembly, and several meetings between People's Power delegates and their constituents. The accounts are supplemented by interviews with ordinary citizens

[1]The network of Committees for the Defense of the Revolution is the largest of Cuba's mass organizations, encompassing about 80 percent of the adult population.

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and local officials. While the history, structure, and officially prescribed operation of Cuba's participatory institutions are all available in official documentary sources, to judge whether mass participation is effective one must actually witness it and talk with people involved. This is precisely what Harnecker has done, and this is the principal value of her study. Her judgment, as stated in her introduction, is unequivocal:

In Cuba, there is a people that discusses the laws, approves economic plans, and, with arms in hand, as a people in uniform, defends the conquests of the Revolution.

Unfortunately, Dr. Harnecker's study suffers from the lack of an analytical framework. As a result, the author fails to locate her subject in the wider context of the historical development of revolutionary politics in Cuba. No mention is made of the absence of effective participatory mechanisms in the early years, despite the fact that this failing bore primary responsibility for bringing about the very democratization upon which Harnecker focuses her attention. Thus we get no sense from this book of the difficulties the Cubans have had in building a network of adequate political institutions, and no sense of how greatly Cuban politics have changed since 1970.

Nor does Harnecker discuss the limits of legitimate political participation in Cuba, limits that Pierre Golendorf was unfortunate enough to transgress. Cuban socialist democracy is, simultaneously, proletarian dictatorship. Challenges to basic policies or to the fundamental features of the political system are not tolerated. Once, when asked about the limits of dissent in Cuba, Castro remarked, "Within the revolution, everything; outside the revolution, nothing."[2] Golendorf's book is the memoir of a French leftist who became disillusioned with the Cuba of the late 1960's, ventured "outside" the revolution, and landed in prison.

For her study, Marta Harnecker interviewed ordinary Cuban citizens. Frank Mankiewicz and Kirby Jones, by contrast, interviewed Cuba's foremost citizen and reproduced the interview in *With Fidel.* Though the process of institutionalization described above has reduced the regime's dependence on Fidel Castro, there can be no doubt that he remains the central figure of Cuban politics. An extended interview with Fidel is always of great interest, but *With Fidel* is somewhat disappointing. Mankiewicz and Jones missed the opportunity to ask Castro about his changing role in Cuban politics, about his views on the institutionalization process as a whole, or about his own part in initiating the changes that have occurred since 1970. Instead they concentrated on such topics as the 1962 missile crisis, the history of US-Cuban relations in the 1960's, and the assassination of US President John F. Kennedy. Not surprisingly, they came up with little that Fidel had not already said elsewhere. The image of Fidel that emerges from the book is a familiar one—namely, that of a tremendously personable, intelligent, and articulate man with encyclopedic knowledge that runs the gamut from the intricacies of New York State politics to the state of the world's energy resources. But it is a similar portrait to that drawn more effectively a decade ago by Lee Lockwood,[3] and Lockwood provided us with a sense of Cuban reality in the 1960's which, unfortunately, Mankiewicz and Jones do not provide for Cuba today.

OF ALL THE BOOKS under consideration here, only the late Herbert Matthews' *Revolution in Cuba* gives sufficient emphasis to the transformations the Cuban revolution has undergone in the 1970's. When Matthews traveled to the Sierra Maestra in 1957 to conduct his famous interview with guerrilla leader Castro, he established a personal relationship with the *commandante* that gave him unrivaled access to the highest echelons of the revolution's leadership after 1959. *Revolution in Cuba* includes a great deal of material garnered from conversations with Castro, Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, and others in 1972, when Matthews made his last trip to Cuba. But this book is by no means a mere reporting of personal experiences or encounters; it is a masterful chronicle of the revolution's history, based upon prodigious research. The period since 1970 is covered in greatest detail, and Matthews' portrait of Cuba successfully captures the diversity of the revolutionary process as it affects everything from economic policy to religious freedom.

In his introduction, Matthews writes, "Important changes in the political, economic, and social structure of Cuba are taking place all the time." While *Revolution in Cuba* is the most up-to-date book-length treatment of the revolution, much has happened since its publication in 1975. It is especially unfortunate that its appearance predated the First Congress of the Cuban Communist Party and the introduction of Organs of People's Power, for we are thereby deprived of Matthews' insight into these crucially important political events.

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[2]Fidel Castro, "Address to the Intellectuals, June 30, 1961," as cited in K. S. Karol, *Guerillas in Power*, New York, NY, Hill and Wang, 1970, p. 241.

[3]Lee Lockwood, *Castro's Cuba, Cuba's Fidel,* New York, NY, Macmillan, 1967.

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TEN YEARS AGO, the Cuban revolution was hurtling full tilt toward the economic disaster and political crisis of 1970. Neither the Communist Party nor the government administration had the organizational capacity to effectively govern the nation. At that time, the revolutionary leadership turned, perforce, to the military, which essentially ran the national economy in 1969 and 1970. In the eight years since the failure of the 10-million-ton harvest campaign, the revolution's leaders have given top priority to creating an enduring political structure for Cuba. The "provisional" institutions of the 1960's have been replaced by an increasingly developed institutional framework that is slowly but surely routinizing Fidel Castro's charismatic authority. While the process of institutionalization is not yet complete and cannot be judged definitively until it withstands the trauma of a post-Castro succession, the Cuban revolution seems to be approaching its third decade with greater strength and brighter prospects than those with which it began its second.

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Nationalism and Socialism in Algeria

By Marina Ottaway

JEAN LECA and JEAN-CLAUDE VATIN. *L'Algérie Politique. Institutions et Régime* (Political Algeria. Institutions and Regime). Paris, Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1975.

MARNIA LAZREG. *The Emergence of Classes in Algeria*. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1976.

ANIA FRANCOS and J.P. SÉRÉNI. *Un Algérien Nommé Boumediene* (An Algerian Named Boumediene). Paris, Éditions Stock, 1976.

EMMANUEL SIVAN. *Communisme et Nationalisme en Algérie, 1920-1962* (Communism and Nationalism in Algeria, 1920-1962). Paris, Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1976.

THE INDEPENDENCE of Algeria in July 1962 was promptly followed by the proclamation of socialism and the launching of a "socialist revolution" in that country. The "revolution" was, in fact, an attempt to institute socialism by peaceful means and with a minimum of social strife. Since then, the Algerian course of development—embarkation on a "socialist revolution" in the wake of a war of national liberation—has become a familiar pattern on the African continent, particularly with the liberation of the Portuguese colonies in the mid-1970's.

The countries that experienced wars of liberation are, of course, not the only ones on the African continent that consider themselves socialist. From Senegal's "tropicalized socialism" to Tanzania's "*ujamaa*," the continent presents a wide variety of "socialist" forms. However, the countries that have come to socialism in the aftermath of a war of national liberation have appeared to be the most radical. Algeria in the early 1960's, Angola and especially Mozambique in the late 1970's have been looked at by radicals as the sites of the "real" socialist revolutions on the African continent. Armed with Marxist ideology and toughened by years of guerrilla struggle against the colonial powers, these countries seemed to hold out a promise of the emergence of scientific, Marxist-Leninist socialism in Africa.

While some of these states—in particular, Mozambique—have still not lost their luster as socialist meccas, Algeria has long since disillusioned its radical admirers. The coup d'état of June 1965, which deposed President Ahmed Ben Bella and brought Colonel Houari Boumediene to power, was a turning point. The policies followed by the new government proved amply that, while a military regime is not inherently reactionary, Algeria was not about to become the first Marxist-Leninist state in Africa. In its foreign policy, the country remained radical, but nationalism far more than socialism determined its often tough position vis-à-vis Western countries. Internally, the state continued to be the leading investor, allowing private enterprise to play only a subordinate role; however, the political institutions of the country never developed in a classic socialist direction. Despite constant propaganda and periodic reorganization campaigns, none of the mass organizations were strengthened and consolidated. In particular, the National Liberation Front (FLN), which had guided the nation to independence, never got transformed into a vanguard party leading the country to socialism.

All the four books under consideration here contribute, although in different ways, to understanding why Algeria in the end did not become the Marxist socialist state Ben Bella proclaimed after 1962. However, they are very different in character and approach, and very unequal in value.

Leca and Vatin's *L'Algérie Politique: Institutions et Régime* is a scholarly and well-documented, if somewhat ponderous and verbose, study. Based on a very detailed examination of legal and political documents, it concludes that Algeria can best be defined as an "administrative state" characterized by a chronic weakness of party and mass organizations and

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the exercise of a preponderant role by the state.

Lazreg's *The Emergence of Classes in Algeria* follows a frankly Marxist approach in trying to show how the legacy of French colonialism, plus certain political and economic choices made after independence, contributed to the emergence of a postcolonial class structure that defeated attempts at socialist transformation. The book, despite its author's tendency to get lost in heavy Marxist jargon and overly theoretical hairsplitting (the fact that it is based on a doctoral dissertation does not help in this regard), is the most interesting of the four. While trying to prove that Algeria is not a socialist country and that it is not being slowly transformed into one, it goes beyond the usual radical deprecations of the failure of socialism in Algeria and examines the structural reasons for this. The questions raised by the book are important in relation not only to Algeria but also to other countries involved in the attempt to move from a nationalist to a socialist revolution.

Francos and Séréni's *Un Algérien Nommé Boumediene* is a superficial and highly biased book which rewrites the history of the war and of the first 15 years of independence by taking Boumediene as the focal point. As history, the book is worthless because the disproportionate focus on Boumediene distorts events. Moreover, the authors fail to consider whether there might have been other reasons behind the 1965 coup d'état than Boumediene's dislike for the inefficiency and superficiality he imputed to Ben Bella. However, the book does provide some insight into the thinking of Colonel Boumediene, particularly his radical nationalism and his mistrust of Marxist socialism.

Finally, Sivan's *Communisme et Nationalisme en Algérie, 1920-1962* provides valuable background to the development of Algerian socialism, showing how, in the preindependence period, class struggle and national liberation were mutually exclusive choices, and how Algerians thus had to turn their backs on the local communist party in order to fight for independence. This helps explain why the National Liberation Front lacked a socialist orientation virtually up to 1962, and why many of its members remained rather ambiguous on the issue of socialism even when this doctrine became the party's official ideology after independence.

TOGETHER, these four books offer an interesting analysis of the overall characteristics of Algerian society. Moreover, they suggest some tentative conclusions about the prospects for a transition from wars of national liberation to socialism in Africa.

The first and most fundamental issue about the fate of Algerian socialism is how it relates to the characteristics of the society. This is the issue Lazreg addresses, and beneath the jargon her assertions are well documented. She argues that the failure of Algerian socialism stems from the prior impact of colonialism on the country's class structure. Algeria under the French had developed a typically colonial class structure, where the national bourgeoisie was economically and politically powerless and thus shared with other classes an overriding hostility toward the French. Nationalism muted class conflict. The result was that no single social class was ready to seize power upon the achievement of independence. The weak national bourgeoisie, represented by the provisional government (GPRA), failed to gain power in the struggle of the summer of 1962, leaving the road open to an amorphous "petty bourgeois" leadership divided between a radical socialist wing centered around Ben Bella and a nationalist one that would later coalesce around Boumediene. Basically, it was a clique rather than a class that seized power. This clique proclaimed socialism, but socialism had no foundations in the country's still amorphous social structure.

Independence initiated a process of crystallization of social classes, since conflicts of interests were no longer hidden by the common nationalist cause. In this process of class formation, according to Lazreg, it was the government that structured the society rather than the society that shaped the government, reversing the relationship between the two that Marxist theory leads one to expect.

In such a situation, government policies became all-important. These policies were determined not by the concrete interests of some groups—classes were still too fluid—but by the beliefs of the leaders and by expediency. The Ben Bella regime basically adhered to a utopian and romantic notion of socialism, although it called itself Marxist and although there were Marxists in Ben Bella's entourage. Sivan's study, as we have already mentioned, provides an explanation of why Marxism was so poorly implanted in Algeria, despite the presence there of a communist party since the 1920's. From its early years, when it was characterized by "a mixture of Leninism and racism" (p. 36), to 1962, when communist *pieds noirs*[1] joined the right-wing ter-

[1] *Pieds noirs* is a term used to describe persons of French ancestry born in Algeria.

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rorist *Organisation de l'Armée* Secrète in a last-ditch attempt to keep Algeria from becoming independent, the Algerian Communist Party could never reconcile itself to Algerian nationalism and completely failed to define what Marxism meant in a colonial or post-colonial situation. As a result, not even the Marxists in Ben Bella's entourage had a clear strategy for building socialism after independence. The fact that the radical faction was not firmly in control further impeded the development of a coherent socialist policy. As a consequence, Algeria stumbled into a vague sort of workers' self-management in the wake of the exodus of the French managers but failed to transform it into an overall policy.

The coup d'état of June 19, 1965, which brought to power a more moderate leadership under Colonel Boumediene, put an end to the brief period in which Marxist socialism had a foothold in Algeria. Algeria under Boumediene continued to call itself socialist, but not Marxist. What socialism basically meant was state control over the economy, with a heavy emphasis on industrialization. Workers' self-management was de facto abandoned in favor of management by technocrats. While ideology was not the only cause of this (the self-managed sector had been encountering great difficulties and a majority of enterprises were running in the red), it played a role. Algeria remained a radical country, but its radicalism was expressed in a nationalist foreign policy rather than a socialist domestic one—in conflictual relations with France and assumption of a radical posture in the North-South dialogue, rather than in confrontation between workers and managers and the building of socialist institutions at home. Internally, concern with efficiency and profitability, rather than with worker participation and democracy, governed the policies of the country. This preoccupation with economic growth and profitability is what made socialism impossible, according to Lazreg's analysis. The economic policies of the Boumediene regime consolidated a class, which she calls a "dominant class," composed of state administrators and managers, new small entrepreneurs, and landowners. The consolidation of this class, according to Lazreg, means not only that Algeria is not socialist now, but that it is not even moving toward socialism.

This analysis of the dynamics of class and power in Algeria is basically accurate, although of course the conclusion that the country is not socialist is debatable, depending on how one chooses to define socialism.

PROFESSOR LAZREG's findings are of relevance not only to Algeria, for the situation she discusses is common to all countries trying to move from nationalism to Marxist socialism immediately after independence. In all these countries, socialism is initially a sort of free-floating system, an ideal without a basis in the society. As long as the social structure of the country is fluid, the situation cannot be different. In Algeria, this free-floating socialism spawned the "administrative state" described so painstakingly by Leca and Vatin. This administrative state has a good bureaucratic apparatus, but it is characterized by the chronic weakness of all the institutions—the party and the other mass organizations—linking state and society.

Algeria demonstrates that for any African country—e.g., Mozambique—attempting the transition from a war of national liberation to socialism, success or failure will depend on the process of class formation which takes place under the influence of government policies. This process of class formation determines whether a free-floating socialist regime will eventually have a basis in the society or will destroy all possibilities of socialism by strengthening those classes that are hostile to it. Colonialism and the national liberation struggle have destroyed the social conditions that would allow a socialist government to become solidly implanted at independence, since they have masked over class conflict with the drive for national solidarity. Only time will show whether any African "socialist" regime will succeed in shaping its society in such a way as to make the proclamation of socialism anything more than a declaration of intentions.

CORRECTION

The photo of a Bulgarian harvest on page 61 of the March-April 1978 issue of *Problems of Communism* was serviced by Wide World, not Eastfoto.

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